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Abstract 
Recent work within relevance theory suggests that the distinction between truth- 
conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning is of limited value in the study of 
linguistic (as opposed to logical) semantics. Of potentially greater interest is the 
distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding. Conceptual encoding 
contributes to the construction of conceptual representations in the mind of the 
addressee, whilst procedural encoding provides the addressee with instructions as to 
how conceptual representations are to be manipulated to achieve relevance. 
The primary aims of this thesis are, firstly to clarify the currently intuitive distinction 
between conceptual and procedural encoding by providing a precise characterisation 
of procedural information and a set of criteria by which linguistically encoded 
information can be identified as either conceptual or procedural, and secondly to 
determine some of the implications of the distinction for linguistic semantics. 
I propose that procedural encoding is of two basic kinds: that which constrains the 
manipulation of propositional conceptual representations, and that which constrains 
the manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual representations. An example of the 
former is the discourse connective so, which establishes an inferential connection 
between the proposition with which it is associated and some highly accessible 
assumption. This type of procedural encoding has been widely discussed (see for 
example Blakemore 1987,1988). 
Less widely discussed is procedural encoding which constrains the manipulation of 
sub-propositional conceptual representations. I propose that such encoding is a 
property of grammaticized expressions, such as pronouns, and tense, aspect and 
modality markers. 1 demonstrate how a procedural account of grammatical markers 
accounts not only for their role in utterance interpretation (constraining the 
construction of propositional conceptual representations) but also for their historical 
development through grammaticization, and the corresponding variation in usage 
which linguistic change engenders. 
I illustrate my thesis through analysis of constructions in English (notably will, shall 
and be going to) and Kiswahili. 
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0 INTRODUCTION 
0_1 Aims of the thesis 
This thesis explores the relevance theoretic distinction between conceptual and 
procedural encoding, with the aim of explicating and testing this potentially important 
distinction. The central distinction underlying theories of meaning until recently has 
been the distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning; 
however this has failed to account for a range of linguistic phenomena (some of 
which are discussed in this thesis) and new approaches are being explored. It has been 
suggested (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 259) that the distinction between conceptual and 
procedural encoding may prove to be of greater importance for linguistic semantics 
than the traditional distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional 
meaning. 
This suggestion reflects the widely accepted view that cognitive science provides a 
better framework for the study of utterance interpretation than logic does. Whilst the 
distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning is a logical 
distinction, the conceptual/procedural distinction is based in general principles of 
cognitive science. All current cognitive theories recognise the following two facts: 
first, that information processing involves a certain amount of effort on the part of the 
processor; and secondly, that an increase in computational effort reduces the chances 
of an information processing task being completed successfully. Now, human beings 
are rational information processors; rationality, in this context, involves not only the 
ability to derive valid conclusions from premises but also "the ability to allocate one's 
cognitive resources efficiently. " (Sperber et al 1995: 44) As a result, most cognitive 
theories (including Sperber & Wilson's (1986,1995) relevance theory, Johnson- 
Laird's (1983) mental models theory, and Fodor's (1983) modularity hypothesis) 
assume that information processing by humans is driven, on the one hand by the need 
to achieve successful outcomes, and on the other by the need to do so as efficiently as 
possible. ' 
Utterance interpretation is a form of information processing in which the information 
to be processed is both ostensively communicated (that is, it is intentional and 
conveys an expectation that it will be worth processing) and linguistically encoded. 
Given that utterances are produced and interpreted by rational information processors, 
and that it is in the interests of both speakers and addressees that utterance 
interpretation should be successful, we would expect utterances to be structured in 
1 Principles of least effort are invoked in other cognitively influenced theories, such as the Minimalist 
Programme in syntax (Chomsky 1991,1993,1995). 
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such a way as to reduce to a minimum the processing effort required. This is the basis 
of the conceptual/procedural distinction in relevance theory. 
Blakemore (1987,1988a) posited a distinction between two types of linguistically 
encoded information: conceptual, which contributes to propositions, viewed in 
relevance theory as conceptual representations; and procedural, which constrains the 
inferential processing of propositions, viewed as psychological computations 
performed over conceptual representations. In constraining the inferential processing 
of propositions, procedural information reduces the computational effort required of 
the addressee, thereby aiding the utterance interpretation process. As exponents of 
procedural encoding, Blakemore discussed non-truth-conditional discourse 
connectives such as so and after all. 
It is also recognised in relevance theory that inference is involved not only in the 
processing of propositions during utterance interpretation, but also in the 
identification of those propositions. Wilson & Sperber (1981) demonstrated that 
propositions are not identified simply through linguistic decoding, but that inferential 
processing is crucial to disambiguation, resolution of vagueness, reference 
assignment, and the determination of ellipsed material, all of which help determine 
truth-conditions, and hence contribute to the proposition expressed. Wilson & Sperber 
(1993a) then suggested that procedural encoding might also constrain these truth- 
conditional inferential processes, and proposed that personal pronouns function in this 
way. In this thesis, I maintain a clear distinction between inferential processes which 
result in the construction of propositional conceptual representations, and inferential 
processes which take such representations as their input. 
The main aim of this thesis is to determine what kinds of linguistic expressions 
encode procedural information constraining the construction of propositional 
conceptual representations, and to specify how they function. To this end, I shall 
discuss pronouns and grammatical markers of tense, aspect and modality. I shall 
conclude by demonstrating how a characterisation of grammatical markers as 
exponents of procedural encoding accounts for certain aspects of grammaticization 
and linguistic variation. 
Since the arguments presented in this thesis are grounded in a general cognitive 
framework, they should be applicable cross-linguistically (assuming that the cognitive 
abilities of speakers of all languages are essentially the same). For this reason, I shall 
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make reference at various points in the thesis to Kiswahili, a Bantu language spoken 
widely in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and eastern Zaire. 2 
To conclude this introduction, I shall provide a justification for working within the 
framework of relevance theory (§0.2) and an overview of the thesis as a whole 00.3). 
02 Why relevance theory? 
In this section I shall briefly address arguments in defence of the choice of relevance 
theory as the theoretical basis (and to some extent the object) of this thesis. I cannot 
hope to provide an exhaustive justification of relevance theory, merely arguments in 
support of the reasonableness of adopting this framework as opposed to certain others 
(as did Blakemore (1987) and Blass (1990) with respect to relevance theory and 
alternative theories such as Halliday & Hasan's (1976) Cohesion theory). I shall first 
indicate why the 'standard' Montague/Grice approach was not adopted, and then why 
relevance theory was selected in preference to other alternative pragmatico-semantic 
theories. 
Traditional truth-conditional, model-theoretic semantics treats the content of 
linguistic expressions as functions from indices (possible-world/time pairs) to 
extensions. The semantic interpretation of a sentence is assumed to be directly truth- 
conditional relative to a given index, i. e. to a context. All aspects of interpretation 
which are not subject to a truth-theoretical analysis can be treated pragmatically, i. e. 
pragmatics = meaning - truth conditions (Gazdar 1979: 2). Grice's Co-operative 
Principle and maxims and some version of speech act theory have traditionally been 
employed to deal with non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning. 
Various arguments have been levelled against traditional Montague semantics3 but I 
shall address just two of its basic assumptions. In stating that a sentence can be 
directly truth-conditionally determined relative to a given context, it is assumed a) 
2 Although Kiswahili (or Swahili) has been influenced by English, for example in the use of relative 
clause constructions by bilingual Kiswahili-English authors (Russell and Rajabu 1995), such influence 
is minimal. 
3 For example, Jardine (1975) is an early critique noting that it is easier to translate a formal language 
into natural language, say by introducing rules which selectively replace names and definite 
descriptions with appropriate pronouns, than it is to translate natural language into a formal language 
by assigning appropriate references to pronouns using contextual information (Jardine 1975: 229); Le 
Pore (1983), Higginbotham (1988), Etchemendy (1988) and Bickhard & Campbell (1992) provide 
theoretical critiques of model theory, as does Kempson (1988b) with respect to truth-theoretical 
semantics. Hirst (1987: 32) offers a practical criticism in the strong claim that "truth-conditional 
semantics is not useful in Al. " Such criticisms also impinge on GPSG, a non-standard (non-GB) 
syntactic theory explicitly linked to Montague semantics (Gazdar er a! 1985). 
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that contexts are given, and b) that sentences can be directly truth-conditionally 
determined. Both of these assumptions are without foundation. Throughout chapter 1 
(and in particular in §1.1,1.3 and 1.4) 1 shall argue that utterance interpretation 
contexts are psychological entities which are created rather than given, and which are 
dependent on the linguistic content of the utterance in question rather than being 
predetermined. In fact, the notion of procedural information which informs this study 
originated with the idea that there might be linguistically encoded information the 
sole purpose of which is to contribute to the psychological process of context 
formation. The assumption that sentences can be directly truth-conditionally 
determined is also false. Relevance theory claims that sentences constitute the input to 
a modular process of decoding which gives rise not to truth-functional propositions 
but to logical forms (representations in the language of thought - see §1.3.1). This is 
argued for in §1.2 and 1.3. The utterance interpretation process is triggered by 
linguistic input, giving rise to a logical form; the addressee then constructs an 
utterance interpretation context and develops the logical form into a propositional 
form (which can then be truth-theoretically interpreted) by a process of inferential 
enrichment (described in § 1.3.2). If the decoding process has to be combined with 
inferential processes to yield propositions, then languages - that is, grammatical 
systems - underdetermine propositions and cannot be directly truth-theoretically 
determined. One of the aims of chapter 1 is to argue for and elaborate on this view. 
The flip side of the above arguments is that the traditional view of pragmatics as 
exclusively non-truth-theoretical is no longer tenable. In § 1.3.3 it will be shown that 
the distinction between semantics as that which is encoded and pragmatics as that 
which is inferred cuts across the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction. 
Having presented just a few arguments against adopting a 'traditional' approach, I 
shall briefly discuss why it is reasonable to adopt relevance theory rather than any of 
the other alternative pragmatico-semantic theories currently on offer, in particular 
Situation Semantics (Barwise & Perry 1983) and Discourse Representation Theory 
(DRT) (Kamp 1981, Kamp & Reyle 1993). Firstly, it is still too early to be able to 
state that any one of these theories is superior to the others in terms of internal logical 
coherence, empirical corroboration, extensibility and simplicity. Moreover, 
competition between rival theories is healthy, or as Lakatos (1978: 69) puts it, 
"'Theoretical pluralism' is better than 'theoretical monism'. " This said, the choice of 
relevance theory over Situation Semantics and DRT is motivated in part by the 
following considerations. In Situation Semantics sentences denote language- 
independent 'situation types' rather than truth-values, and utterance interpretation 
involves the recognition of the relation between the situation described (by a 
10 
sentence) and the situation in which it is uttered. Situation Semantics recognises the 
underdeterminacy of linguistic content (what it calls the 'efficiency of language') - 
hence sentences do not denote truth values - but, in its current form, rejects the idea of 
mental representations. Meaning in Situation Semantics is the recognition of a 
relation between situation types rather than the construction of a mental 
representation. §1.2 provides arguments (not exhaustive, of course) for Fodor's 
modularity hypothesis which underlies relevance theory and which presupposes the 
existence of mental representations (as does Chomsky's theory of UG). 
DRT attempts to provide a formal representation of the utterance interpretation 
process which takes into account the dynamic nature of context formation (as 
recognised within the tradition of 'update semantics', e. g. Heim's (1983) File Change 
Semantics). In line with Grice's (1989: 25) assumption that the only context-dependent 
processes which contribute to the interpretation of what is explicitly (as opposed to 
implicitly) communicated are disambiguation and reference assignment, work within 
DRT has focused on quantification (since resolution of quantifier vagueness is a 
prerequisite to the construction of a Discourse Representation Structure) and nominal 
anaphora (and to a lesser extent temporal anaphora, e. g. Partee (1984)). However, 
DRT fails to provide a model of context formation which takes account of its 
essentially psychological nature (for example the ability to draw on encyclopaedic 
knowledge in the interpretation of bridging reference). DRT (as given in Kamp & 
Reyle (1993)) updates the interpretation context (represented by a Discourse 
Representation Structure) of a text purely on"the basis of previous discourse, and does 
this incrementally, i. e. each new sentence is incorporated into the principle (most 
recent) DRS to form a new DRS. There are two drawbacks to this procedure: First, 
DRT has problems coping with multiple-sentence discourses, since anaphoric 
reference need not be to the most recent DRS; what DRT lacks is a mechanism or 
heuristic by which the most appropriate DRS for anaphora resolution can be selected. 
Second, the initial context (or 'starting DRS') is empty and the formation of each 
subsequent DRS results purely from the incorporation of the following sentence into 
the prior DRS. According to Kamp & Reyle (1993: 85) "nothing of importance is lost" 
if the initial context is assumed to be empty, and for the purposes of DRT this may 
well be true, since DRT is an attempt to model, in an idealised fashion, the 
capabilities of natural language and to imitate this process. Relevance theory, on the 
other hand, attempts to explain how everyday human communication is possible and 
therefore such idealisation is inappropriate. In addition, DRT does not attempt to 
represent the process of inferential enrichment of semantically underdetermined 
expressions (discussed in § 1.3.2), which is an integral aspect of the interpretation of 
explicit communication and is also context-dependent. 
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03 Overview 
In discussing procedural encoding, a distinction will be made between procedural 
encoding which constrains the construction of propositional conceptual 
representations, and procedural encoding which constrains the processing of such 
conceptual representations once recovered. This distinction is couched in a model of 
the utterance interpretation process in which three distinct phases are recognised: a 
linguistic decoding phase, an inferential phase which results in propositional 
conceptual representations, and a further inferential phase which computes the 
relevance of these. In chapter 1I shall introduce this three-phase model of utterance 
interpretation and discuss the importance of inferential processing and the notion of 
relevance. 
In chapter 2 the conceptual/procedural distinction will be introduced within the 
context supplied in chapter 1. I shall discuss the theoretical basis of the distinction 
and provide an analysis of various exponents of procedural encoding which constrain 
the processing of propositional conceptual representations. In chapter 3I shall extend 
the analysis to incorporate procedural encoding which constrains the construction of 
propositional conceptual representations, discussing pronouns, and tense and aspect 
markers. In chapter 4, the principles underlying the analysis of tense and aspect will 
be applied to a more detailed account of the English modal auxiliaries can, may, must 
and should, drawing on previous relevance theoretic accounts. 
A truly comprehensive analysis of grammatical markers must take account of 
variations in distribution and interpretation, and should also be compatible with a 
model of grammaticization - the process whereby grammatical markers develop out 
of lexical expressions. In chapter 51 shall relate grammaticization to the extended 
analysis of the conceptual/procedural distinction provided in the previous chapters. It 
will be shown how the conceptual/procedural distinction is compatible with research 
into grammaticization, and how it allows for monosemous synchronic accounts of 
grammatical markers capable of accommodating linguistic change and variation. In 
chapter 6 such accounts will be provided for the grammatical markers will, shall and 
be going to. 
Chapter 7 summarises the main conclusions drawn in* the thesis, and their 
implications. 
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1 RELEVANCE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the current chapter is to introduce the central tenets of relevance theory 
and to lay the foundation for the conceptual/procedural distinction to be introduced in 
chapter 2. I shall do this within the framework provided by the three-phase model of 
utterance interpretation to be introduced in §1.1. This model makes a distinction 
between coded and inferential communication which is motivated by the modularity 
hypothesis (Fodor 1983). In §1.2 1 shall outline the main features of the modularity 
hypothesis and review some of the experimental psycholinguistic evidence pertaining 
to it. 
§1.3 and U. 4 deal with inferential communication. In §1.3 I shall discuss the 
relevance theoretic account of the role of inference in the identification of 
propositions, and compare this with the traditional Gricean approach. In §1.4 I shall 
discuss the role of inference once a proposition has been recovered, and introduce the 
notion of relevance. It is these inferential -phases of utterance interpretation which are 
constrained by procedural information; I shall therefore begin by emphasising the 
centrality of inferential (as opposed to coded) communication within relevance 
theory. 
J ,j Inferential Communication 
1.1.0 Introduction 
Although both conceptual and procedural information types can be linguistically 
encoded, the conceptual/procedural distinction itself functions during inferential 
rather than coded communication. The significance of the conceptual/procedural 
distinction in linguistic semantics is therefore proportionate to the relative importance 
of inferential communication in the utterance interpretation process; in § 1.1.11 shall 
summarise the arguments underlying the relevance theoretic claim that inferential 
communication takes precedence over coded communication, a claim addressed in 
further detail in §1.3. In §1.1.2 I shall introduce a three-phase model of utterance 
interpretation in which one coded and two inferential phases are distinguished. This 
three-phase model of the utterance interpretation process informs not only the current 
chapter, but the thesis as a whole. 
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1.1.1 The primacy of inferential over coded communication 
Meaning can be characterised either extensionally, as a relation between an external 
sign and an objective referent in the world, or intentionally, as a relation between a 
sign and a representation in the mind. The former characterisation is associated with 
the semiotic approach, and following Saussure has been the dominant paradigm 
within linguistics. Relevance theory, on the other hand, adopts the latter approach 
which dominates in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. 
The radically cognitive nature of relevance theory is evident from Sperber & Wilson's 
characterisation of contexts as psychological constructs, being subsets of hearers' 
assumptions about the world (S&W 1986: 15). Since psychological constructs are 
internal to individuals and not directly amenable to observation by others, contexts as 
defined by Sperber & Wilson are uniquely determined for each participant in a 
conversation. Therefore, it is impossible to talk of the (unique) context of an 
utterance (or of the (unique) interpretation of an utterance), rather, each context is 
determined relative to an individual and is accessible to that individual alone. This 
entails that mutual knowledge can play no role in communication. Mutual knowledge 
is psychologically unfeasible, since, by definition, people who share mutual 
knowledge must know for certain that they share this knowledge; given what has been 
said about contexts above, such certainty is an ideal rather than a psychological 
reality, (cf. Smith 1982 for further discussion of mutual knowledge). Since 
communication is a psychological process, mutual knowledge can play no part in it, 
hence the definition of a psychological construct as a subset of assumptions rather 
than of knowledge. 
The rejection of mutual knowledge as a basis for utterance interpretation leads 
Sperber & Wilson (S&W 1986: 18) to reject the traditional (Saussurian) code model 
of communication; if inference has no role to play in verbal communication, that is, if 
a coding-decoding process alone is sufficient, then communication is only possible 
where every coded element has a single, unambiguous referent. Such a situation could 
only occur within a strictly determined, wholly shared context for which mutual 
knowledge is a necessity. This argument is developed in line with proposals made by 
Grice, whose most original contribution to the study of communication, according to 
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 25), was to suggest that communication is possible even in 
the absence of a code. It has been claimed (e. g. Stevenson (1993: 136), Vallduvi 
(1993: 32)) that relevance theory is basically a modification of Grice's proposals; 
there is a sense in which this is the case, but relevance theory is more than simply a 
reduction of the Co-operative Principle and maxims to the single maxim of relation, 
recast as the principle of relevance (see § 1.4.2). The existence and use of determinate 
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linguistic signs in communication is not denied in relevance theoretic work - on the 
contrary, the accurate characterisation of such signs and the ways in which they are 
used in communication is a central concern of this thesis. Nonetheless, in relevance 
theory, the coding-decoding process is seen as subservient to the inferential process of 
the Gricean model, according to which communication involves the production and 
interpretation of evidence (S&W 1986: 27). This subservience of the coded system to 
inference is fundamental to relevance theory. 
Having rejected mutual knowledge as a basis from which inferences can be drawn, 
Sperber & Wilson introduce the weaker notion of mutual manifestness (1986: 39-45). 
Any assumption constructed by an individual is 'manifest' if it can be accepted as 
being true or probably true by her; it is therefore possible for there to be degrees of 
manifestness, and for an assumption to be both manifest and false. Mutual 
manifestness need not, therefore, involve certainty, and so is psychologically feasible. 
A set of manifest assumptions constitutes an individual's cognitive environment. To 
illustrate these notions Sperber & Wilson give the following example: 
"Suppose Peter and Mary are looking at a landscape where she has 
noticed a distant church. She says to him, 
(49) I've been inside that church. 
She does not stop to ask herself whether he has noticed the building, 
and whether he assumes she has noticed, and assumes she has noticed 
he has noticed, and so on, or whether he has assumed it is a church, 
and assumes she assumes it is, and so on. All she needs is reasonable 
confidence that he will be able to identify the building as a church 
when required to: in other words, that a certain assumption will be 
manifest in his cognitive environment at the right time. " 
(S&W 1986: 43-44) 
With mutual manifestness rather than mutual knowledge as a basis, communication 
must be assumed to be governed by a less than perfect heuristic rather than a fail-safe 
mechanism. Occasional failures in communication are therefore to be expected; what 
requires explanation is the fact that communication is so often successful. The notion 
of relevance is proposed as an explanation of this fact: successful communication 
makes manifest the speaker's informative intention, "to make manifest or more 
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions (I). " (S&W 1986: 58). Before 
addressing relevance itself, I shall propose a model of the utterance interpretation 
process within which the notion of relevance will be situated; I shall then discuss the 
roles of coded and inferential communication within this model. 
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1.1.2 Three phases of utterance interpretation 
Broadly speaking, utterance interpretation is viewed in relevance theory as a two-tier 
system consisting of decoding and inference. In this thesis I shall recognise inference 
as having two distinct functions: the identification of the proposition expressed and 
the identification of intended contextual effects. Thus, utterance interpretation as a 
whole can be viewed as a three-phase process; for convenience I shall speak of phase 
one, phase two and phase three of utterance interpretation, as follows: 
Phase One 
A linguistically encoded utterance is decoded to give an abstract semantic 
representation, or (possibly incomplete) logical form .4 
Phase Two 
The logical form is inferentially, or contextually enriched resulting in the 
identification of a propositional forms A propositional form is a conceptual 
representation which may be propositional, corresponding to a fully understood 
idea; or, a propositional form may be what Sperber (1985: 51) calls a `semi- 
propositional representation', which fails to identify a unique proposition, and 
corresponds to a half-understood idea. 
Phase Three 
The conceptual representation is combined with other conceptual representations 
(prior assumptions, background knowledge, etc. ) in order to achieve contextual 
effects. 
Although this three-phase model is not explicitly employed in other relevance 
theoretic work, it is implicit in the theory as it derives, as will be seen, from basic 
relevance theoretic assumptions about the utterance interpretation process. Figure 1 
(below) provides a preliminary sketch of the model of utterance interpretation to be 
developed: 
4 See §1.3.1 below for a discussion of logical form. 
SA propositional form has an associated propositional attitude (expressing, for example, illocutionary 
force) which aids in the recovery of contextual effects; for example, (la) and (lb) have different 
propositional attitudes but the same propositional form, for example that in (2): 
(I) a Mary: You shouldn't. 
b Peter: Shouldn't I? 
(2) Peter shouldn't smoke when Mary is present. (Wilson & Sperber 1988: 134) 
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Figure 1: The three phase model of utterance interpretation 
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What figure 1 fails to indicate, is that the three phases are neither wholly autonomous 
nor wholly sequential. For example, inferential processes can inhibit the first phase of 
interpretation (construction of a logical form), and can do so at the level of individual 
words as well as of larger units of discourse (see § 1.3.1 below), and the search for 
adequate contextual effects can play a decisive role in the identification of a 
propositional form, say, by contributing to the determination of reference assignment 
by pronouns (discussed in §3.1). This is ultimately a result of the fact that utterance 
interpretation is relevance-driven; every act of ostensive communication is assumed 
to be optimally relevant, a notion which will be addressed in § 1.4. This said, in the 
subsequent discussion of procedural encoding (that is, linguistically encoded 
expressions which constrain inferential processes) it will be necessary to distinguish 
between expressions which constrain phase three of utterance interpretation (the 
identification of the intended contextual effects of an utterance) and expressions 
which constrain phase two of utterance interpretation (the identification of a 
propositional form). For this reason I shall maintain a three-way rather than the more 
general two-way distinction (between decoding and inference); the three phases of 
utterance interpretation will be discussed in turn. 
Phase One: Decoding 
1.2.0 Introduction 
I cannot hope to provide a comprehensive account of linguistic decoding in the short 
space available here; my intention is simply to summarise the relevance theoretic 
position, such as it is, on the role of linguistic coding in utterance interpretation and 
its interaction with the inferential processes which the theory and this study are 
primarily concerned to explain. This entails addressing Fodor's (1983) modularity 
hypothesis, as this provides the justification for recognising what I have termed phase 
one of utterance interpretation as distinct from the inferential phases. The modularity 
hypothesis will be introduced in § 1.2.1, and the extent to which decoding determines 
the identification of logical form will be discussed in § 1.2.2. I shall then (§1.2.3) 
assess the modularity preserving model of syntactic parsing which most closely 
corresponds to my findings thus far (the parallel weakly interactive model) before 
summarising and discussing the findings (§1.2.4). 
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1.2.1 The modularity hypothesis 
The fundamental characteristic of the first phase of utterance interpretation (and 
production), is that it is modular. Following Fodor (1983)6, Sperber & Wilson 
(1986: 71) assume that the mind consists of, on the one hand, input systems, which 
process various kinds of perceptual information (visual, auditory, etc. ), and on the 
other hand, the central systems, which integrate information from the various input 
systems and from memory, and perform inferential tasks. The input systems are 
modules, which exhibit the following main characteristics: 
1. Input systems are mandatory - the operation of each one is automatic. 
2. They are fast - in `close shadowing' experiments, where subjects have to repeat 
utterances as they hear them, the time lag between hearing and producing speech is 
typically less than 250ms. 
3. They are domain specific - the processes of each module are unique to it and not 
shared with any other module. 
4. Modules are cognitively impenetrable - that is, only the end product of modular 
processing is available to the central systems. 
5. They are informationally encapsulated - they are unaffected by the beliefs, values, 
etc. of the central systems. 
There is considerable experimental support for modularity, such as neuro- 
psychological data from aphasia which shows that there is a language module which 
can be impaired in people who are otherwise not mentally impaired; analysis of 
grammaticality judgements by Broca's aphasics further demonstrates that "the 
linguistic processing system is itself modular, as shown by the divisions between 
lexical processing, syntactic parsing and the semantic interpretation of syntactic 
structures" (Bänreti 1994: 29). 
As for the central systems, Fodor (1983: 140) claims that, given their informationally 
unencapsulated nature, no account can be given of them; that is, a psychology of the 
central processor would have to account for the potentially infinite number of factors 
which may have some bearing on the fixation of beliefs. (This is the essence of 
Fodor's 'First Law of the Non-existence of Cognitive Science'. ) However, Sperber & 
Wilson (1986: 66,75) (and Wilson & Sperber 1986a) claim that an account of the 
relatively local inferential processes of utterance interpretation offers an insight into 
6Although early formulations of relevance theory (e. g. Wilson & Sperber 1981) preceded Fodor 
(1983), the modularity hypothesis is part of the cognitive psychological framework upon which 
relevance theory is currently based. The idea of modularity was current prior to Fodor however; for 
example Chomsky (1980: 89) invoked a form of modularity: "I am tentatively assuming the mind to be 
modular in structure, a system of interacting subsystems that have their own special properties. " 
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more complex functions of the central systems, such as scientific theorising - Fodor's 
paradigm case of a central process. Aside from these differences and differences over 
the nature and status of the central systems (Fodor assumes these are essentially 
inductive, Sperber & Wilson deductive), Sperber & Wilson follow Fodor in 
distinguishing between a language module and a non-modular central processor. 
More recently, however, Sperber (1994) has suggested that the central systems might 
be less modular rather than simply non-modular. Sperber (1994: 49) suggests that the 
presence of certain concepts in a conceptual representation might activate specific 
central modules in a similar way to the activation of certain input modules by the 
presence of particular stimuli. Moreover, Sperber (1994: 60) posits a meta- 
representational module which takes "concepts of concepts and representations of 
representations" as input, rather than simply first order concepts and representations 
of things, thereby facilitating communication (which is the processing of other 
people's beliefs and representations). 
Returning to the input modules, both Fodor and Sperber & Wilson (1986) argue that 
because we cannot help but construct a semantic representation of any utterance we 
hear in a language known to us, even accidentally or unwillingly, linguistic decoding 
must be modular. Relevance theory has little to say concerning the decoding phase of 
utterance interpretation - this is properly the domain of phonological, morphological 
and syntactic theories - however, what detail is provided has some bearing on the 
more fully articulated inferential interpretation process. In this section I shall be 
concerned primarily with the interaction between the modular decoding phase of 
interpretation and the central inferential processes. 
1.2.2 The role of linguistic decoding in the identification of logical form 
Identifying the intended logical form of an utterance is not done simply by 
mechanically applying linguistic rules. Evidence from (minimally contextualised) 
garden path utterances suggests that the outcome of any such decontextualised 
disambiguation procedure is rejected if it is inconsistent with some non-syntactic 
criterion (see examples below). According to Sperber & Wilson (1986: 184) this, 
ultimately, is the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance (described in 
§ 1.4). The identification of logical form therefore involves both a linguistic input 
module and a central inferential process. It is the relationship between these that is the 
concern of the current section. A common view (assumed in the models described 
below) holds that grammar is modular and that its form and functions can (and indeed 
must) be described independently of considerations pertaining to the central systems. 
What is made accessible to the central systems consists of concepts associated with 
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individual words and a syntactic structure. An alternative view holds that the 
structure of language is explained by basic principles of the general cognitive system 
as a whole" (Groefsema 1992: 276). On this latter view, which is still modular, the 
linguistic processor consists (in addition to a prosodic processor) of a mental lexicon 
containing phonological and orthographic forms, the output of which is a string of 
concepts accessible to the central systems. Groefsema (1992) does not claim that 
there is no syntactic structure, merely that syntactic structure is derivative on logical 
structure, and that-no independent syntactic structure is created during utterance 
interpretation. Experimental evidence from Bock & Loebell (1990) which 
demonstrated that speakers tended to produce sentences with structural (syntactic) 
forms similar to those of topically unrelated priming sentences (cf. Bock et al 1992) 
suggests that syntactic structures are created and stored during utterance 
interpretation, but this does not determine whether syntactic structure is generated 
independently of logical structure or is derivative on it. 
Whether an utterance gives rise to a set of concepts plus a syntactic representation, or 
to concepts only, the question of exponency, that is, of the relation between the two 
levels (linguistic and cognitive), remains to be resolved. There are two basic choices 
to be made. First is the choice between a parallel processing model, in which the input 
module presents the central systems with a choice of semantic representations, and a 
serial model, in which the input module delivers one representation at a time, 
beginning with the easiest to construct and only constructing the second easiest if the 
first is rejected, and so on. Second, there is a choice over the point at which semantic 
representations are made available to the central systems; in a highly modular model 
with a minimum of interaction between the modules and the central systems this point 
would be as late as possible and would include a syntactic representation, but in a 
weakly modular model semantic representations could be available earlier, say, at the 
end of each word, in which case a syntactic representation could, but need not, be 
represented. With regard to these alternatives, Sperber & Wilson (1986: 206) assume 
that the central systems perform computations of semantic interpretations of syntactic 
category labels, thus implying that a syntactic representation is part of the output of a 
language module. Elsewhere, they suggest that: 
"the input module might construct all the linguistically possible 
interpretations of the first constituent of the sentence, and submit them 
to the central mechanism, which would, when possible, choose one of 
them and inform the linguistic module of its choice. As a result, the 
module's decoding processes would be partly inhibited. " 
(S&W 1986: 186) 
Although Sperber & Wilson's model is, as they admit, purely speculative and non- 
technical, it is sufficiently precise to be compared with other more comprehensive 
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models. Modularity is clearly maintained since the module remains informationally 
encapsulated, having no access to encyclopaedic contextual information; modular 
processes are affected by contextual information, but only in an inhibitory way. It is 
also clearly a parallel processing model, and one in which linguistic interpretations 
are made available earlier, at the end of a constituent, rather than later. 
Relevance theory is a partial theory of performance in that it provides a model of the 
inferential phases of utterance interpretation; if this is to contribute to a complete 
model of interpretation, relevance theory must be compatible with a defensible model 
of parsing. Such a model must allow clear delimitation of the inferential phases of 
interpretation from linguistic decoding in theory. Stevenson (1993: 79) lists three basic 
models of parsing which assume modularity: serial independent (Frazier 1979), 
parallel weakly interactive (Crain & Steedman 1985, Altmann & Steedman 1988) and 
connectionist (Walz & Pollack 1985). These differ primarily over whether or not a 
syntactic representation is represented and the point at which semantic and pragmatic 
processes are introduced. I shall briefly compare each type of model with Sperber and 
Wilson's tentative proposals. 
Frazier's (1979) serial independent model is extremely modular in that it assumes 
syntax and semantics to be autonomous in practice as well as in theory. Cases of 
syntactic ambiguity are therefore resolved initially by purely syntactic strategies, such 
as 'late closure' and 'minimal attachment' which state that the syntactic parser will 
automatically attach incoming material to material on its left which has already been 
analysed (Frazier 1979: 114). Only if the resulting semantic interpretation of the 
whole clause is incompatible with the context will the processor backtrack and 
reparse the sentence. This model is obviously inconsistent with Sperber & Wilson's 
model of a parallel syntactic parser which makes the various interpretations of each 
constituent immediately available to the central systems. 
Closer to Sperber & Wilson's view is the parallel weakly interactive model of Crain & 
Steedman (1985) and Altmann & Steedman (1988). As evidence against the serial 
independent model, Crain & Steedman (1985) noted that sentences such as (1.1): 
(1.1) He told the woman that he was having trouble with to leave. 
are garden path sentences when presented out of context (that is, as isolated written 
examples), a complement reading being the preferred interpretation. However, given 
the preceding context clause in (1.2), the relative clause interpretation is not only 
easier to construct, but seems to be the preferred reading: 
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(1.2) The psychologist saw two women. He told the woman that he was 
having trouble with to leave. 
Their experiments suggested that: 1: referential context can influence garden path 
effects; 2: it can do so even while the clause remains incomplete; 3: residual effects, 
such as those predicted by a serial model, are not apparent.? 
This led to the development of a weakly interactive model of parallel syntactic 
parsing. Crain & Steedman (1985: 325) distinguish between weakly interactive 
models, in which syntactic processing proposes alternative interpretations which 
inferential processing selects or rejects, and strongly interactive models, in which 
semantics and context influence which syntactic entities get proposed in the first 
place. Weakly interactive models are modularity preserving but strongly interactive 
models are not, since central processes can give the syntactic parser feedback about 
the contextual acceptability of its output (Fodor 1983: 134-5), but semantic or 
pragmatic information cannot be used predictively to guide linguistic parsing. The 
strong hypothesis is untenable because, according to Altmann & Steedman 
(1988: 206), the context could only produce such specific effects if there were already 
an interpretation available, but the only way that such detailed interpretations can be 
obtained is via syntax. Similarly, their preference for parallel over serial processing 
rests on the theoretical implausibility of a serial model once weak interaction is 
assumed: 
"We can only reject [an interpretation] in comparison with some more 
plausible alternative, simply because it may be the only analysis. We 
therefore claim that weakly interactive processors must by definition 
propose syntactic alternatives for semantic and pragmatic adjudication 
in parallel. " 
(Altmann & Steedman 1988: 208) 
However, if we also assume that weak interaction occurs as soon as constituents are 
identified, and that these are smaller (e. g. words) rather than larger (e. g. clauses or 
sentences) - what Altmann & Steedman (1988) term "fine-grained" processing - then 
serial and parallel processing will be empirically indistinguishable. 
7 Eye movement experiments conducted by Altmann et at (1992) support these findings. Whilst the 
serial independent model would account for the preferred reading of sentences like (1.1) on the 
grounds of minimal attachment, Altmann et al (1992) propose a cognitive cause. The context 
presupposed by the use of the linguistic form "the woman" (a universe of discourse containing one 
accessible instance of an adult female) is more easily constructed than the context presupposed by the 
identifying clause "the woman that he was having trouble with" (a universe of discourse containing 
more than one woman). 
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Whereas in the parallel weakly interactive model described above, the fine-grained 
nature of the parser renders the distinction between parallel and serial processing of 
little practical importance, it is central to the connectionist model of Walz & Pollack 
(1985) (cf. Tanenhaus et al 1987). This is a massively parallel system in which 
syntactic, semantic and contextual components analyse the input in parallel. Because 
syntactic units are subject to excitation or inhibition from the other components only 
after they have been activated, the connectionist model maintains modularity and can 
be viewed as weakly interactive. However, Walz & Pollack's connectionist model is 
incompatible with Sperber & Wilson's because it posits excitatory links in addition to 
inhibitory ones, and, more importantly, it assumes a modular structure for pragmatic 
processes (Stevenson 1993: 80). Wilson & Sperber (1986a: 67) explicitly deny that 
pragmatics is modular, as this would amount to saying that there is a pragmatic code - 
contrary to the relevance theoretic claim for the independence of ostensive-inferential 
communication from coded communication. 8 
1.2.3 Assessing the weakly interactive model 
The closest model to Sperber & Wilson's suggestions regarding the processes 
underlying the recovery of propositional form would appear to be the 'fine-grained' 
parallel weakly interactive model. Two questions now need to be addressed: How 
plausible is this model? and What are its implications for relevance theory? Support 
for the parallel weakly interactive model comes from experiments conducted by e. g. 
MacDonald (1993), Ni et al (1996), Trueswell & Tanenhaus (1991), and Trueswell et 
al (1994), which suggest that ambiguity in the processing of information in one 
domain (say, syntactic information or semantic information) can be constrained by 
transferring processed information from other relevant domains. On the other hand, 
criticisms have recently been made of the weakly interactive model from both a serial 
independent perspective (Nicol & Pickering 1993) and a strongly interactive 
perspective (Marslen-Wilson et al 1993). 
In their experiments, Nicol & Pickering (1993) showed that a relative clause 
interpretation (1.4) is still a viable option at the point of the embedded verb 'phoned', 
at which point, they claim, only the complement clause interpretation (1.3) ought to 
be viable in a weakly interactive model: 
8 As mentioned above in §1.2.1 (p. 19), however, Dan Sperber (Sperber 1994) has suggested that 
pragmatic processing might involve meta-representational skills which are modular, that is, that there 
might be modules which take representations made available by other modules as their input. This 
suggestion is still the object of considerable debate, and so will not be pursued further here. 
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(1.3) The receptionist informed the doctor [that the journalist had phoned 
about the events]. 
(1.4) The receptionist informed [the doctor that the journalist had phoned] 
about the events. 
"the weakly interactive model assumes that both analyses are active 
momentarily, but that, without discourse support, the relative clause 
reading is rapidly rejected. Hence [it] would predict that, by the point 
at which the embedded verb is encountered, the complement clause 
analysis is the only one still under consideration. " 
(Nicol & Pickering 1993: 226) 
However this criticism is multiply flawed. First, the weakly interactive model posits 
inhibitory interaction with discourse, rather than "discourse support", so in the 
absence of contextual counter evidence both analyses will continue to be viable, as 
Nicol & Pickering in fact found. Second, Nicol & Pickering (1993: 226) admit that the 
sentences "were deliberately intoned in such a way as to favor the relative clause 
analysis", but dismiss this variable because "these differences are extremely subtle at 
the point when [Crain & Steedman] predict a choice should be made"; however, 
Marslen"Wilson et al (1992) found that prosodic information aids syntactic 
disambiguation as does contextual support. Third, Nicol & Pickering (1993) failed to 
meet the criterion suggested by Altmann & Steedman (1988: 204) that: 
"any experiment that attempts to falsify the interactive model cannot 
depend upon the supposed neutrality of any contexts: Contexts must be 
actively manipulated to explicitly support or deny the relevant 
presuppositions. " 
Both Altmann & Steedman (1988) and Sperber & Wilson (1986) recognise that there 
is no such thing as a completely decontextualised sentence. Hearers will bring their 
encyclopaedic knowledge to bear on any sentence they encounter, as this, as well as 
previous discourse and the physical environment, is part of context: 
"In the traditional psycholinguistic experiment, in which the sentences 
are presented out of context, definite expressions still carry their 
presuppositions9, which must be supported or accommodated by the 
hearer. In a case of local ambiguity it is reasonable to assume that the 
reading carrying fewest unsupported presuppositions, and therefore 
requiring fewest modifications to the database, will be favoured... " 
(Altmann & Steedman 1988: 203) 
9I interpret Altmann & Steedman's use of the term 'presupposition' to refer to presuppositional effects 
rather than to presupposition as a technical linguistic term in opposition to focus. Sperber & Wilson 
(1986: 217), whilst accepting the existence of presuppositional effects, reject the theoretical focus- 
presupposition distinction in favour of a foreground-background distinction which "is simply a 
descriptive label used to distinguish two complementary and independently necessary aspects of the 
interpretation process". 
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Thus, the complement clause interpretation (1.3) is to be favoured since it assumes 
fewer presuppositions than the relative clause interpretation (1.4) in which it is 
presupposed that the journalist had already phoned the doctor. However, if the 
complement clause interpretation is "favoured" this does not entail that the relative 
clause interpretation is rejected, which is what Nicol & Pickering (1993: 226) claim 
the weakly interactive model predicts. Thus the parallel weakly interactive model has 
not been falsified or even weakened by Nicol & Pickering's supposed counter- 
evidence. 
Arguing against the modularity hypothesis, Marslen-Wilson & Tyler (1987) 
suggested that processing which results in the recovery of discourse models (that is, 
processing which takes contextual factors into account) exhibits the same 
characteristics with respect to modularity as does processing resulting in a logical 
form. That is, they claim that processes which map onto discourse models are domain 
specific, mandatory, fast, and have limited access to intermediate representations - all 
typical input system characteristics. With regard to informational encapsulation 
Marslen-Wilson & Tyler (1987: 41) note that the modularity hypothesis can be 
defeated if it is shown that central and modular processes are not isolated from each 
other in the ways required by the theory. This means that the crucial question is when 
semantic and pragmatic information interact with the syntactic parser. If the 
modularity hypothesis is correct, this should be after the first pass syntactic output 
becomes available to central processes. 
The aim of the four sets of experiments reported in Marslen-Wilson & Tyler (1987) 
is to demonstrate that pragmatic considerations can influence utterance interpretation 
prior to syntactic processing. In one of these types of experiment, reported in greater 
detail in Marslen-Wilson et al (1993), subjects heard short stories ending in an 
incomplete fragment. The discourse focus, type of anaphor, and pragmatic inference 
in the stories were systematically varied. At the end of the incomplete fragment 
subjects were given a visual probe and the time it took them to name this was 
measured. It was found that, whatever the nature of the subject anaphor or focus, the 
probe was invariably checked for pragmatic coherence with listeners' 
presuppositions, suggesting to Marslen-Wilson et al that pragmatic inference can 
determine reference assignment in the absence of support from discourse factors, and 
that inference takes precedence over focus when these conflict. They conclude that 
this analysis favours a strongly interactive (and hence non-modular) model of 
syntactic processing. 
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This conclusion is only valid if the output of syntactic parsing is `course-grained', 
that is, if only complete syntactic outputs (whole clauses) are made available to the 
central processes. Given the fine-grained account proposed in Altmann & Steedman 
(1988), however, inferential processes can affect first-pass syntactic parses in the way 
described in Marslen-Wilson et al (1993) without violating modularity. Marslen- 
Wilson & Tyler (1987: 51) admit that "no matter how early context effects are 
detected, it is always possible to argue that multiple readings were nonetheless 
computed, so that what we are picking up are after-the-event selection effects rather 
than direct control of the initial syntactic parse. " This, they claim, is nonetheless bad 
for the modularity hypothesis since it entails that modular accounts are empirically 
indistinguishable from non-modular accounts. The two are indeed empirically 
indistinguishable, but this is as bad for non-modular accounts as for modular ones. 
The only implication of this observation for the modularity hypothesis, is that 
informational encapsulation becomes a theoretical constraint on modules rather than 
an empirically observable heuristic for determining what is or is not a module. 
In conclusion, two key observations were made in Marslen-Wilson & Tyler 
(1987: 43): (i) that the mapping from an incoming utterance onto a discourse model is 
as rapid as the mapping onto a logical form; (ii) that the discourse mapping process is 
not significantly slowed down by pragmatic inferences. This, they claim, provides 
clear evidence for top-down influences on syntactic choice during first-pass syntactic 
processing. If this is the case, informational encapsulation has been violated, and the 
modularity hypothesis becomes untenable. Against this view I have argued that a 
fine-grained, incremental approach (such as the parallel, weakly interactive model 
discussed above) can accommodate observations (i) and (ii), since the construction of 
a discourse model takes place on the basis of partial information before complete 
syntactic structures have been made available to the central processes. 
1,2A Summary 
The account of linguistic (as opposed to inferential) processing with which relevance 
theory is most clearly compatible is the fine-grained, parallel, weakly interactive 
model of Crain & Steedman (1985) and Altmann & Steedman (1988). This account is 
modularity preserving, but empirically indistinguishable from strongly interactive 
accounts such as that of Marslen-Wilson & Tyler (1987) and Marslen-Wilson et al 
(1993). 
According to relevance theory, the output of linguistic decoding is a (possibly 
incomplete) logical form, which is completed and inferentially enriched by the central 
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inferential system to correctly identify the propositional form of the speaker's 
utterance. Put another way, inferential enrichment of logical form leads to the 
construction of a mental representation in the hearer's mind, corresponding (if 
successful) to the intended propositional form of the utterance. In practice, assuming 
that a) utterance interpretation is fine-grained - i. e. that linguistic analyses of input are 
made accessible to the central processes as soon as possible, and b) that the central 
processes begin interpreting the output of the language module immediately, an 
entire, unenriched logical form should rarely, if ever, be entertained in the mind of an 
addressee. In theory, however, it is possible to talk of complete, unenriched logical 
forms as distinct from propositional forms. Bearing this in mind, I shall now discuss 
how logical forms are inferentially enriched. 
j. Phase Two: Inferential Enrichment 
1.3.0 Introduction 
In this section, I shall provide a brief characterisation of logical form (§1.3.1) 
followed (in § 1.3.2) by a non-technical account of how logical form is inferentially 
enriched to recover the correct propositional form. 10 In its defence, I shall compare 
the relevance theoretic approach with that of Gricean pragmatics (§ 1.3.3). 
1.3.1 Logical form 
Logical forms are well-formed formulae in the internal language of thought; although 
derived from linguistic input, they are not themselves linguistic representations. 
Sperber & Wilson's use of the term `logical form' therefore differs from Chomsky's: 
"On GB assumptions, the LF of a sentence is a construct of the same 
type as the S-structure from which it is derived, one of a set of indexed, labelled bracketings which jointly constitute the syntactic 
analysis of the sentence. By contrast, the logical form of a sentence on 
relevance-theoretic assumptions is an incomplete expression of a 
different formal system, that of the internalised language of thought, 
an inferentially transparent system whose completed formulae display 
all the properties of formal systems devised to reconstruct inference - 
no ambiguity, no indexical elements. " 
(Kempson 1988b: 20) 
10 A technical model in the form of a Labelled Deductive System has been proposed by Ruth Kempson 
(e. g. Kempson 1994a, 1994b); in this, inferential enrichment has been "modelled as a reasoning task 
over logical type specifications driven by lexical input, with additional choices being made by the 
hearer in all cases where the input does not fully dictate the selected interpretation" (Kempson 
1994b: 144-5). 
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A logical form, as characterised here, is an abstract semantic representation consisting 
of a well-formed string of concepts. Following Sperber & Wilson (1986: 86), I assume 
that concepts are abstract psychological labels, or addresses, containing logical, 
encyclopaedic and lexical entries, defined as follows: 
"The logical entry for a concept consists of a set of deductive rules 
which apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent. 
The encyclopaedic entry contains information about the extension 
and/or denotation of the concept.... The lexical entry contains 
information about the natural-language counterpart of the concept... " 
(S&W 1986: 86) 
This is represented in a simplified formlI in figure 2 
Figure 2: Concepts in a logical form 
onological orm + phonological form + ... II 
CONCEPT + CONCEPT + ... [logical entry] [logical entry] 
[encyclopaedic entry] [encyclopaedic entry] 
A word gives rise to a concept containing a logical entry which helps determine the 
meaning of the word when it is used in conjunction with other words in an utterance; 
I shall postpone discussion of the nature of the logical entry until §2.2.3, in which 
Groefsema's (1992) characterisation of logical entries in terms of 'logical selection 
frames' will be discussed. The encyclopaedic entry specifies the assumptions held 
about the extension and/or denotation of the concept, and is not objectively 
determined, but will vary from individual to individual; the encyclopaedic entry for a 
given word may differ between speaker and hearer since each interlocutor's 
encyclopaedic data base is unique, being the result of numerous and diverse 
experiences. The encyclopaedic entry is also typically semantically incomplete or 
underdetermined (see below). What Sperber & Wilson (1986: 86) call the lexical entry 
specifies the phonological structure, syntactic category membership and syntactic co- 
occurrence restrictions (presumably strict subcategorization rules etc. ) of the lexical 
counterpart of the concept. There is some debate as to whether a lexical entry should 
be part of a concept; Groefsema (1992: 155) argues that the only relevant information 
in the lexical entry of a concept, so far as processing is concerned, is its phonological 
structure, since syntactic structure is, she argues, derivative on logical structure. As I 
mentioned in §1.2.2, the relation between syntax and logical structure is far from 
11 Logical forms are far more complex than figure two suggests as, for example, Jackendoff (1983) 
demonstrates. 
28 
clear, however syntactic structure (whether independently motivated or not) is created 
during processing, as demonstrated by Bock &. Loebell (1990). Since processing is 
incremental, operating on incomplete syntactic structures, I assume that any syntactic 
information contained in the lexical entry is akin to the incrementally sensitive 
syntactic categories of, for example, left-associative grammar (Hausser 1989), 
although no specific syntactic theory or approach is assumed. 12 
1.3 .2 Disambiguation. reference assignment and inferential enrichment 
In the previous section a logical form was defined as a well-formed string of 
concepts, each of which gives access to the information in its logical, encyclopaedic 
and (possibly) lexical entries. The information provided by the logical (and lexical) 
entries of the concepts in a logical form, being necessary for the construction of the 
logical form, is immediately and fully accessible to an addressee. In contrast, the 
information provided by the encyclopaedic entries of the concepts in a logical form is 
not accessed in its entirety; the subset of encyclopaedic information used in the 
interpretation of an utterance is restricted to information which has been made 
immediately accessible, through the construction of an utterance interpretation 
context. 
The specification of this subset of encyclopaedic information is a necessary step in 
the development of a logical form into a fully propositional form. The process 
involved in this development is that of inferential enrichment: 
"Linguistically encoded semantic representations [logical forms] are 
abstract mental structures which must be inferentially enriched before 
they can be taken to represent anything of interest. " 
(S&W 1986: 174) 
For a logical form to represent anything of interest, in the sense of the above 
quotation, it must be capable of achieving adequate contextual effects (see §1.4). This 
does not necessarily mean that a logical form has to give rise to a fully propositional 
representation, corresponding to a fully understood idea to be of interest; as Sperber 
(1985) notes, half-understood ideas (including religious, philosophical and often 
scientific beliefs) entertained as `semi-propositional representations' may also be 
relevant. (All the cases discussed in this thesis, however, involve propositional 
representations. ) 
12 Left-associative grammar is mentioned because the process of inferential enrichment to be 
discussed below requires that sentences typically be underdetermined in terms of both the lexical 
semantics of their constituent words and of their syntax; Hausser (1989) posits a suitably 
underdetermined syntax and a correspondingly important role for pragmatics. 
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Sperber & Wilson (1986: 183-193) distinguish three inferential processes which a 
logical form may undergo in order to represent something of interest to an addressee: 
reference assignment, disambiguation, resolution of vagueness and the recovery of 
ellipsed material. The application of these three processes can be illustrated in 
sentence (1.5), the intended propositional form of which is unclear out of context: 
(1.5) Peter's bat is too grey. [amalgam of S&W (1986) (20) and (21)] 
When (1.5) is uttered, a referent must be assigned to Peter, although Peter is not 
ambiguous, reference assignment must nonetheless distinguish the intended Peter 
from various other Peters. Bat, on the other hand, is truly ambiguous; syntactic 
decoding will be able to distinguish bat as a verb from bat as a noun, but the noun bat 
is still many ways ambiguous; pragmatic disambiguation disposes amongst alternative 
meanings of bat and, if successful, ensures that a unique concept is recovered. 
Resolution of vagueness resolves what Sperber & Wilson (1986: 188) call the 
semantic incompleteness, rather than the ambiguity (that is, polysemacity) of the 
genitive encoded in "Peter's". If bat refers to a flying mammal, "Peter's bat" might 
indicate the bat owned, chosen, killed, discovered, mentioned, seen, etc. by Peter. The 
potential number of relations covered by the genitive is infinite, yet specific relations 
are typically understood in actual utterances. (In some sentences, only one 
interpretation of the genitive is possible: for example, in "The Huns' destruction of 
the city" (Napoli 1993: 158) the only possible interpretation is that the destruction of 
the city was done by the Huns. ) Sperber & Wilson (1986: 188) therefore conclude that 
"contextual information is needed to resolve what should be seen as the semantic 
incompleteness, rather than the ambiguity of the genitive. " 
Sperber & Wilson (1986: 188) claim that too is also semantically incomplete since not 
only can too modify a whole range of adverbs and adjectives, each in various ways, 
but in order to answer the question 'too grey for what? ' in relation to (1.5), an 
addressee would have to be familiar with the context in which (1.5) was uttered. 
However, it seems more probable that the key to answering the question, 'too grey for 
what? ' lies in recovering ellipsed material, rather than in resolving any vagueness in 
too. A fully propositional form of (1.5) would have to make explicit any ellipsed 
material: 
(1.6) The bat discovered by Peter is too grey to be a fruit bat. 
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Despite the distinctions drawn between reference assignment, disambiguation, 
resolution of vagueness and the recovery of ellipsed material, these all contribute to 
the same inferential (pragmatic) operation, that of relating a linguistically decoded 
semantic representation (logical form) to a context. In view of this, and because this 
study will primarily be concerned with phase two of utterance interpretation 
(disambiguation, although inferential, I have treated as operating at phase one), I shall 
use inferential enrichment as a blanket term for the pragmatic task of relating logical 
form and context (as Sperber & Wilson also do at times, as for example in the 
opening quotation from S&W (1986: 174)). I also prefer to follow Recanati 
(1989: 299) in using the terms semantically underdetermined and semantic 
underdetermination in place of Sperber & Wilson's semantically incomplete and 
semantic incompleteness. This reflects both the unified treatment of reference 
assignment and inferential enrichment proper in this study, and the characterisation of 
logical forms as complete semantic representations (albeit inadequate for 
communicative purposes in isolation from an appropriate context). 
The consequences of adopting inferential enrichment are perhaps best illustrated in 
comparison with an alternative model. For this purpose I shall compare relevance 
theory with trice's model, this being a well-known pragmatic theory, and one with 
which the early development of relevance theory was closely connected. 
Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory 
Grice's observation that communication is possible even in the absence of a code is at 
the heart of Sperber & Wilson's fundamental claim for the primacy of ostensive- 
inferential over coded communication (see § 1.1). S&W (1986: 37-8) makes clear that 
although Grice's thesis is central, the subsequent development of relevance theory is 
distinct from that of traditional Gricean pragmatics. There are a number of differences 
between relevance theory and Gricean pragmatics, the most important being that 
whereas Grice posits a distinction between what is (literally) said (governed by a code 
model) and what is implicated (governed by the Co-operative Principle and maxims, 
and also by decoding in the case of `conventional implicatures'), relevance theory 
assumes both implicit and explicit content (in Gricean terminology) to be inferentially 
determined, with the result that: 
"the distinction between semantics and pragmatics - that is, the distinction between linguistically determined meaning and meaning 
that is contextually determined in accordance with general principles 
of communication - is not coextensive with the distinction between 
what is said and what is implicated. " 
(Blakemore 1987: 34) 
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Sperber & Wilson's reservations about Grice's explicit/implicit distinction date back 
at least to 1981 when they suggested that the scope of pragmatics is wider than Grice 
thought (S&W 1981: 159). For Grice, all pragmatic aspects of interpretation, bar 
disambiguation and reference assignment, are necessarily implicatures, but according 
to relevance theory, pragmatic interpretation in the form of inferential enrichment of 
logical form is often required in order to recover explicitly communicated 
information, or explicatures, in addition to implicatures. To use Gricean terminology, 
relevance theory posits pragmatic aspects of `what is literally said'. As Recanati 
(1989: 328) notes, Grice's `tests' for conversational implicature (cancellability, 
nondetachability, calculability, and so forth) are not wholly superfluous within the 
relevance theoretic framework; they still indicate the presence of a pragmatically 
determined aspect of utterance meaning, but what they do not indicate is whether this 
is a genuine implicature or a constituent of what is literally said. 
This can be illustrated through a consideration of the interpretation of clauses 
conjoined by and (see in particular Carston 1988b, 1993); the examples below (bar 
(1.10a) and (1.13)) are taken from Wilson & Sperber (1993b). The traditional Gricean 
system results from conflating the linguistically determined semantic/pragmatic 
distinction (semantic = linguistically encoded; pragmatic = inferred) and the logically 
determined semantic/pragmatic distinction (semantic = truth-conditional; pragmatic = 
non-truth-conditional) and can be summarised in the following two equations (based 
on Gazdar 1979: 2): 
(1.7) a. Truth-conditional = semantic = linguistically encoded 
b. Non-truth-conditional = pragmatic = inferred 
Take the examples in (1.8); the temporal and causal connection between the 
propositions expressed in the conjoined clauses in (1.8) could either be truth- 
conditional (encoded by and) or non-truth-conditional (implied by the maxims of 
manner and relation): 
(1.8) a. I took out my key and opened the door. 
b. John dropped the glass and it broke. 
c. They planted an acorn and it grew. 
d. Peter left and Mary got angry. 
The latter explanation is supported by the examples in (1.9) in which the same 
temporal and causal interpretations arise in the absence of and, and in (1.10) in which 
there are no such temporal (or, in (1 .1 Oa), causal) connections: 
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(1.9) a. I took out my key. I opened the door. 
b. John dropped the glass. It broke. 
c. They planted an acorn. It grew. 
d. Peter left. Mary got angry. 
(1.10) a. I like Beethoven and I like Elgar. 
b. It was dark and I couldn't see. 
c. Susan is underage and can't drink. 
Since the temporal and causal connections of (1.8) are not encoded by and they must 
be pragmatic (and therefore, according to (1.7b), non-truth-conditional) in the Gricean 
system; this conclusion would be supported by the fact that the temporal and causal 
interpretations of (1.8d) are cancellable: 
(1.11) Peter left and Mary got angry, but not in that order. 
However, sentences such as (1.12a) and (1.12b) indicate that the temporal and causal 
connections of (1.8d) are in fact truth-conditional; if they were non-truth-conditional 
(as they must be if pragmatically derived according to (1.7b)), example (1.12a) would 
be contradictory and example (1.12b) would be tautologous: 
(1.12) a. What happened was not that Peter left and Mary got angry, 
but that Mary got angry and Peter left. 
b. A: So Peter left and Mary got angry? 
B: No. Mary got angry and Peter left. 
The fact that the above examples are neither contradictory nor tautologous suggests 
that truth-conditional content need not be linguistically encoded, and cancellability 
merely indicates that a given interpretation is not linguistically encoded. The equation 
upon which the Gricean system is based must therefore be abandoned. If, in the 
divorce settlement between truth-conditionality and linguistic encoding, custody of 
the term 'semantic' is awarded to linguistic encoding (and therefore the term 
'pragmatic' belongs to what is not linguistically encoded), there can be pragmatic 
aspects of what is literally said. 13 
13 The above arguments do not, however, entail that semantically and can be equated with logical &. 
In the preferred reading of (3), B is interpreted as preceding A, whilst in (4) A precedes B: 
AB 
(3) a. The glass broke. John dropped it. 
b. I hit Bill. He insulted me. 
c. I got caught. My best friend betrayed me. 
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The relation between linguistic semantics and logical semantics in terms of the three 
phase model of utterance interpretation which I have been expounding is illustrated in 
figure 3: 
Figure 3: The relation between linguistic and logical semantics 
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Two further differences between Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory follow 
from Sperber & Wilson's dissatisfaction with Grice's characterisation of explicit 
communication, and their own definition of explicitness, given below: 
"An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and 
only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U. " 
(S&W 1986: 182) 
Firstly, relevance theory assumes degrees of explicitness: the greater the element of 
decoding involved in interpretation, the more explicit the explicature; the greater the 
degree of inference involved, the less explicit. For example, (1.6) is more explicit 
than (1.5) (repeated below): 
(1.6) The bat discovered by Peter is too grey to be a fruit bat. 
(1.5) Peter's bat is too grey. 
AB 
(4) a. The glass broke and John dropped it. 
b. I hit Bill and he insulted me. 
c. I got caught and my best friend betrayed me. 
In (5) the occurrence of then cancels the causal connection between A and B: 
AB 
(5) a. I spoke to John and discovered that he was charming. 
b. I spoke to John and then discovered that he was charming. 
Taking the above examples along with (1.8) and (1.10) I propose the following description of how and 
functions: If there is a temporal connection between the propositions expressed by two clauses 
conjoined by and then there is also a causal connection, unless e. g. then is present; if there is a causal 
connection there need not be a temporal one. 
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Secondly, Grice says very little concerning how propositional attitudes, that is, non- 
truth-conditional functions such as illocutionary force, are communicated. Grice is 
unclear regarding what he regards as explicit or implicit here, but in relevance theory, 
these propositional attitudes, also termed `higher-level explicatures', are incorporated 
into the same system as other explicatures. In common with speech-act theory and 
functional grammar, it is recognised that semantic differences between declarative 
sentences and their non-declarative counterparts are not differences in the 
propositions expressed, but in the higher-level explicatures communicated, which 
specify the intended illocutionary-force of the utterance by indicating the direction in 
which relevance is to be sought (S&W 1986: 254). Relevance, and its role in 
communication (in particular the criterion of consistency with the principle of 
relevance, which an interpretation must meet in order to achieve contextual effects), is 
discussed in § 1.4 below. 
JA Phase Three: Relevance 
1.4.0 Introduction 
I noted in the introduction and in §1.1 that relevance theory is concerned with the 
interpretation of utterances within a context, cognitively determined, and that the aim 
of communication is to achieve contextual effects, that is, alterations to the 
addressee's cognitive environment. This occurs at phase three of utterance 
interpretation; procedural encoding was first posited as functioning at this phase of 
the utterance interpretation process, where it constrains the computation of contextual 
effects, thereby reducing processing effort. In this final section of chapter 1, I shall 
begin (§1.4.1) by discussing contextual effects and processing effort, before 
considering their role in determining relevance (§ 1.4.2). Having clarified the notion of 
relevance, I shall consider (in § 1.4.3) the implications of the central tenet of relevance 
theory: the principle of relevance, for a theory of ostensive-inferential 
communication, before summarising the discussion (§ 1.4.4). 
1.4.1 Contextual effects and processing effort 
The end result of utterance interpretation is what Sperber & Wilson call a contextual 
effect. When a set of assumptions is made mutually manifest (see §1.1) by an act of 
communication it can, when combined with a context, give rise to a further 
assumption or assumptions. S&W (1986: 108) expresses this in the following terms: 
"a deduction based on the union of new information (P) and old information [C) is a contextualisation of (P) in (C). Such a 
contextualisation may give rise to what we will call contextual effects. " 
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Contextual effects come in three general forms: implications, strengthening and 
contradiction. Contextual implications are propositions which are implied neither by 
(P) alone nor by (C) alone but by the union of (P) and (C). Strengthening occurs 
when the union of (P) and (C) increases the probability, that is the strength, of some 
proposition or propositions contained within (C), and contradiction occurs when the 
union of (P) and (C) eliminates a proposition or propositions within (C). 
No matter how contextual effects are derived, a certain amount of processing effort is 
involved in computing them. Processing effort occurs both at phase one of utterance 
interpretation in the form of the effort required to decode linguistic input, and at the 
inferential phases of utterance interpretation. Various factors interact to influence 
both sources of processing effort. In decoding, factors such as frequency of mention 
of a lexical item affect its accessibility and hence the processing effort needed to 
process it, but because linguistic decoding is a modular phase it incurs little 
processing effort in comparison with inferential processing, as evidenced by the speed 
with which linguistic decoding occurs (around 250ms in close shadowing tasks). At 
the inferential phases, the construction of a context - that is, the selection of a subset 
of old information (C) with which to combine new information (P) - and the 
determination of the precise relation between (C) and (P), both incur processing 
effort. (In chapter two an explicit link will be made between procedural encoding and 
the reduction of processing effort. ) 
1.4.2 The principle of relevance 
The relation between contextual effects and the processing effort required to derive 
them forms the basis of the principle of relevance to be described below. `Relevance', 
as Sperber & Wilson use the term, describes a clearly defined theoretical concept. In 
this, it is not to be identified with Grice's vague and undefined (Grice 1989: 27) use of 
the word in the Maxim of Relation: "be relevant". S&W (1986) provides three partial 
and complementary definitions of relevance: relevance in a context, relevance to an 
individual, and relevance of a phenomenon. I shall look at each in turn. 
Relevance in a context 
An assumption is relevant in a context iff it has some contextual effect in that context 
(S&W 1986: 122), and the greater the contextual effects, the greater the relevance. 
However, computing the contextual effects of an utterance requires some mental 
effort; it is assumed that human beings aim to process information as efficiently as 
possible, that is, to minimise the mental effort required, therefore the greater the 
mental effort required to compute the contextual effects of an utterance, the smaller 
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the relevance of the assumption identified in the particular context. Contexts are sets 
of mutually manifest assumptions (§1.1), and as such are dynamic in that they 
develop as assumptions are made mutually manifest. Since a large number of 
assumptions are typically mutually manifest in a discourse, and the inferential phase 
of utterance interpretation, being global, has potential access to all of these, some 
criterion for the selection of the particular context within which a given utterance is to 
be processed is required (similar to the inhibitory effect of inferential processing on 
linguistic decoding, mentioned in §1.2). The assumption that speakers aim to be 
relevant is such a criterion, and this remains constant; according to relevance theory 
contexts vary but speakers always aim to be relevant (S&W 1986: 142). 
This entails that a sentence might be more relevant if uttered in one context than in 
another. For example, (1.5) uttered in the context of a zoological field trip would 
activate a number of mutually manifest assumptions (for example that Peter had been 
looking for fruit bats, and that fruit bats are brown) and so achieve the intended 
contextual effect without incurring disproportionate processing effort. 
(1.5) Peter's bat is too grey. 
Uttered in a context where such assumptions were not mutually manifest, (1.5) would 
not be as relevant as (1.6) would: 
(1.6) The bat discovered by Peter is too grey to be a fruit bat. 
However, in a context where all the appropriate assumptions were mutually manifest 
an utterance of (1.6) would cause the addressee excess processing effort, in particular 
at phase one (linguistic decoding) and would not be so relevant. 
Relevance to an individual 
The First (Cognitive) Principle of Relevance (S&W 1995) states that human cognition 
tends to be geared towards the maximisation of relevance: 
"Other things being equal, the greater the cognitive effect achieved by 
the processing of a given piece of information, the greater its relevance 
for the individual who processes it [... and... ] the greater the effort 
involved in the processing of a given piece of information, the smaller 
its relevance for the individual who processes it. " 
(Wilson & Sperber 1988: 140) 
A `cognitive effect' is a contextual effect in an individual, and should be taken to 
include social as well as purely propositional relevance, that is, relevance to an 
individual's particular goals and purposes. Sanders (1988: 607) criticised relevance 
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theory for only taking account of relevance to the individual's prior cognitions, at the 
expense of relevance to the social activity in progress. Similar criticisms are made by 
Mey & Talbot (1988), Nemo (1988) and O'Neill (1988). However, Sperber & Wilson 
themselves are aware of the affective dimension in communication and explain 
(Sperber & Wilson 1987: 742) that the social dimension of relevance theory is poorly 
articulated simply because they had no idea of how to define relevance to a purpose, 
goal, etc. in social terms. 
Also, the degree of relevance achieved is dependent on the addressee as well as the 
speaker. For example, a lecturer may aim to be optimally relevant with regard to her 
audience, that is, for the content of her lecture to bring about substantial contextual 
effects whilst being as perspicuous as possible; however, some students will be 
unwilling to make the necessary processing effort, and others may already be familiar 
with the content, so degrees of relevance achieved will vary within the audience. The 
link between individuals and phenomena is relevance; phenomena which are unlikely 
to be relevant tend to be filtered out by human perceptual mechanisms; that is, the 
perceptual mechanisms are relevance-oriented (S&W 1986: 152). This leads us to the 
final partial definition of relevance: 
Relevance of a phenomenon 
"A phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent that the 
contextual effects14 achieved when it is optimally processed are large 
[... and... ] the effort required to process it optimally is small. " 
(S&W 1986: 153) 
The only phenomena which individuals assume always have some relevance are 
ostensive stimuli. Ostensive stimuli attract the audience's attention and focus it on the 
communicator's intentions (S&W 1986: 153-4). They include not only speech but 
other deliberate gestures which also come with a guarantee of relevance. 
The principle of relevance 
The above definitions of relevance combine to give the following informal definition 
of optimal relevance: 
An utterance, on a given interpretation, is optimally relevant if and 
only if: 
(a) it achieves enough effects to be worth the hearer's attention; 
(b) it puts the hearer to no gratuitous effort in achieving those effects. 
(Smith & Wilson 1992: 5) 
14 Revised (S&W 1995) to read 'positive cognitive effects', where 'positive' reflects the cognitive goal 
of deriving only true assumptions from input. 
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Combining the presumption of relevance guaranteed by ostensive stimuli with the 
above definition of optimal relevance results in the presumption of optimal relevance 
which, as Carston (1988a: 60) points out, is a presumption of adequate (rather than 
maximum) cognitive effects for least processing effort. This is better known as the 
principle of relevance15: 
"Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption 
of its own optimal relevance. " 
(S&W 1986: 158) 
Before looking at the implications of the principle of relevance for a model of 
utterance interpretation, I shall briefly mention a few differences between it and 
traditional Gricean assumptions. Whilst the principle of relevance is an exceptionless 
generalisation about communication which cannot be overtly violated (S&W 
1986: 162, Wilson & Sperber 1988: 140), Grice's Co-operative Principle and maxims 
are conversational norms which can be violated; 16 the nature and purpose of these 
violations is culture specific, as Keenan's (1976) study of violations of the maxim of 
quantity by some Malagasy interlocutors demonstrates. Also, Clark (1982: 126) noted 
that an early formulation of the principle of relevance "explicitly allows both 
authorized and unauthorized inferences... therefore, it cannot be used as a 
specification of Grice's maxim of relation. It does not belong to Grice's co-operative 
principle", a claim with which Sperber & Wilson (1982: 131) agreed. Although the 
principle of relevance has subsequently been criticised for being vague (e. g. Mey & 
Talbot 1988, Gorayska & Lindsay 1993), the maxim of relation remains undefined 
(Grice 1989: 27). 
1.4.3 Consistency with the principle of relevance 
The central consequence of applying the principle of relevance is that the only 
interpretation whose selection it warrants is the first one tested and found to be 
consistent with the principle. This is not as gratuitous as it at first appears, but is 
rather a result of the way information is processed. Broadly speaking, there are two 
15 This is strictly speaking the Second (Communicative) Principle of Relevance and is grounded in the 
First (Cognitive) Principle of Relevance. As in S&W (1995) the phrase `principle of relevance' refers 
to the second (communicative) principle. S&W (1995) also modifies the presumption of optimal 
relevance, acknowledging "the speaker's right to be lazy or prudish, i. e. to have her own preferences 
and take them into account. " The definitions given here are adequate for the purposes of this thesis. 
16 This distinction has developed: "Earlier versions of relevance theory were closer in these respects to 
Grice's approach. We had generally assumed that there was a presumption of maximal rather than 
optimal relevance, and that communicator and audience had to have and use knowledge of the 
principle of relevance. However, the idea that the principle was exceptionless was there from the start" 
(S&W 1986: 261 n. 1 1). Maximal rather than optimal relevance is described in Sperber & Wilson (1982, 
1985/6), and is referred to in e. g. Wilson & Sperber (1988: 140), Jucker (1993). 
39 
possible strategies for information processing: listing and ranking hypotheses, and 
testing hypotheses one by one. The former is psychologically unfeasible, as Sperber 
& Wilson note: 
"If the only way of finding the right interpretation were to list and rank 
all possible interpretations, then all possible interpretations would 
require the same- amount of effort: namely, the effort needed to 
construct and compare them. It is hard to think of any ostensive 
stimulus that would be worth such an absurd amount of effort. " 
(S&W 1986: 166) 
The second strategy also appears problematic, since there are various interpretations 
which might be consistent with the principle of relevance. If we simply select the first 
appropriate hypothesis, this seems to beg the question, since there must be some 
method for choosing in which order to test hypotheses. Sperber & Wilson avoid this 
dilemma by appealing to the fact that contexts are variable (whereas speakers 
consistently aim at optimal relevance), and it is not simply the ostensive stimulus but 
the union of stimulus and context which ultimately gives rise to contextual effects. 
Ostensive stimuli give access to "assumption schemas", that is, logical forms stored 
systematically in the memory, and these are then combined with other aspects of the 
context to form full hypotheses. The most accessible context at a given point in 
discourse consists of the most salient mutually manifest assumptions, determined as 
assumptions derived from previously interpreted discourse and the current physical 
environment as well as other prior assumptions and beliefs. 
Given this combination of context and stimulus, some hypotheses are more accessible 
than others, and therefore require less processing effort (S&W 1986: 167). The most 
accessible interpretation, since it requires least processing effort and is therefore 
processed quickest, is formulated and tested first; if it achieves adequate contextual 
effects it is consistent with the principle of relevance and the interpretation process 
ceases. Therefore the only interpretation warranted by the principle of relevance is the 
first one tested and found consistent with it. 
As noted above, an utterance may fail to be optimally relevant, but speakers will 
always aim for optimal relevance. Combined with the first-past-the-post model of 
utterance interpretation, this is the basis of the pragmatic criterion of consistency with 
the principle of relevance: 
"for an utterance to be understood, it must have one and only one 
interpretation consistent with the fact that the speaker intended it to 
seem relevant to the hearer - adequately relevant on the effect side and 
maximally relevant on the effort side. We will say that in this case the 
interpretation is consistent with the principle of relevance... " 
(Wilson & Sperber 1988: 141) 
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The criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance provides the answer to the 
question posed in §1.1, of how it is that communication is so often successful, and 
also resolves the frame problem (Pylyshyn 1987), namely that if the inferential 
system automatically considered all potentially relevant data "this would trigger a 
computational explosion with no end in sight" (Sperber 1994: 43). Since speakers are 
assumed to be aiming to make their utterances consistent with the principle of 
relevance, audiences can be fairly confident that the first interpretation tested and 
found to be consistent with the principle is the one intended by the speaker. There is 
thus no need to reserve judgement on this interpretation or to go on infinitely 
formulating and testing alternative interpretations since "the interpretation process has 
an inbuilt stopping place" (Smith & Wilson 1992: 7). 
Relevance-driven interpretation: the case of metaphor 
The criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance underlies the claim made 
in §1.1.2 above that utterance interpretation is essentially relevance-driven. It also 
entails that the three phases of utterance interpretation need not occur sequentially in 
the order presented here (i. e. first phase one, followed by phase two, and finally phase 
three). Evidence cited earlier (Crain & Steedman 1985, Altmann & Steedman 1988, 
Marslen-Wilson & Tyler 1987, Marslen-Wilson et al 1993) suggests that there might 
be no fixed order for the operation of the three phases of utterance interpretation. This 
principle is exploited in the relevance theoretic account of metaphor and is supported 
by experimental data (Gibbs 1986a, b, 1989). In order to illustrate how this works in 
practice I shall briefly discuss how metaphor can be treated within a relevance 
theoretic framework. 
A model of metaphor must explain how metaphors are recognised as such and how 
they are processed. Stroik (1988) gives the following account of how metaphor is 
treated in semantic and traditional pragmatic models. In a decompositional semantic 
model, the metaphor "All men are pigs" could be analysed by substituting one or 
more of the constituent properties of the word pig into the definition of man. 
However, such an account neither specifies which constituent property to substitute 
nor accounts for non-truth-conditional connotations (e. g. that pigs are usually viewed 
as fat and dirty) and hence cannot cope with literally self-contradictory metaphors 
such as "Pigs are not necessarily pigs". 
Of traditional pragmatic models, Stroik (1988) considers speech act theories and 
Gricean pragmatics. According to speech act theories, when an utterance is known to 
be literally false, it may be reinterpreted as if it were another, true, utterance on the 
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assumption that the speaker intends to be meaningful. However, Stroik (1988: 21) 
argues that such accounts "neither capture the conditions under which metaphors are 
identified nor formulate a procedure for expressing the extra-literal meaning 
necessarily associated with metaphor. " That is, speech act theories fail to account for 
tautologies ("Boys will be boys"), predict that all obviously false utterances ("The 
square root of forty nine is six" etc. ) can be metaphors, and cannot assign 
interpretations to metaphors, hence Stroik favours a Gricean account. According to 
this model, metaphors may "flout", that is, "blatantly fail to fulfil" (trice 1975: 49), 
the maxims of quantity ("Boys will be boys": uninformative) or quality ("All men are 
pigs": semantically false) without violating the CP. Metaphors engender 
conversational (weak) implicatures, which are cancellable ("Bill isn't fat but he's still 
a pig"), thus allowing the hearer to assume that a maxim is being "exploited". 
The Gricean account of metaphor interpretation tacitly assumes that the three phases 
of utterance interpretation posited here occur in strict sequence and hence involves the 
following stages: the utterance is given a literal interpretation, this is seen to violate 
the CP, the flouted maxim is identified, various weak implicatures are generated, 
these are disposed amongst with reference to the CP. All this would suggest that 
metaphors should be harder (and hence take longer) to process than non-metaphorical 
utterances, but experimental evidence (Gibbs 1986a, b, 1989) suggests that this is not 
the case. If the interpretation process is relevance-driven, on the other hand, the initial 
interpretation will not result purely from the literal interpretation of the utterance, but 
will be restricted by the utterance interpretation context and the principle of 
relevance. Hence, processing time is not wasted deriving and rejecting -literal 
interpretations and formulating alternatives, that is: 
"By the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance, an 
utterance will be understood as loose or metaphorical unless nothing 
less than a fully literal interpretation will do. " 
(Wilson & Sperber 1988: 144) 
1.4.4 Summary 
The simple model of the three phases of utterance interpretation presented in figure 1 
(§1.1.2) can now be augmented to take account of the relevance-driven nature of 
utterance interpretation as described above. Figure 4, below, is identical to figure 1 
apart from the additional representation of the principle of relevance and the utterance 
interpretation context. 
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Figure 4: The utterance interpretation process 
r------------------ 
constant: Principle of Relevance 
o1j. variable: utterance interpretation Context 
phonetic Phase phase phase contextual one logical two propositional three 
IND. input form form effects 
The arrow from the combined principle of relevance/utterance interpretation context 
box to phase one of utterance interpretation represents the process occurring during 
interpretation of, for example, metaphor; this inhibits the interpretation process from 
deriving a literal (linguistically decoded) interpretation of an utterance if a loose or 
metaphorical interpretation is more relevant. The arrow to phase two facilitates 
correct inferential enrichment of underdetermined aspects of a logical form, for 
example in cases of reference assignment (§1.3.2). The arrow to phase three of 
utterance interpretation helps determine the intended contextual effects which in turn 
feed back into the utterance interpretation context, so that the whole system is being 
constantly updated. 
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2 CONCEPTUAL AND PROCEDURAL ENCODING 
In chapter 11 outlined the relevance theoretic model of utterance interpretation and 
characterised it in terms of three phases, phases two and three of which are purely 
inferential. In this chapter I turn to the central topic of this thesis: the distinction 
between conceptual and procedural encoding. §2.1 explains what is meant by these 
types of encoding and provides arguments, from within the relevance theoretic 
framework outlined above, both for and against such a distinction, before briefly 
discussing the different functions which the conceptual/procedural distinction might 
serve at phases * two and three. §2.2 proceeds to exemplify procedural encoding at 
phase three (constraining the inferences to be drawn from propositional conceptual 
representations) drawing on work already conducted in this field. Finally, in §2.3,1 
propose a definition of procedural encoding at phase three along with criteria by 
which procedural and conceptual encoding at phase three can be distinguished. 
2J. Information Types in Linguistic Semantics 
2.1.0 Introduction 
It was noted in §1.3.3 that linguistic semantics, in which semantic information is 
defined as that which is encoded and pragmatic information as that which is inferred, 
is not coextensive with logical semantics, in which semantics is concerned with what 
is truth-conditional and pragmatic with what is non-truth-conditional. As a result, the 
distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional information is of only 
marginal importance for linguistic semantics. Of greater significance are the two basic 
distinctions recognised by relevance theory: First, there is the distinction discussed in 
§ 1.3.3 between explicit information, involving an element of encoding - since "An 
assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a 
development of a logical form encoded by U" (S&W 1986: 182) - and implicit 
information which is purely inferential. 
Secondly, there is the distinction between conceptual encoding and procedural 
encoding. Conceptual information contributes to contextual effects by specifying the 
content of an utterance at the level of logical form, which is enriched to give rise to 
new information ((P) - which is contextualised in {C): old information). Procedural 
information does not contribute directly to the propositional content of an utterance, 
rather its contribution to the interpretation process lies in reducing processing effort; 
at phase two of utterance interpretation procedural information constrains the 
processes of inferential enrichment (in ways to be discussed in chapter 3), whilst at 
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phase three it aids the addressee's search for contextual effects. Before discussing how 
procedural information functions at phase three, I shall look in greater detail at the 
arguments for and against the conceptual/procedural distinction. 
2.1.1 Arguments for a dualistic semantics 
The role of procedural encoding at phase three can be compared to that of a catalyst in 
a chemical reaction, in that it facilitates the computation of the intended contextual 
effects without directly contributing to them, in much the same way that a catalyst 
induces or accelerates a chemical reaction without itself being part of that reaction. 
As discussed in §1.1.1 and 1.4.3, relevance theory is largely concerned with the 
context dependence of utterance interpretation (and derivatively of text 
interpretation). An utterance interpretation context is viewed as a subset of the 
addressee's cognitive environment, consisting of the most salient mutually manifest 
assumptions. Contexts are therefore dynamic; an addressee's cognitive environment is 
constantly updated as new assumptions are made, and different assumptions become 
more or less salient. The particular subset of the addressee's cognitive environment 
within which utterance interpretation occurs is therefore unstable. In contrast to the 
instability of contexts and the dynamic nature of context formation, the presumption 
of optimal relevance provides a constant reference point for the interpretation process. 
Much formal semantics (e. g. Lewis 1972), on the other hand, defines context 
"objectively, independently of speaker or hearer, as the set of individuals, times, 
places, etc. that supply the values of the variable expressions" (Blakemore 1987: 9). 17 
The characterisation of utterance interpretation provided in chapter 1 suggests that 
during the inferential phases of utterance interpretation an addressee performs the 
following three tasks: 1) the construction of an appropriate interpretation context, 2) 
the correct relation of logical form to context in order to arrive at the intended 
propositional forms, and 3) the correct relation of propositions to context in order to 
derive adequate contextual effects. Of these, the third task takes precedence over the 
other two; if the context initially selected as the utterance interpretation context fails 
to yield adequate contextual effects, an alternative interpretation context must be 
sought which does; or if the propositional form derived via inferential enrichment 
fails to combine with existing assumptions to yield adequate contextual effects, an 
alternative interpretation may be sought. This follows from the characterisation (in 
17 An exception is Situation Theory which, according to Kempson (1994b: 143), is, apart from 
relevance theory, the only theory to propose a general solution to the problem of context dependence. 
(Sec Kempson 1994b for discussion. ) 
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§ 1.4.3) of utterance interpretation as being relevance-driven: every act of ostensive 
communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance. But, as 
we have seen, there are two sides to optimal relevance, since optimal relevance is 
defined in terms of adequate contextual effects and minimal processing effort 
(§ 1.4.1). It is to be expected, therefore, that speakers will employ strategies aimed at 
reducing addressees' processing requirements, by indicating in what way 
propositional forms are intended to achieve contextual effects. 
This is the basis of Blakemore's (1987) argument that some expressions, including so, 
too, after all and because, "impose constraints on the context in which the utterances 
containing them must be interpreted" (1987: 75). A dualistic semantics, in which 
Gricean conventional implicatures are viewed as imposing constraints on the contexts 
in which utterances containing them may occur, was proposed by Stalnaker 
(1974: 212). However, as S&W (1986: 263 n. 21) observed, in the absence of an 
account of the role of context in utterance interpretation, it was difficult to see why 
such structures should exist. Blakemore (1987,1988a, 1990) noted that since, in a 
relevance theoretic framework, the impact of an utterance depends on combining the 
proposition presented with a context (1988a: 187) as effectively as possible (i. e. for a 
minimal amount of processing effort), the use of structures whose "sole function is to 
guide the interpretation process by specifying certain properties of context and 
contextual effects" (1987: 77) is to be expected. She concludes: 
"This suggests a non-unitary theory of linguistic semantics. On the one 
hand, there is the essentially conceptual theory that deals with the way 
in which elements of linguistic structure map onto concepts - that is, 
onto constituents of propositional representations that undergo 
computations. On the other, there is the essentially procedural theory 
that deals with the way in which elements of linguistic structure map 
directly onto computations themselves - that is, onto mental 
processes. " 
(Blakemore 1987: 144) 
The types of computations which propositional representations can undergo can be 
divided into two broad categories: those which result in implicatures (assumptions not 
directly derived from information represented in logical form) and those which result 
in higher level explicatures (speech act information). Correspondingly we can expect 
there to be at least two types of procedural encoding: one which encodes constraints 
on implicatures and another which encodes constraints on higher-level explicatures. 
Both types of computation give rise directly to contextual effects, and (since neither 
contribute to inferential enrichment resulting in the identification of a propositional 
form, which occurs at phase two) occur at what I have termed phase three of utterance 
interpretation. Thus we can talk of procedural encoding (functioning) at phase three 
of utterance interpretation, whose purpose is to constrain the inferences drawn from 
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propositional representations, and thus aid the search for intended contextual effects. 
Such procedural encoding will be exemplified in §2.2. 
It has further been suggested (Wilson & Sperber 1993a) that procedural encoding may 
function at the level of linguistic semantic representation (that is, at phase two of 
utterance interpretation) to constrain the construction of propositional representations 
(the expression of experiential or ideational meaning in the terminology of functional 
grammar). I shall begin this discussion of Wilson & Sperber's proposals by clarifying 
some terminological vagueness, and in the process bring their account into line with 
my three-phase model of utterance interpretation. I shall then consider their extension 
of procedural encoding to include truth-conditional expressions. 
According to Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 2) the distinction between conceptual and 
procedural information corresponds to the distinction between the construction and 
the manipulation of conceptual representations: 
"inferential comprehension involves the construction and manipulation 
of conceptual representations. An utterance can thus be expected to 
encode two basic types of information: representational and 
computational, or conceptual and procedural - that is, information 
about the representations to be manipulated, and information about 
how to manipulate them. " 
(Wilson & Sperber 1993a: 2) 
Wilson & Sperber (1993a) use the term 'conceptual representation' to refer to two 
distinct types of mental object - one a representation of a proposition and the other a 
sub-propositional representation. This can be demonstrated as follows: Wilson & 
Sperber (1993a: 2) state that "some truth-conditional constructions encode concepts, 
others encode procedures, " where a construction is truth-conditional "if and only if it 
contributes to the proposition expressed" (W&S 1993a: 6). Thus, a conceptual 
representation whose manipulation is constrained by a truth-conditional construction 
must be less than fully propositional, since its manipulation contributes to the 
proposition of which it is part. Yet procedural constructions functioning at phase three 
(which Wilson & Sperber term procedural' and non-truth-conditional) constrain the 
manipulation of fully propositional conceptual representations. Wilson & Sperber 
(1993a) thus fail to make explicit that the term 'conceptual representation' refers to 
both propositional and sub-propositional conceptual representations. 18 
18 This lack of clarity is grounded in Wilson & Sperber's conflation of what I have termed phase two 
and phase three of utterance interpretation: "Our book Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986) treats 
utterance interpretation as a two-phase process: a modular decoding phase is seen as providing input to 
a central inferential phase in which a linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and 
used to construct a hypothesis about the speaker's informative intention. " (Wilson & Sperber 1993a: 1) 
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Wilson & Sperber note that the conceptual/procedural distinction is not coextensive 
with the traditional truth-conditional vs. non-truth-conditional distinction, nor with 
the other relevance theoretic distinction between explicit and implicit information. 
Explicit information concerns not only propositions, which have truth conditions, but 
also information about the speech acts an utterance is intended to perform, which is 
illocutionary as opposed to propositional, and therefore non-truth-conditional. Given 
that the conceptual/procedural distinction cross-cuts both the other distinctions, 
Sperber & Wilson (1993a) recognise six subcategories of linguistically encoded 
information, corresponding to the six 'head' categories in figure 5 below: 
Figure 5: Types of communicated information. 
information conveyed by an utterance 
ostensively not ostensively 
communicated communicated 
linguistically not linguistically 
communicated communicated 
linguistically not linguistically 
encoded encoded 
conceptually procedurally 
encoded encoded 
contn utes to contributes to constraints on constraints on 
explicatures implicatures explicatures implicatures 
conm utes to contributes to constraints on constraints on 
proposition higher-level proposition higher-level 
expressed explicatures expressed explicatures 
(Wilson & Sperber 1993a: 3) 
Below, I shall briefly discuss the six subcategories of linguistically encoded 
information posited by Wilson & Sperber (1993a), addressing first linguistically 
encoded conceptual information and then linguistically encoded procedural 
information. 
Conceptually encoded information which contributes to explicatures is viewed as 
being of two kinds: truth-conditional, which contributes to the proposition expressed, 
and non-truth-conditional, which contributes to higher-level explicatures. The former 
includes "most regular 'content' words" (W&S 1993a: 19); the latter includes, for 
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example, illocutionary adverbials such as seriously, frankly and confidentially, which 
are not constituents of the proposition expressed (W&S 1993a: 16-19). 
One further logically possible subcategory of linguistically encoded information 
which is included in figure 5 but not discussed elsewhere in W&S (1993a) is 
conceptually encoded information which contributes to implicatures. Deirdre Wilson 
(p. c. 16/6/94) has stated that, although this subcategory was left open, perhaps 
nothing fits in it. She has suggested that one might want to claim that, in Gricean 
terms, (2.1) conventionally implicates (2.2): 
(2.1) John isn't here yet. 
(2.2) John is expected. 
or that (2.3) conventionally implicates (2.4), 
(2.3) I didn't manage to finish the paper. 
(2.4) 1 tried to finish the paper. 
If this is so, words like yet and manage could be characterised as carrying 
conceptually encoded implicatures (either implicated premises or implicated 
conclusions). However, to claim that there are words that regularly carry a class of 
conceptually encoded implications is contradictory; decoding provides the `skeleton' 
of what is explicitly communicated, so unless a clear distinction can be drawn 
between "regularly carrying" and "encoding" no clear distinction can be made 
between implicatures and explicatures. In relevance theory, "explicit" is a degree 
term: the greater the amount of decoding involved in interpretation, the more explicit 
an explicature; the greater the degree of inference involved, the less explicit. This 
suggests that (2.2) and (2.4) should be treated as explicatures derived from utterances 
of (2.1) and (2.3) respectively, through a combination of inference and decoding (of 
yet and manage respectively). Even if the degree of decoding required were minimal 
in comparison to the amount of inference, these would still be cases of explicit 
communication. I conclude, therefore, that the subcategory of conceptually encoded 
information which contributes to implicatures is logically impossible. 
We turn now to linguistically encoded procedural information. Procedurally encoded 
information which imposes constraints on implicatures is non-truth-conditional and 
includes discourse connectives such as so and well (to be discussed below) which 
guide for intended contexts and contextual effects. Procedurally encoded information 
which imposes constraints on explicatures can also be non-truth-conditional, for 
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example illocutionary force indicators such as non-declarative syntactic mood, and 
the Kiswahili interrogative particle JE (see §2.2.3) which constrain higher-level 
explicatures (see § 1.3.3). Both kinds of non-truth-conditional procedurally encoded 
information were characterised above as procedural encoding functioning at phase 
three of utterance interpretation. In addition, Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 20) suggest 
that there is a subcategory of linguistically encoded information which imposes 
constraints on explicatures and is truth-conditional, the purpose of which is to 
constrain the proposition expressed. They propose that procedural encoding of this 
sort (which I have termed procedural encoding at phase two) includes I and other 
personal pronouns, which "guide the search for the intended referent, which is part of 
the proposition expressed" (W&S 1993a: 21). 
Implicit in Wilson & Sperber (1993a) is the suggestion that, since there are six 
logically possible subcategories of linguistically encoded information, we can expect 
there to be exponents of each category. I have just shown, however, that the 
subcategory of conceptually encoded information which contributes to implicatures is 
not, in fact, logically possible and therefore nothing can be expected to be an 
exponent of it. The other types of conceptual encoding are well attested, as are the 
two types of procedural encoding at phase three (see §2.2). Now that the symmetry 
has been broken, we would be justified in exhibiting scepticism with regard to the 
existence of the remaining subcategory - procedural encoding at phase two - 
exponents of which are not nearly so well attested. Further discussion of procedural 
encoding at phase two - its role in the construction of fully propositional conceptual 
representations and the type of expressions which might play such a role - will be 
resumed in chapter 3. Before then, I shall address some initial objections to the notion 
of procedural encoding in general (§2.1.2) and look at examples of procedural 
encoding at phase three (§2.2). 
2, L2 A reappraisal of the conceptual/procedural distinction 
Before turning to an exemplification of procedural encoding at phase three of 
utterance interpretation (to constrain the manipulation of propositional conceptual 
representations), I shall consider an objection to the whole notion of a 
conceptual/procedural distinction. The arguments with which I shall be concerned are 
due to Groefsema (1992) and arise from work within the relevance theoretic 
framework. Groefsema's arguments raise a number of issues which I shall take on 
board in subsequent investigations into procedural encoding at phase two and the 
characterisation of different types of procedural information. 
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Groefsema's arguments against a dualistic semantics assume Jackendoff's (1983) 
compositional theory of Conceptual Semantics (cf. Jackendoff 1990). Jackendoff 
proposed that meaning in natural language consists of information structures 
represented at the level of conceptual structure, the major units of which are 
conceptual constituents belonging to a small set of ontological categories: THING, 
EVENT, STATE, ACTION, PLACE, DIRECTION, PATH, PROPERTY, AMOUNT, MANNER 
(and also possibly: SOUND, SMELL and TIME). For Groefsema, these categories serve 
to specify the logical categories (variables over conceptual representations) of which 
S&W (1986) claims logical hypotheses consist. 
According to Groefsema (1992: 213-220) exponents of what I have termed both 
conceptual and procedural information are all concepts. Concepts provide access to 
logical selection frames, which specify: a) what a concept has to combine with to 
yield a well formed formula in the language of thought, and b) what conceptual 
category the concept belongs to (if any), and what the concept can combine with (if 
anything) to form a complex concept. She distinguishes between concepts which 
occur in conceptual structure (what I have termed conceptual information) and those 
which do not (what I have termed procedural information), the function of this latter 
sort of concept being "to constrain the interpretation of the utterance in which they 
occur in some way. " (Groefsema 1992: 217) 
As an example of a concept which occurs in conceptual structure (and is therefore an 
example of conceptual information), Groefsema (1992: 213-214) takes the verb hit, as 
in Pat hit Anne, which gives rise to the concept HIT: 
EV NT 
THING PRE71c TE 
HIT THING 
This gives access to the following logical selection frame: 
[[EVENT 
_] 
[PLACE] [TIME]] 
PROPOSITION 
[PREDICATE [HIT [THING]] ([MANNER]) ([PLACE]) ([PROPERTY*]) 
The top tier represents the fact that the concept expresses an event which occurs at a 
place and a time. The second tier indicates that hit is also a predicate which combines 
with a thing (Anne), and optionally with a manner (violently), a place (on the head), 
and a property (with a stick) - the star after PROPERTY indicates that the resulting 
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complex predicate can also have a property. Note that the term HIT appears as a 
constituent of the second tier of this logical selection frame. Concepts which occur in 
conceptual structure (i. e. which are represented within the logical selection frames to 
which they give rise) include verbs, nouns and adjectives (Groefsema 1992: 215-218). 
The complementizer that and the determiners a/an and the also give access to two-tier 
logical selection frames, but unlike HIT which belongs to the conceptual category 
PREDICATE, do not belong to any conceptual category - that is, they do not appear 
within the logical selection frames to which they give access. Groefsema (1992: 218) 
interprets a(n) as follows: 
what a(n) does is signal that an instance of a THING is at stake. In other 
words, it puts a constraint on the interpretation of a following THING. 
This means that the phonological or orthographic form a(n) maps onto 
a conceptual address A, which gives access to the following logical 
selection frame: 
[[EVENT/STATE [THING] [PREDICATE] [PLACE] [TIME]] 
PROPOSITION 
[THING] 
Individuation: 
Instance 
This contrasts with the definite article which gives rise to a logical selection frame 
identical to that of the indefinite article except that an instance of THING is an 
accessible19 instance rather than just an instance: 
[[EVENT/STATE [THING] [PREDICATE] [PLACE] [TIME]] 
PROPOSITION 
[THING] 
Individuation: 
Accessible instance 
Since these expressions do not occur in conceptual structure (that is, they do not 
appear within the logical selection frames to which they give access), they encode 
procedural information. This conforms to previous analyses of determiners, such as 
Hawkins (1978), which treat them as encoding processing instructions (see §3.1 for 
further discussion). What Groefsema's analysis demonstrates is that both conceptual 
and procedural information might, in principle, be amenable to semantic 
representation in terms of the same set of primitive ontological categories represented 
19 Groefsema (1992) adopts Kempson's (1988a) model of accessibility in discourse. 
4. 
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as abstract semantic representations in 'the language of thought'. 20 In this, she runs 
counter to Blakemore (1987) who, in line with S&W (1986), excluded all non- 
propositional information from logical form. Implicit in Blakemore's theory 
(according to Groefsema 1992: 219) is the suggestion that an expression encoding 
procedural information "can be an element of linguistic structure, but nevertheless not 
be part of the linguistic representation that [Blakemore] assumes is computed in the 
interpretation process [i. e. the logical form]. " Groefsema's response is to suggest that 
both conceptual and procedural information "must be represented in a format that can 
be 'read' by the central cognitive device, i. e. they must be represented in the language 
of thought. " (1992: 220) 
What Groefsema assumes is that every element of linguistic structure, once decoded, 
is represented in the language of thought; this she contrasts with the view that only 
logical forms, which are "blueprints for propositions" (Blakemore 1987: 18), are 
represented in the language of thought. An alternative view21 holds that although only 
conceptual information is represented in the language of thought, this can contribute 
either to propositions (the information in a logical form does this) or to higher-level 
explicatures, that is "conceptual representations [which] though true or false in their 
own right, ... do not generally contribute to the truth conditions of their associated 
utterances" (W&S 1993a: 16). Procedural information, on the other hand, is not 
represented in the language of thought, but rather consists of constraints which 
function rather like paths along which the interpretation of conceptual information is 
channelled. However, it is not obvious how or where procedural information is to be 
represented according to this view. 
I shall follow Groefsema in considering both conceptual and procedural information 
to be represented in the language of thought, but I shall retain the distinction between 
conceptual and procedural encoding by viewing the output of phase one of utterance 
interpretation (linguistic decoding) as giving rise to both conceptual representations 
and constraints on how those representations are to be manipulated. Crucially, it is 
whether an expression contains in its logical selection frame information about itself, 
or about whatever falls within its scope (the manipulation of which it constrains), that 
determines whether it encodes conceptual or procedural information. This is 
analogous to the syntactic information encoded by a linguistic expression which may 
state both the syntactic class of the encoding expression and the syntactic class of any 
20 In chapter 51 propose that, diachronically, exponents of procedural encoding may develop from 
exponents of conceptual encoding; this type of development could only be possible if conceptual and 
procedural information were related at some fundamental level of semantic representation. 
21 Deirdre Wilson, p. c. 28/10/95. 
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element with which the encoding expression may combine to form a well-formed 
string (subcategorization information). 
Thus Groefsema's arguments can be viewed as leading to a reformulation rather than 
a refutation of the conceptual/procedural distinction. The different types of 
linguistically encoded information which can be represented in the language of 
thought (i. e. as the output of phase one of utterance interpretation) are illustrated in 
figure 6 (figure 1 provides the wider context): 
Figure 6: Information types represented in the language of thought 
phase Logical form = blueprint for a proposition phase 
one (conceptual information contributing to propositions) two 
Conceptual information contributing to higher level 
explicatures + procedural information 
Before continuing with a discussion of procedural encoding at phase three - in which 
Groefsema's analysis of so will be discussed -I shall briefly outline two of the 
consequences of the above reformulation of the conceptual/procedural distinction in 
line with Groefsema's arguments. Firstly, the reformulation entails that, in principle, 
there is no reason why a single expression could not encode both conceptual and 
procedural information, since all stem from the same set of ontological categories. 
This possibility will be explored in relation to the identification of procedural 
encoding constraining phase two of utterance interpretation. Secondly, Groefsema 
suggests that not only propositions, but other less complex (i. e. sub-propositional) 
conceptual representations may be amenable to manipulation on the basis of 
linguistically encoded constraints on interpretation; she writes: 
"we do not have to postulate that there is a separate 'procedural theory' 
to account for the interpretation of discourse connectives. A 
consequence of this is that we end up with a unified account of 
constraints on interpretation: constraints may range over the kind of 
logical form that can be built, they may range over the interpretation of 
elements within a logical form..., or they may range over whole 
propositions, as is the case with so. " 
(Groefsema 1992: 220) 
This allows for the possibility of procedural information operating not only at phase 
three, constraining the inferences to be drawn from propositional conceptual 
representations, and at phase two, constraining the process of inferential enrichment 
of semantic representations (see §2.1.1), but also at phase one, constraining "the kind 
of logical form that can be built". If the informational encapsulation of the language 
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module is to be preserved (i. e. if the modularity hypothesis is to be retained) 
procedural information can operate at phase one only in so far as it imposes 
constraints on anticipatory logical hypotheses, thereby disposing amongst alternative 
logical forms and avoiding possible subsequent ambiguity; that is, procedural 
encoding at phase one, if it exists, will have an inhibitory effect only on the decoding 
process. However, phase one of utterance interpretation, being a fast and efficient 
modular process, involves relatively little processing effort in comparison with the 
inferential phases, and it is debatable whether procedural information at this phase, 
however it might function, would reduce overall processing effort. The possibility of 
procedural encoding at phase one will not be addressed here; instead I shall 
concentrate on procedural encoding at phases two and three. 
Exemplification of Procedural Encoding at Phase Three 
2.2.0 Introduction 
In this section I shall attempt to clarify the nature of procedural encoding at phase 
three with reference to four examples. I shall first review and extend accounts of two 
discourse connectives as exponents of procedural encoding: Blakemore's (1987, 
1988a) account of so and Jucker's (1993) account of well. Second, whilst there have 
been many relevance theoretic studies of discourse connectives (not just in English) 
which treat them as encoding procedural constraints on the computation of 
implicatures (cf. Luscher (1994) and references therein), there have been far fewer 
studies addressing non-lexically encoded information; the discussion of Vallduvi's 
(1993) theory of information packaging in §2.2.2 attempts to demonstrate how certain 
aspects of word order and intonation can also be accounted for in terms of procedural 
encoding constraining the computation of implicatures. 
Conversely, it has been suggested, with respect to the computation of higher-level 
explicatures, that non-declarative word order in English is an example of procedural 
encoding constraining the way in which a speaker intends a proposition to achieve 
relevance (Wilson & Sperber 1993a: 22). The suggestion is that the proposition is 
'mentioned' not as an assertion but in order to seek additional information about it, 
such as confirmation or disconfirmation of its truth. §2.2.3 suggests that procedural 
encoding of this sort can be lexical as well as syntactic and intonational, and takes the 
Kiswahili interrogative markers je and -je as an example. 
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2.2.1 Constraints on implicatures 1: Discourse connectives so and well 
So 
In this subsection I shall review Blakemore's (1987,1988a) procedural account of so. 
This begins with a discussion of Grice's brief comments on the role of therefore in 
(2.5): 
(2.5) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. 
Grice claimed that therefore in (2.5) indicates that his being brave is a consequence of 
his being an Englishman, However, the term consequence can indicate either causal 
effect: 
(2.6) He is an Englishman. Because of that he is brave. 
[Blakemore 1987 (20)] 
or a logical conclusion - i. e. the fact that he is an Englishman is evidence for the 
belief that he is brave. "in other words, " asks Blakemore (1987: 78), "does therefore 
indicate a causal relation between states of affairs or an inferential relation between 
propositions? " Because therefore in (2.5) is parenthetical, that is, it is intonationally 
separated from the rest of the utterance, as indicated by the commas, Blakemore 
(1987: 80) claims that therefore in (2.5) expresses an inferential relation; (2.5) does 
not mean (2.6). It is perhaps best not to read too much into Grice's use of parenthesis, 
however, it is still true to claim that (2.5) does not mean (2.6), if "mean" indicates 
semantic identity. Thus (2.5) could (minus parenthesis) be used to express the 
proposition in (2.6), or it could express that his being an Englishman is reason to 
believe that he is brave. 
In (2.7) and (2.8) on the other hand, only an inferential interpretation is possible: 
(2.7) She's your teacher. Therefore respect her. 
(2.8) She's your teacher. Therefore you must respect her. 
[Blakemore 1987 (23) and (24)] 
Blakemore (1988a: 186) notes that although therefore does not contribute to the truth- 
conditions of utterances that contain it, it does affect the way propositions are 
interpreted. In (2.5) for example, therefore indicates that the proposition [He is an 
Englishman] is relevant because it contributes evidence for the proposition [He is 
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brave]22. In other words, therefore provides addressees with an indication of how 
utterances containing it are to be inferentially interpreted in line with the principle of 
relevance. The least effort clause of the principle of relevance justifies the existence 
of such expressions, since by constraining the utterance interpretation process, 
therefore reduces the processing effort required to compute the relevance of an 
utterance containing it. 
So behaves similarly to therefore, but with some striking differences. Blakemore 
claims that so could replace therefore in all the above examples without infelicity 
except that therefore but not so can be used to express a causal connection. If so can 
be used to express causal connections it should always be possible to substitute it for 
expressions such as because of that and as a result without infelicity. Blakemore 
(1987: 88,1988a: 192) claims that (2.10) below is acceptable only to a hearer who 
already assumed that anyone who ate the *condemned meat would fall ill thirteen 
hours later (in which case so could indicate an inferential rather than a causal 
relation), whereas the acceptability of (2.9) does not depend on this prior assumption: 
(2.9) Tom ate the condemned meat. Because of that / As a result he fell ill 
thirteen hours later. 
(2.10) Tom ate the condemned meat. So he fell ill thirteen hours later. 
[Blakemore 1987 (40) and (41)] 
However, native speakers of British English (none of whom already entertained the 
assumption that eating condemned meat results in illness thirteen hours later) to 
whom (2.10) was presented have found it perfectly acceptable (and also where so has 
been replaced with therefore); they generally commented that thirteen hours later was 
incidental - the fact that Tom fell ill being the salient point. So can be used in other 
expressions in which the proposition it introduces is not already held as an 
assumption by the addressee and in which the relation between the states of affairs is 
a causal one. For example (2.11) below, describes a causal relation: 
(2.11) The child survived largely on a diet of maize and so developed kwashiorkor. 
I assume that most readers will be unfamiliar with kwashiorkor and yet still find 
(2.11) acceptable (if obscure). This demonstrates that so is not only acceptable when 
the addressee is assumed to already entertain the assumption that two conjoined 
propositions are causally linked in a particular way (and will hence form an 
22 These are strictly only propositions once the referent of `He' has been determined. Also, Blakemore 
(1992: 153 fn. 16) concedes that therefore can be truth-conditional and conceptual if (2.5) is interpreted 
as 'It is a consequence of his being an Englishman that he is brave. ' 
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inferential connection). The relevance of (2.11) above lies in the assumption that the 
child's kwashiorkor was caused by diet. The relevance of the more explicit (2.12), 
which defines kwashiorkor, lies in the implication that maize is not high in protein, 
which the addressee may or may not be assumed to entertain as an assumption, (a 
further highly relevant implication might be that a high protein diet will improve the 
child's health). 
(2.12) The child survived largely on a diet of maize and so developed kwashiorkor 
which is a wasting disease resulting from protein deficiency. 
Awareness that the link between the states of affairs, The child survived largely on a 
diet of maize' and The child developed kwashiorkor' is one of causal effect, arises 
from determining the contextual effects of an utterance of (2.11) on the basis of 
(among other factors) world knowledge. The relation between representations of 
these states of affairs, on the other hand, as encoded by so, is less precise, and 
consists simply of the instruction to make an (unspecified) inferential connection. 
Whilst the ability to express causal relations does not distinguish so and therefore, 
genuine differences between these forms can be seen in the following examples: 
(2.13) There's $5 in my wallet. So I didn't spend all my money then. 
(2.14) There's $5 in my wallet. ?? Therefore I didn't spend all my money then. 
[Blakemore 1988a (11) and (12)] 
"The addition of sentence final then in these examples indicates that 
the second proposition must be construed as the specification of the 
significance or relevance of the first proposition rather than as a 
proposition whose truth is proven by the first proposition. In other 
words, so, but not therefore can be used to indicate that the relevance 
of the proposition it introduces lies in the fact that it is a contextual 
implication of the first proposition. " 
(Blakemore 1988a: 188) 
The claim that, "so, but not therefore can be used to indicate that the relevance of the 
proposition it introduces lies in the fact that it is a contextual implication of the first 
proposition, " does not conflict with my arguments above that so can express causal 
connections. Contextual implications can arise when either a causal or an inferential 
relation is assumed to hold between two propositions. Expression of either type of 
relation is not part of the semantics of so; however an utterance containing so can be 
inferentially enriched to give rise to either of these readings. 
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In addition to indicating that one proposition is a contextual implication of another, so 
can be used to confirm the relevance of a remark by checking that the intended 
implication has in fact been drawn: 
(2.15) A: Tom's car isn't here. 
B: So he decided not to come after all. [Blakemore 1987 (34)] 
Or if the intended contextual implication (and hence the relevance) of a proposition is 
unclear, the response, 'So? ' or 'So what? ' may be appropriate, whereas 'Therefore? ' is 
not. 
One final difference between so and therefore cited by Blakemore is that so but not 
therefore can be used when there is no antecedent proposition. If the addressee arrives 
home laden with parcels, (2.16) but not (2.17) would be an appropriate response: 
(2.16) So, you've spent all your money. 
(2.17) ? Therefore, you've spent all your money. 
[Blakemore 1988a (13) and (14)] 
The preceding examples and analyses suggest that the semantics of so consists of an 
instruction to the hearer to establish an inferential connection with some mutually 
manifest assumption (not necessarily derived from a preceding utterance as we have 
seen). Although a conceptual representation derived from an utterance of a sentence 
containing so may contain an assumption functionally equivalent to the logical 
operator =), this is inferred rather than encoded by so. 
So has other discourse functions which can be accounted for by the above 
characterisation of its semantics. Firstly, so often marks a change of topic or a return 
to a previous topic. For example, 
(2.18) So, what shall we have for dinner? 
uttered `out of the blue' is felicitous when something in the utterance interpretation 
context makes this a relevant remark; in fact (2.18) was uttered at about six o'clock 
when dinner is usually prepared (all the following examples were noted in authentic 
conversation). The utterance of (2.18) served a dual purpose: it posed a worthwhile 
question and it drew the addressee's attention to the fact that the underlying 
proposition, `we shall have dinner', was inferable from the context; that is, it 
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prompted the addressee to pay attention to the context, specifically the time. In 
Blakemore's example, 
(2.16) So, you've spent all your money. 
the communicative intention could be as much to draw the addressee's attention to the 
number of parcels they are carrying and to the fact that the speaker has noticed this, as 
it is to convey the proposition expressed. The speaker of (2.16) may well not be 
concerned with its truth; an utterance of (2.16), as of (2.18), is a device for making 
some mutually manifest assumption more manifest. 
So can also be used to mark a return to a previous topic, like `as I was saying' with 
which it can co-occur. So makes explicit the fact that there is some inferential 
connection between the context and the content of the following utterance, and can 
direct the addressee to view the content of the forthcoming utterance as inferable from 
some mutually manifest assumption. Related to this is the use of so in phatic 
communication, where it can precede a representation of an event which is not merely 
inferable from some mutually manifest assumption but is identical with one: 
(2.19) So, here we are. 
This conveys no new information, but merely makes explicit some mutually manifest 
assumption. So is also commonly used in introductions, for example at parties, and in 
interviews and supervisory sessions: 
(2.20) So, how do you know Nickie? 
(2.21) So, how's the work going? 
Here, so introduces a new topic which is in some way derivative from the context. In 
(2.20) both the interlocutors were unknown to each other but met at Nickie's party, 
therefore it can be assumed that both know Nickie. In (2.21) the mutually manifest 
assumption is that the interlocutors have met for a supervisory session in which the 
addressee's work will be discussed. 
The above paraphrase of the semantics of so can be augmented to take account of this 
retrospective effect: The semantics of so consists of an instruction to the hearer to 
establish an inferential connection with some mutually manifest assumption (not 
necessarily derived from a preceding utterance) to which it may in turn draw the 
addressee's attention. 
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I shall now compare the above paraphrase of the semantics of so with Groefsema's 
(1992) analysis of so as encoding a concept which gives access to a particular logical 
selection frame. A successful reformulation of content of this selection frame (as an 
example) will lend support my adoption of a number of Groefsema's arguments in 
§2.1.2. 
Like the definite and indefinite articles, the discourse connective so does not belong 
to any conceptual category according to Groefsema (1992), and neither can it 
combine with anything to yield a well formed formula in the language of thought. 
There is therefore only one tier (the top tier) in Groefsema's (1992: 220) representation 
of so, since. the lower tier contains no information: 
[PROPOSITION] 
logical consequence of a proposition in context 
There are three faults with Groefsema's representation of so: First, Groefsema 
(1992: 220) claims that "by necessity so introduces a proposition" which is indicated 
in the logical selection frame of the concept SO as [PROPOSrrroN]. This is clearly not 
the case as the examples (2.7) and (2.18) illustrate: 
(2.7) b. She's your teacher, so respect her. 
(2.18) So, what shall we have for dinner? 
In (2.7b) so introduces an imperative and in (2.18) it introduces a wh-interrogative. In 
these examples so could be viewed as introducing a complex proposition (as opposed 
to more than one conjoined propositions) if the Davidsonian approach to mood and 
performance is adopted, although there is no evidence that this is (consciously) the 
case. In the speech act literature (e. g. Davidson 1979), utterances of non-declarative 
sentences have been analysed as consisting of the performance of two speech acts; a 
non-declarative sentence consists of a declarative core plus a 'mood-setter'. Both the 
declarative core and the mood-setter have a truth value (unlike the combined 
utterance, since this is not the utterance of a conjunction), and may therefore have the 
status of propositions. However, this entails that, in relevance theoretic terms, the 
propositional attitude of an utterance is as much a proposition (albeit a dependant 
one) as the propositional form itself; in this case the distinction, which Groefsema 
(1992) consistently makes, between logical form (which can be enriched into a 
propositional form) and semantic representations other than logical form (including 
those elements which can be enriched into a propositional attitude) must be vacuous. 
Second, the logical selection frame of so contains the information that the proposition 
introduced by so is a logical consequence of a proposition in context; as we have 
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seen, however, one of the differences between so and therefore is that so but not 
therefore can be used when there is no overt antecedent proposition (for example in 
response to the addressee arriving home laden with parcels): 
(2.16) So, you've spent all your money. 
(2.17) ? Therefore, you've spent all your money. 
This leads to the third inadequacy of Groefsema's representation of so which is that, 
as it stands, the logical selection frame proposed for SO could, if its inaccuracies were 
overlooked, serve equally well as the logical selection frame of THEREFORE. In other 
words, it fails to capture the differences between so and therefore, and suggests that 
both so and therefore map onto the same concept. To avoid these inadequacies, the 
logical selection frame for SO could be reformulated as follows: 
[[PROPOSITION] ([PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE])] 
inferentially connected with some mutually manifest assumption 
The fact that an instance of so gives rise to the above logical selection frame also 
accounts for the fact that so may draw the addressee's attention to some mutually 
manifest assumption, since explicit mention is made of some such assumption in the 
logical selection frame itself. 
WelP3 
According to Jucker's (1993) procedural analysis, the presence of the discourse 
connective well in an utterance serves to help the addressee select the intended 
interpretation context. It does this in a negative way, by indicating that the currently 
most accessible context is inappropriate, thus saving the addressee the effort of 
searching in vain for contextual effects in that context. The aspects of the utterance 
interpretation context to which well draws the addressee's attention are assumptions 
made on the basis of previous discourse. Jucker describes well as, 
"a signpost signalling to the hearer that the context created by the 
previous utterance - whether produced by the current speaker or the 
current hearer - is not the most relevant one for the interpretation of the 
impending utterance. " 
(Jucker 1993: 440) 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, well is commonly used by politicians in radio and 
television interviews. Jucker (1993) identifies four distinct uses of well which will be 
exemplified in turn (all examples are from The World at One, BBC Radio 4,22/9/95): 
23 An earlier version of this sub-section appeared as part of Nicolle (1995). 
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i) as a marker of insufficiency, for instance in response to an interrogative where 
yes/no is not a sufficient response, or where neither straightforward agreement nor 
denial is an appropriate response to a statement, as in the reply given by David Davis 
(British Foreign Office Minister) to A's question in (2.22): 
(2.22) A: ... now that surely is not being at the heart of Europe that is, as 
Robin 
Cook says, an acceptance sometimes of marginalisation ... if 
it is in 
Britain's interest. 
DD: Well, you may view it as marginalisation ... 1. let me give you an 
example... 
(2.23) A: What um was Mr. Major's mood when he arrived there is he is he look- 
ing forward to this or is he think he's going to get as ... tough a time as he usually gets at these mini summits? 
B: Well he seemed in a very bouncy mood... 
The use of well in (2.23) can be analysed as a marker of insufficiency for various 
reasons. First, A asks three separate questions of B, so clearly a straightforward yes or 
no response is insufficient. Also, if B is taken as responding to the final question 
about whether Mr. Major thinks he is going to have a tough time, the use of well 
indicates that B doesn't know what Mr. Major thinks (he has insufficient knowledge 
to answer this question) but from appearances the affirmative response which A 
seems to expect is mistaken. 
ii) as a face-threat mitigator, by which Jucker means that the presence of well 
indicates a problem on the interpersonal level in which either interlocutor risks losing 
face should their background assumptions be contradicted. In (2.24) Frank Dobson 
(Labour's local government spokesman) risks losing face if he accepts the suggestion 
that certain aspects of his party's latest policy document have not been thought 
through: 
(2.24) A: what about these hit squads who would go in if there is - it sounds 
rather like a broken marriage - if there is an 'irretrievable breakdown in' I mean who decides if it is [broken down] 
FD: [w... W... W... I well it's set out i. ... it's set out very clearly in the document. 
iii) as a frame, separating discourse units, in particular at the beginning of a turn, or to 
introduce direct reported speech (note that in (2.25) well indicates a new topic, but 
occurs, not at the beginning of the turn, but after a short preamble which sets the 
scene for the topic without adequately introducing it): 
63 
(2.25) A: ... the 
Tories lose no opportunity of pointing to either financial 
fecklessness or political correctness in local Labour-run councils. 
Well today Labour has unveiled its plans for reinvigorating local 
government... 
(2.26) B: I asked him specifically about that speech and how it should be 
interpreted by ... Europe's 
leaders and he said well that's exactly the 
same sort of thing that I was trying to say at er Leiden. 
iv) as a delay device. Jucker's example and comment are given: 
(2.27) R: ... well never mind. 
It's not important. 
D: Well, it is important. 
(Pomerantz 1987: 74) 
In this use there is some overlap with the category of well as a face- 
threat mitigator because here, too, well indicates problems on the 
interpersonal level. " 
(Jucker 1993: 448) 
Jucker's analysis is essentially accurate, but can be refined in two respects. First, 
intonation is crucial to the interpretation of well. Jucker only mentions prosody once, 
in his discussion of well as a frame, and then only to dismiss it as largely irrelevant: 
"If the words in reported direct speech cannot be claimed to be 
verbatim, it makes little sense to distinguish between those instances of 
well that belong to the reporting clause and those that belong to the 
quotation. The original words may or may not have included well, 
even if the prosody of the reporting clause and the quotation seem to 
indicate a difference between the two. " 
(Jucker 1993: 447) 
Prosodically, well, like so and other discourse connectives, is -parenthetical; a number 
of distinct prosodic forms can be distinguished in utterances of well in discourse. As a 
marker of insufficiency, well is typically lengthened and at a steady, moderately high 
pitch level; as a face-threat mitigator, well is again typically lengthened but with a 
rising-falling pitch; and as a frame, it is significantly shorter in duration than in its 
other uses and may occur at various pitch levels. As a delay device, there is 
considerable prosodic variation and any of the above three prosodic forms are 
possible, which leads to my second refinement of Jucker's analysis: that the use of 
well as a delay device can invariably be subsumed under one of the other three uses. 
An utterance of well as a discourse marker, in whatever use, indicates, (a) an intention 
to speak, and (b) that the most accessible background assumptions are insufficient for 
the interpretation of the impending utterance. Hearers will therefore assume that there 
is no point in continuing or initiating their own turn until the background assumptions 
have been renegotiated. A delay may then follow in order to give the interlocutors 
time to reorient their assumptions - the new addressee with regard to what aspect of 
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the current context is irrelevant for the interpretation of the impending utterance 
(based on an analysis of prosody), and the new speaker with regard to what 
background assumptions can be mutually assumed, how to tactfully save face, etc. 
This analysis could be falsified if it could be shown that well is ever used in situations 
where the most accessible background assumptions are clearly appropriate and 
sufficient and where this was recognised by the speaker. Consider the following 
(invented) dialogue: 
(2.28) A: Could I borrow your pen, please? 
B: Well, yes. 
B's response would be felicitous if well were used as a marker of insufficiency ('Well, 
yes, but it's not working very well'), as a face-threat mitigator ('Well, yes, of course 
you can - you don't have to ask'), or as a frame ('Well, yes, I've been meaning to have 
a discussion with you about pens... '). However, where none of these situations pertain, 
the use of well is infelicitous, and so the procedural analysis of well is not falsified. 
In summary, then, what is common to all the uses of well is the function of indicating 
that the currently most salient context is deficient in some way for the correct 
interpretation of the forthcoming utterance. The semantics of the discourse connective 
well is unitary, but underdetermined; intonation is one indication of the way in which 
well is to be inferentially enriched to specify more precisely the nature of the 
contextual deficiency. (Thereby demonstrating that semantic representations of 
linguistically encoded elements outside of logical form can also undergo inferential 
enrichment. ) 
Conclusion 
I began my investigation into so and well with the claim that they both encode 
procedural information constraining phase three of utterance interpretation, the output 
of which is a contextual effect (or effects). Specifically, they perform this function by 
stipulating constraints on the identification of implicatures; implicatures are 
assumptions which are communicated by the use of a particular utterance without 
being developments of the logical form encoded by that utterance. In §1.4.1, 
contextual effects were defined as assumptions arising out of the union of 'old 
information' (C), that is, currently held assumptions, and 'new information' (P), 
typically assumptions ostensively communicated by a speaker. It is the 
'contextualisation' of (P) in (C), that is, the way in which (P) is related to (C), that 
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determines which contextual effect(s) are computed by the addressee. I have 
demonstrated that what discourse connectives do is constrain the contextualisation of 
(P) in (C). The use of the term 'discourse connective' to designate so and well is 
somewhat misleading, since it suggests that what so and well connect is stretches of 
discourse. As we have seen, this is not always the case (see for example (2.16)); there 
are many ways in which prior assumptions (C) can come to be held, and previous 
discourse is only one of them. 
The contextualisation of (P) in (C) is constrained in the following different (and 
contradictory) ways by so and well. So instructs the addressee to establish an 
inferential connection between (P) and (C), and in the process may guide the 
addressee to the particular mutually manifest assumption(s) of which (C) consists. 
Well, on the other hand, indicates that the speaker's intended contextual effects will 
not be computed if (P) is contextualised in (C), where (C) consists of the currently 
most accessible background assumptions. That is, it signals that (C) is inappropriate, 
thus indicating that the addressee should select an alternative set of background 
assumptions (C) in which to contextualise (P). Intonational differences provide 
some indication as to the nature of the inappropriateness of (C). 
Some of the communicative functions of both so and well are illustrated in the 
following (authentic) exchange, which will be analysed in accordance with the above 
characterisations of so and well: 
(2.29) A (a teacher): We're having a non-uniform day at school tomorrow. 
B (A's husband): What, for the staff as well? 
A: Yes. 
I gap of approximately ten minutes] 
B: So, what are you going to wear tomorrow? 
A: Well... I don't know. 
B's use of so helps A to determine the intended contextual effects of his utterance in 
the following way: So indicates that there is an inferential connection between {P) 
(the assumptions derivable from the question "what are you going to wear 
tomorrow? ") and some mutually manifest assumption or set of assumptions (C); this 
prompts A to look for some mutually manifest assumption on the basis of which (P) 
could be inferred. This assumption was made mutually manifest some ten minutes 
previously through A's utterance "We're having a non-uniform day at school 
tomorrow" from which it can be inferred that A has to make a decision about what to 
wear. A's use of well in response to B's question indicates that the currently most 
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accessible assumption (C) is inappropriate and hence A's response (P') will fail to 
achieve the intended contextual effects if contextualised in (C'). The assumption that 
A has decided what to wear (inferred from the use of ... going to wear - see 
§6.4) is 
inappropriate because false, hence A uses well as a marker of insufficiency. 
2.2.2 Constraints on implicatures 2: Information packaging 
Thus far, I have demonstrated that procedural information constraining the 
identification of implicatures can be lexically encoded in the form of discourse 
connectives. I shall now investigate whether, and in what ways, such procedural 
information might be encoded syntactically. It has been suggested (Wilson & Sperber 
1993a) that differences in word order can (in English) encode procedural information 
which contributes to higher-level explicatures through differences in mood (indicated 
by the respective ordering of the grammatical subject and finite verb of a clause). 
Differences in word order can also constrain the proposition expressed: 
Mary loves Peter vs. Peter loves Mary 
At other times, differences in word order merely guide the search for intended 
contexts and contextual effects without altering either the proposition or the higher 
level explicatures associated with unmarked declarative word order. Examples 
include: 
topicalisation: She loves Peter vs. Peter she loves 
passives: Peter is loved by Mary 
clefts: It's Peter that she loves 
pseudo-clefts: Who she loves is Peter, etc. 
The effect of such differences in word order is to specify the nature of the relation 
between the associated proposition and the utterance interpretation context; in other 
words, to guide the addressee as to how (P) is to be contextualised in (C). Similar 
effects can be achieved in many languages through variations in intonation. Thus, 
word order can contribute both conceptual and procedural information. This fact is 
reflected in functional grammar, with its long established three-way division into 
experiential meaning (propositional), interpersonal meaning (syntactic mood and 
illocutionary force: higher-level explicatures in relevance theoretic terms) and textual 
meaning (which excludes. higher-level explicatures and is characterised syntactically 
as theme-rheme). 
67 
What functional grammarians call textual meaning is developed in Vallduvi's (1993, 
1994) theory of information packaging. Whilst Vallduvi"s theory of information 
packaging is neither a branch of functional grammar nor a form of relevance theory (it 
is, rather, a version of update semantics incorporating ideas drawn from Heim's File 
Change Semantics, and, like relevance theory, assumes a generative perspective) it is 
discussed here since most relevance theoretic accounts of procedural constraints on 
implicatures have followed Blakemore's lead in dealing with lexical rather than 
syntactic procedural encoding. I shall demonstrate that, whilst Vallduvi (1993) 
provides a detailed analysis of information packaging in English and Catalan in 
particular, the principle of relevance provides a complementary account of why 
interlocutors exploit information packaging resources. 
Information packaging is a pragmatic notion concerning the processing of 
information, where `information' is defined by Vallduvi as that part of the 
propositional content of a sentence which contributes to the hearer's knowledge-store. 
Information packaging consists of a small set of linguistically encoded instructions 
with which a speaker instructs a hearer to retrieve the information carried by a 
sentence and enter it into her/his knowledge-store in a specific way (Vallduvf 
1993: 14-18). In relevance theoretic terms, information packaging involves constraints 
on how new assumptions are intended to be added to existing ones - i. e. it constrains 
the addressee's search for intended contextual effects. Specifically, information 
packaging guides the addressee towards those subsets of the communicated 
assumptions which constitute (P) and (C), such that the contextualisation of (P) in 
(C) will result in adequate contextual effects at the cost of minimal processing effort. 
I shall address this relevance theoretic interpretation after a brief discussion of 
information packaging itself. 
Vallduvfs theory of information packaging is restricted in that information packaging 
does not belong to the same class as illocutionary acts (Vallduvf 1993: 30-31) or 
Gricean implicature (ibid. 31-33), both of which are subsumed under relevance 
theory. Furthermore, Sperber & Wilson's discussion of "stylistic effects" (S&W 
1986: 202), roughly equivalent in scope to the textual part of meaning in functional 
grammar, subsumes both information packaging considerations and cohesion 
(Halliday & Hasan 1976). There is a high degree of compatibility between the 
theories however. Both theories reject such distinctions as theme-rheme, topic-focus, 
given-new, as adequate to a linguistic description of sentences (Vallduvf 1993: 35-53; 
S&W 1986: 210-217), but recognise that utterances of sentences can contain more 
informative and less informative parts (Vallduvf 1993: 35) corresponding to 
foreground and background, which "arise as automatic effects of the hearer's 
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tendency to maximise relevance, and of the speaker's exploitation of that tendency" 
(S&W 1986: 217). 
Whilst Vallduvi describes in some detail the S-structure realisation of information 
packaging, Sperber & Wilson merely refer to such a possibility in a footnote 
(1986: 263 n. 21), and subsequent relevance theoretic studies have concentrated on 
lexically encoded procedural indicators such as well and so rather than on procedural 
syntax. Vallduvf posits a distinction between LF (logical form in GB) and information 
structure (IS) whereby IS is derived from S-structure in the same way that LF is, 
according to transformational rules. In the same way that LF links S-structure and 
logical semantics, IS links S-structure and informatics (Vallduvf 1993: 142). Vallduvf 
(1993: 54-65) characterises the S-structure realisation of IS in the following terms: 
S =(FOCUS, GROUND) GROUND = (TAIL, LINK) 
The FOCUS is "the only nonelidable part of the sentence, since it is the only 
contribution to the hearer's knowledge-store at the time of utterance (or so the speaker 
assumes)" (Vallduvi 1993: 57-8). In relevance theoretic terms, the FOCUS can be 
viewed as the new information contained in (P). The LINK is the "address pointer" 
and - obligatorily in Catalan or, in English, when not prosodically marked - must be 
sentence-initial, following Halliday's (1967) restriction on themes. In the same way 
that there can be multiple themes, there can be more than one LINK in a sentence (a 
"link string"). The TAIL is what remains. I shall view the LINK and the TAIL as 
specifying that subset of {C) in which a contextualisation of {P) is intended to 
achieve adequate contextual effects. The LINK and TAIL both express `background 
information' in the sense of S&W (1986: 202-217) and are informationally more alike 
than distinct; indeed Vesselin Vatchkov (p. c. 9/6/96) has suggested - on account of 
cross-linguistic data from `pragmatically ordered languages' (Mithun 1992) such as 
Cayuga (Iroquoian), Ngandi (Australian) and Coos (Penutian, Oregon) which present 
focal information first (and therefore have no LINKs), and languages like Czech which 
typically present focal information last (and therefore rarely exhibit TAILs) - that the 
LINK/TAIL distinction be abandoned in favour of some kind of `split topic' (or split 
GROUND) analysis. Whilst bearing these considerations in mind, I shall maintain 
Vallduvi's terminology as it provides a convenient representation of IS in English, 
Catalan and Kiswahili - the languages discussed here. 
On the basis of English and Catalan data, Vallduvi (1993: 62-65) identifies four 
possible "formational structures" that a sentence can have; they are: LINK-FOCUS; 
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ALL-FOCUS; LINK-FOCUS-TAIL; FOCUS-TAIL. For example, (2.30) exhibits the 
informational structure LINK-FOCUS-TAIL: 
(2.30) a. The boss HATES broccoli. 
b. L'amo 11' ODIA ti el bröquil. 
LINK FOCUS TAIL (Vallduvi 1993: 92) 
In contrast, (2.31) and (2.32a) are informationally ALL-FOCUS constructions: 
(2.31) What doesn't the boss like? 
BROCCOLI. (Vallduvi 1993: 93) 
(2.32) How does the boss feel about broccoli? 
a. He HATES it. (Vallduvi 1993: 92) 
Although 'He' looks like a LINK, directing the addressee to a certain address, in fact 
(2.32a) has no LINK since the speaker assumes the addressee is already at the 
appropriate address. 24 Furthermore, in Catalan (and other pro-drop languages) there is 
no overt counterpart to the 'weak' or unstressed 'He' of (2.32a) which indicates that 
this cannot, therefore, be a LINK: 
(2.32) b. pro 1' ODIA. (ibid. ) 
Similarly, whilst 'broccoli' in (2.30a) is a TAIL, 'it' in (2.32a) is not, given the virtual 
ungrammaticality of (2.32c) with a stressed 'IT': 
(2.32) c. He hates IT. (ibid. ) 
Whilst Vallduvf (1993) provides a detailed account of how differences in word order 
interact with the utterance interpretation process, relevance theory accounts for why 
such differences occur and are to be expected. The principle of relevance states that 
every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of adequate 
contextual effects for minimal processing effort; this principle can be seen at work in 
each of the above examples. If the White House chef announced that broccoli in a 
24 This is born out experimentally by Garrod et a! (1994) who demonstrate that the use of pronouns 
such as 'He' as opposed to more explicit referential expressions such as 'The boss' enables the 
processing system to interact directly with the active discourse representation; this could explain the 
'repeated name penalty' suggested by experiments reported in Gordon & Chan (1995) whereby the use 
of repeated names rather than pronouns (independent of the thematic roles of these) increases 
processing time. The semantics of pronouns is discussed in §3.1. 
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creamy sauce was on the menu some years ago, this would make assumptions 1 and 2 
manifest to the addressee(s) and would allow the addressee(s) to infer assumptions 3, 
4,5, etc. depending on their individual background knowledge: 
1. The diners will be eating broccoli; 
2. the broccoli will be served in a creamy sauce; 
3. the diners like broccoli in a creamy sauce; 
4. the President, George Bush, will be among the diners; 
5. the First Lady will be among the diners, etc. 
These are all possible assumptions against which an utterance (by the head waiter) of 
(2.30a) could be processed: 
(2.30) a. The boss HATES . broccoli. 
LINK FOCUS TAIL 
The response in (2.30a) achieves optimal relevance in the following way: The FOCUS 
'HATES' specifies new information which is neither manifest in the chef's 
announcement, nor inferable from it, and is therefore prosodically marked (Vallduvrs 
use of capitals indicates this). Identification of the FOCUS activates a focal scale of 
entailments which includes the background entailment `the President feels some way 
about broccoli' (combining the LINK and the TAIL). This background assumption 
results from the following chain of inferences: (i) combine assumptions 3 and 4 by 
modus ponens, giving `the President likes broccoli in a creamy sauce', (ii) trivially 
infer `the President likes broccoli', (iii) trivially infer `the President feels some way 
about broccoli'. This chain of background entailments constitutes (C), the subset of 
existing assumptions against which (2.30a) is intended to be processed. However, the 
assumption `the President likes broccoli' is contradicted by the proposition expressed 
by (2.30a), so (2.30a) achieves relevance by eliminating this assumption from (C}. 
Had `The boss' been the FOCUS, it would have given rise to a chain of entailments 
including `somebody hates broccoli'; since this is not a background assumption, 
making `the boss' the FOCUS in this exchange would have been infelicitous. 
Similarly, making `broccoli' the FOCUS would have given rise to a chain of 
entailments including `the boss hates something' which again is not a background 
assumption, and would have resulted in infelicity. 
We now turn to the ALL-FOCUS constructions: 
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(2.31) (C) What doesn't the boss like? 
{P) BROCCOLI. 
(2.32) (C) How does the boss feel about broccoli? 
{P} He HATES it. 
In (2.31) (C) consists of the assumption that the boss doesn't like something plus the 
higher level explicature that the speaker would like to know what this is; (P), the 
response 'BROCCOLI', thus achieves adequate contextual effects (it specifies what 
the boss doesn't like) for minimal processing effort. In (2.32) {C) consists of the 
assumption that the boss entertains some feeling about broccoli plus the higher level 
explicature that the speaker would like to know what this is; (P), the response 'He 
HATES it' achieves adequate contextual effects (it specifies how the boss feels about 
broccoli) whilst putting the addressee to minimal processing effort. The pronouns 'he' 
and 'it' are grammatical requirements since English generally requires an overt 
grammatical subject in each clause and the verb hate subcategorises for an object. 
Information packaging considerations and the relevance theoretic justification for 
them outlined above hold also for Kiswahili. Variations in word order are used more 
frequently in Kiswahili than in English to indicate procedural information and 
associated contextual effects such as implicit contrast and emphasis. Reasons for this 
include the lack of a syntactic mood function in Kiswahili to constrain higher-level 
explicatures (as noted in §2.2.3 below), and the fact that Kiswahili speakers often 
employ syntactic and morphological devices where English speakers might use 
intonation. The following examples demonstrate how word order contributes to 
procedural meaning at phase three in Kiswahili. Examples (2.33) to (2.38), below, all 
refer to the same event; all convey precisely the same conceptual information, except 
(2.38) which omits mention of agency. Differences in procedural information will be 
described by reference to Vallduvfs classification. 
[Key: SP ='subject prefix'; OM ='object marker'; subscripted numbers refer to noun 
class (final -a is the indicative suffix). More detailed information on Kiswahili is 
provided in §3.1.3. ] 
(2.33) A: What did you do? 
B: ni + li + vunja kikombe 
SP PAST break cuP7 
I broke a cup 
formational structure ALL-FOCUS 
72 
Since (2.33) is discourse initial it can make no reference to any assumption 
established by previous discourse; all of the information is new information, i. e. (P), 
and so (2.33) is ALL-FOCUS. 
(2.34) A: What did you do to the cup? 
B: ni + li + ki + vunja 
SP PAST OM7 break 
I broke it 
formational structure ALL-FOCUS 
In (2.34), the morphologically bound pronouns ni- and -ki- (SP and OP respectively) 
are functioning like the pronouns in (2.32a); both require a minimal amount of 
processing effort and refer to highly accessible antecedents and therefore neither is a 
LINK or a TAIL. 
(2.35) A: What happened to the cup? 
B: (kikombe) ni + li + ki + vunja 
cup? SP PAST OM7 break 
(the cup) I broke it 
formational structure (LINK) FOCUS 
(2.36) A: What happened to the cup? 
B: ni + li + ki + vunja (kikombe) 
SP PAST OM7 break cups 
I broke it (the cup ) 
formational structure FOCUS (TAIL) 
In both (2.35) and (2.36) the VP nilikivunja (I broke it) is the FOCUS since it 
constitutes the new information, (P), to be contextualised in (C) which contains the 
assumption 'something happened to the cup'. The use of kikombe (the cup) as a LINK 
or TAIL is informationally superfluous (it is obvious that the cup is at issue) but by 
directing A towards this address nonetheless, B topicalises kikombe (for example the 
cup might have been faulty, or the cup was broken in contrast to, say, the teapot when 
both were dropped). 
(2.37) A: Who broke the cup? 
B: (kikombe) ki + 1i + vunj +w+a na mimi 
cups SP7 PAST break PASSIVE by me 
(the cup) was broken by me 
formational structure (LINK) LINK FOCUS 
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(2.38) A: 
B: 
formational structure 
What happened to the cup? 
(kikombe) ki + me + vunj + ik +a 
cups SP7 PERF break STATIVE 
(the cup) broke 
(LINK) FOCUS 
(with the stative suffix there can be no reference to an agent) 
Finally, (2.37) and (2.38) differ primarily over whether agency is mentioned. In both, 
kikombe has been made the grammatical subject but whilst (2.37) provides the 
information that it was B who broke the cup, and hence mimi (me) is the FOCUS, 
(2.38) omits mention of the agent (using the stative rather than the passive suffix) and 
makes the VP kimevunjika ('it broke') the FOCUS, thereby excluding the question of 
agency (and hence guilt) from the contextual effects which A is licensed to deduce. 
Although, the propositional form of (2.33) to (2.37) is the same, the procedural 
information encoded by the variations in syntax and agreement, together with passive 
and stative morphology in (2.37) and (2.38) respectively, imposes various constraints 
on the processing of utterances of these examples. For example, B's response in (2.37) 
would be inappropriate in response to the question What did you do? The LINK or 
TAIL, when realised, must refer back to a relevant constituent of the utterance 
interpretation context (C), and the FOCUS should identify the new information (P) 
which the addressee is expected to add to (C). 
Summary 
Information packaging reduces the addressee's processing effort by indicating, 
through systematic variations in word order and intonation, those subsets of the 
communicated assumptions which constitute (P) and (C}. Speakers do not use the 
information packaging resources of their language to provide additional information, 
rather they use information packaging to present information in such a way as to 
facilitate the contextualisation of new information (P) in existing assumptions (C). 
The function of a LINK or a TAIL is to specify the subset of existing assumptions 
which constitutes (C); where the relevant subset of existing assumptions is mutually 
manifest, the speaker does not need to provide a LINK or a TAIL and may use, say, a 
pronoun rather than a definite description. The FOCUS specifies the new information 
(P) and is non-elidable and may be intonationally prominent. Taken as a whole, 
information packaging has the effect of reducing the effort required by the addressee 
to contextualise (P) in (C), and can therefore be classified as an example of 
procedural encoding at phase three constraining the computation of implicatures. 
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2.2.3 Constraints on higher-level explicatures: Kiswahili iel-ie interrogatives 
So far I have discussed procedural encoding at phase three constraining the 
computation of implicatures. Such encoding can be both lexical, as in the case of the 
discourse connectives so and well, and syntactic, in the case of information 
packaging. We have also seen that intonation has a role to play, and could also be 
viewed as encoding procedural information. We now turn to the second type of 
procedural encoding at phase three (first mentioned in §2.1.1) - procedural encoding 
which constrains the interpretation of higher-level explicatures (introduced in § 1.3.3) 
which indicate propositional attitudes and speech act information. In §2.1.1 I noted 
Wilson & Sperber's (1993a) claim that differences in mood in English encode 
procedural information, the purpose of which is to constrain the identification of 
higher-level explicatures. Such information comes in various forms. Wh-questions 
present the addressee with an incomplete proposition and an indication as to how the 
speaker would like it completed, encoded by a particular interrogative expression. 
Polar interrogatives (yes-no questions) may be indicated by changes in word order, 
distinctive intonation, interrogative particles, or a combination of these. This 
information may also be conveyed intonationally in English. As an example of lexical 
rather than syntactic procedural encoding constraining higher-level explicatures, I 
have selected the Kiswahili interrogative markers je and -je. 
Ashton (1947: 151) lists three ways in which questions can be formed in Kiswahili; 
these are: 1) by means of a statement with declarative word order but distinctive 
intonation, sometimes introduced (or followed) by the (morphologically free) particle 
je; 2) by the use of the interrogative roots -ni and -pi which take various prefixes to 
form question words functioning as adverbs (of time - Uni, place - wapi, and manner - 
vipi), as pronouns (nani - who, nini - what, -pi - which one, -ngapi - how many) or as 
adjectives (gani - what sort, -pi - which, -ngapi - how many); 3) by the use of -je 
(manner), -ni (neuter) or -pi (place) as bound morphemes suffixed to the verb, (-ni 
and -pi are rarely found, however). Below, I shall look at the free particle je and the 
bound morpheme -je, as used in the first and third question forms respectively. 
König (1991: 13), in his discussion of what he called 'focus particles', observed that, 
"In languages in which yes-no interrogatives are distinguished from 
declaratives not through word order, but through the addition of certain 
particles, these particles are often added to the focused constituent. " 
Questions in Kiswahili may be optionally indicated by the occurrence of je. Rather 
than being added to a simple constituent (a verb or noun in isolation, say), je occurs 
either initially, where it forms a separate tone group (Maw & Kelly 1975: 58), or 
finally in a clause, and has scope over an utterance expressing a proposition. What is 
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questioned is the entire proposition expressed (however explicit or implicit the 
utterance) rather than any particular part of it. The enclitic -je, on the other hand, is 
added to a verb phrase; the focused constituent is therefore the verb phrase alone, but 
the information requested is not confirmation or disconfirmation, but rather further 
information about the action associated with that verb phrase. This latter form is more 
akin to a wh-question than a yes-no question. I shall describe first the free particle je 
and then the bound morpheme -je, and evaluate two hypotheses suggested by the data. 
Je resembles the particle re in Sissala, a Niger-Congo, Gur (Voltaic) language spoken 
in Burkina Faso and Ghana (Blass 1990), in so far as questions in Sissala may be 
optionally marked with re (Blass 1990: 117). However, unlike je, re, can occur in both 
questions and in answers, frequently marks figurative speech (i. e. irony), beliefs and 
desires, and occurs in embedded 'perceptual' clauses (with verbs meaning see, hear, 
etc. ). Nonetheless, the underlying function of re is similar to that of je, even though 
the range of interpretations derivable from these two particles is not coextensive; 
Blass characterises the underlying function of rC as follows: 
"My proposal is that re , and other 
'hearsay' particles in other 
languages, have the function of indicating to the hearer that the 
utterance which contains them is interpretively used. In other words, re 
is an explicit linguistic indicator of interpretive use. " 
(Blass 1990: 104) 
My proposal is that the underlying function of je, like that of re, is as a linguistic 
indicator of interpretive use. By the interpretive use of an expression (as opposed to 
its descriptive use) Blass means the use of a propositional form "to represent not 
itself, but some other propositional form it more or less closely resembles" (S&W 
1986: 264 n. 25), such as incredulity or doubt as to the truth of the proposition 
expressed. The distinction is similar to the use/mention distinction employed in 
Sperber & Wilson's (1981) analysis of irony, except that there need be no full 
linguistic or logical identity between the original propositional form and what it 
represents where interpretive use is concerned. In the case of je, interpretive use is 
restricted to the interrogative function (although see examples (2.44) and (2.45) and 
discussion), but there is considerable variation in the kinds of question expressed by 
utterances containing je. The following examples serve to illustrate this: 
(2.39) "Je, Najum, utakwenda sokoni? " 
Je, Najum, you will go to the market? 
"Najum, are you going to the market? " (MWK p. 14) 
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(2.40) "Unatakiwa kwa Mkuu, " mmoja wao alimweleza. 
"You're wanted at the Governor's, " one of them explained to him. 
"Je, kwema? " 
Je, good? "Is that a good place? " (Uk p. 19) 
(2.41) Tunajikinga na Ukimwi. Wewe je? (Tanzanian T-shirt slogan) 
We struggle with Aids. You je? 
We are fighting Aids. What about you? 
Je in (2.39) indicates that the following proposition, 'You will go to the market', is to 
be used interpretively, giving rise to an interrogative interpretation. In (2.40) Je 
indicates that what is grammatically an adjective (consisting of an agreement marker 
ku- in concord either with the infinitive of the preceding verb or with the locative 
kwa, and an adjectival stem -ema, 'good'), is being questioned. Finally, in (2.41) Je 
questions the emphatic pronoun 'you', which the addressee is expected to complete 
into 'you are also fighting Aids'. Je can also occur alone in an utterance; in such cases 
its interpretation depends, as ever, on the interpretation context, and can convey ideas 
which Johnson (1939) glosses as "How? Well? What now? Answer me! Tell me! etc. " 
The bound form, -je, is open to a similarly wide range of interpretations, depending 
on the nature of the verb to which it is bound and the interpretation context. Often, 
questions indicated by the -je enclitic can be paraphrased more explicitly by the use of 
one of the question words, e. g. vipi? (how? ) could have been used in examples (2.42) 
and (2.43) second sentence, or nini? (what? ) could have been used in (2.43) first 
sentence. (Instances of -je are underlined): 
(2.42) "Unaionajg hali yako sasa? Umeumia sana? " 
You see je your condition now? You are hurt very much? 
"How do you feel now? Are you badly hurt? 
(MWK p. 25) 
(2.43) "Nitafanyaje kuitisha wito wa kujitawala na kuitikiwa na Wanyika? 
Itakuwaj iwapo nitashindwa kuwashawishi kujiunga pamoja na kudai 
utawala wa haki na kwa kweli? " 
"What shall I do (literally: I shall do -je) to bring about the calling for 
self rule and to be called (to leadership) by the Wanyika? MW will 
happen (literally: It shall be je) if I jail to persuade them to join 
together and truly claim their rightful (self) rule? " 
(Lk p. 12-13) 
In the light of the above data, I shall propose two hypotheses, one specific to 
Kiswahili interrogative forms and the other more general. They are: 
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1) The free and bound forms je and -je, described above, are exponents Of a single 
particle, JE, which has the unitary and underdetermined semantic form to be described 
below. 
2) If an interpretation context is already highly constrained, fewer or less explicit 
procedural indicators are required to fulfil the criterion of consistency with the 
principle of relevance, that "Every act of ostensive communication communicates the 
presumption of its own optimal relevance. " (S&W 1986: 158). For example, -je is less 
explicit than nini, since nini could have been used in place of -je in example (2.43) to 
mean 'what' but not in (2.42) to mean 'how'. 
JE is semantically underdetermined, and the range of potential interpretations which 
can be assigned to utterances containing it depends on its scope25 and the 
interpretation context. Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 22) suggested that illocutionary 
force indicators, such as je and -je, encode procedural constraints on the inferential 
construction of higher-level explicatures. Semantically, JE is an instruction to the 
addressee to treat whatever is within its scope as being used interpretively by the 
speaker for the purpose of seeking more information about it. This paraphrase of the 
semantics of JE is deliberately vague because JE itself is significantly semantically 
underdetermined. The term 'whatever is within its scope' was used rather than 'the 
proposition within its scope' because it is often not a proposition which is 
interpretively used, but something less determinate. A clause (representing a full 
proposition) is interpretively used in (2.39), however, elsewhere it is an adjective 
(2.40), an emphatic pronoun (2.41), or a verb (2.42) and (2.43) that is interpretively 
used. When Je? occurs alone in an utterance it could be said to have the interpretation 
context as a whole in its scope. In order to arrive at the correct interpretation of the 
speaker's utterance the addressee must perform two inferential tasks: she must enrich 
whatever is in the scope of JE, or in cases where there is nothing to enrich, must 
recover the intended mutually manifest assumption; and she must enrich JE to identify 
the kind of information being sought by the speaker. 
The second hypothesis, that if an interpretation context is already highly constrained, 
fewer or less explicit procedural indicators are required to fulfil the criterion of 
consistency with the principle of relevance, is suggested by the facts, a) that JE is 
optional, and b) that more precise question words also exist in Kiswahili. As already 
mentioned, a yes-no question in Kiswahili is generally indicated by intonation alone, 
and other question forms involving JE often include - or have more explicit 
25 By whatever is within the scope of JE, I mean the focused constituent, in the sense of König (1991) 
above. At the level of linguistic semantic representation (the output of phase one) JE has scope over 
conceptual representations which may be either complete or incomplete logical forms. 
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paraphrases which include - the question words nini? (what? ), vipi? (how? ) etc. 
Only 
when the interpretation context is sufficiently constrained (that is, when the most 
relevant set of mutually manifest assumptions is obvious) will fewer procedural 
indicators (e. g. intonation alone) or less explicit procedural indicators (e. g. -je as 
opposed to a more explicit question word) be used. For example in (2.42) repeated 
below, the first question "How do you feel? " is introduced by -je, but the second 
question "Are you badly hurt? " does not contain je, as a question sequence has 
already begun. 
(2.42) "Unaionajg Kali yako rasa? Umeumia sana? " 
You see je your condition now? You are hurt very much? 
"How do you feel now? Are you badly hurt? 
(MWK p. 25) 
There are two sides to the notion of optimal relevance: adequate contextual effects, 
and minimal processing effort (see §1.4.3). The above hypothesis concerns the 
reduction of processing effort; when an interpretation context is already highly 
constrained, explicit procedural indicators like JE ought to be superfluous. However, 
JE does occasionally occur in utterances which are already highly constrained, such as 
the following examples: 
(2.44) Je, mzee half yake vipi siku hizi? 
Je, old person his/her state how these days? 
So/By the way, how is grandfather (etc. ) getting on these days? 
(2.45) "Je, nini khabari Bin Malik? Sikupata kukuona hata siku moja ofisini 
kwetu; je, kumezidi nini tena leo? " 
Je, what news Bin Malik? I didn't get to see you even one day in our 
office; je, what has increased again today? 
So, what news (do you have) Bin Malik? I haven't been able to find you 
in our office even once; so what's come up again this time? 
(KMF p. 55) 
Because of the occurrences of the question words vipi in (2.44) and nini in (2.45) je is 
superfluous as an interrogative indicator, since no other interpretation of propositional 
attitude other than that of a question is possible; hence je is not necessary to reduce 
processing effort. The principle of relevance suggests that the addressee will seek 
additional contextual effects to compensate for the additional processing effort 
involved in processing je. In both cases, the additional contextual effect achieved by 
the addition of je to the questions is stylistic. In (2.44) -je is glossed as So/By the way 
since an utterance of (2.44) would be appropriate on a first mention of mzee by the 
speaker; in such circumstances je acts as a topic change indicator. Je in this example 
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is not totally superfluous from a cognitive point of view, since the other interrogative 
marker, the question word vipi, doesn't occur until late in the sentence. This is in 
contrast to the question word nini in (2.45) which occurs sentence initially in the first 
instance. The presence of je in (2.45) indicates that the questions 'what news Bin 
Malik? ' and 'what's come up again this time? ' are being mentioned. Yet they are not 
mentioned to request further information (they are already unambiguously questions), 
but rather to express another interpretive function; the most relevant interpretation 
with respect to the utterance interpretation context, in this case the passage from 
which the example was taken, is an ironic interpretation. This is not surprising if we 
consider the aforementioned similarities with the interpretive use indicator re in 
Sissala which is also used to mark irony. 
It is not necessary to revise the characterisation of the semantics of JE as an 
essentially interrogative marker in the light of (2.44) and (2.45). JE merely encodes 
that the question has been mentioned rather than used, and (since an interrogative 
interpretation is blocked by the fact that this is already the only possible interpretation 
of the mentioned constituent), a further interpretation must be sought. Irony, however, 
is not encoded by JE; it is simply the most relevant interpretation in this particular 
context. 
Summary 
I have defined procedural information at phase three as information which constrains 
the computation of contextual effects without directly contributing to them. 
Contextual effects arise out of the contextualisation of new information (P) in 
existing assumptions (C). The function of jel je in a given utterance is to indicate that 
the sentence expressing the proposition which constitutes (P) has been interpretively 
used. Unless other more explicit question words (vipi, nini, etc. ) have been used to 
form a question, je/-je indicates that a proposition or incomplete semantic 
representation has been interpretively used in order to request more information about 
it (confirmation or disconfirmation of its truth, information concerning how, what, 
etc. ). When explicit question words do occur, je/ je still indicates that whatever is 
within its scope has been interpretively used, but the addressee is free to look beyond 
an interrogative interpretation and, in line with the principle of relevance, recover 
additional contextual effects, such as indication of a change of topic or irony. 
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22 Conclusions 
2.3.0 Introduction 
We have seen that exponents of procedural encoding at phase three can take a variety 
of linguistic forms. The discourse connectives so and well are discrete lexical items 
occurring outside of clause structure; the Kiswahili interrogative marker JE can be 
realised either as the morphologically free form je preceding or following a clause or 
as the morphologically bound verbal suffix -je. Procedural information may be 
encoded syntactically in the form of mood and information packaging, and may also 
be specified phonetically through intonation. The distinction between procedural 
encoding constraining implicatures and procedural encoding constraining higher-level 
explicatures cross-cuts these linguistic forms: constraints on implicatures are encoded 
by so and well and by information packaging; constraints on higher-level explicatures 
are constrained by intonation, syntactic mood and by je/ je. 
In this final section, I shall provide a theoretical definition of procedural encoding at 
phase three and state precisely how the examples discussed above correspond to this 
definition. I shall then propose criteria by which exponents of the different types of 
procedural encoding at phase three can be distinguished descriptively from each other 
and from conceptual encoding. 
23-1 Procedural encoding at phase three: a theoretical characterisation 
The output of phase three of utterance interpretation is a contextual effect or effects; 
hence, procedural encoding at phase three constrains the computation of contextual 
effects. Since contextual effects result from the contextualisation of new information 
{P) in existing assumptions (C) (the utterance interpretation context) there are 
various ways in which the computation of contextual effects could, theoretically at 
least, be constrained. To begin with, {C) is constructed rather than given; although 
any {P) is almost certain to achieve some contextual effects in combination with all 
the addressee's currently held assumptions, it would do so at the cost of a large 
amount of processing effort. For this reason, consistency with the principle of 
relevance (§1.4.3) ensures that if {P) achieves adequate contextual effects in 
combination with those assumptions currently most accessible to the addressee, the 
interpretation process comes to an automatic halt, thus minimising processing effort. 
Any assistance the speaker can give the addressee in selecting the subset of 
assumptions (C} in which a contextualisation of (P) will achieve adequate contextual' 
effects will reduce the addressee's processing effort. The discourse connective well 
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performs such a function by indicating that the assumptions which the speaker 
assumes to be currently most accessible to the addressee (that is, those assumptions 
from which the speaker assumes the addressee will construct {C)) are inappropriate 
for a successful contextualisation of {P). Well constrains the construction of {C) and 
hence reduces the processing effort required by the addressee to derive contextual 
effects. Information packaging also aids the addressee in the construction of (C). 
Word order and the choice of, for example, definite descriptions as opposed to 
pronouns, all assist the addressee in the construction of (C). The new information 
which constitutes (P) is also specified by syntactic information packaging through 
the use of topicalisation, clefts, pseudo-clefts, etc. and by intonation. 
Having constructed an appropriate utterance interpretation context (C) and identified 
the new information (P) which the speaker intends to communicate, the addressee 
still has to relate (P) to (C) in such a way that adequate contextual effects result. The 
use of the discourse connective so assists the addressee in this process by instructing 
the hearer to establish an inferential connection between {P) and (C). Markers of 
interpretive use, such as syntactic mood and the Kiswahili interrogative particle jel-je, 
also contribute to this process by constraining higher-level explicatures in the form of 
the propositional attitudes associated with proposition(s) in (P). 
In §2.1.2 1 proposed that both conceptual and procedural information are represented 
at the level of linguistic semantic representation (the output of phase one of utterance 
interpretation). An expression which encodes conceptual information contains in its 
logical selection frame information about itself, whilst an expression which encodes 
procedural information contains information about the interpretation of whatever is 
within its scope. This may be either a fully propositional conceptual representation 
(that is, a conceptual representation of a determinate state of affairs which provides 
the input to phase three of utterance interpretation) or a sub-propositional conceptual 
representation (constituting the input to phase two of utterance interpretation). In the 
terminology of Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 2), procedural encoding at phase three 
`constrains the manipulation' of fully propositional conceptual representations. 
Defining procedural encoding at phase three in terms of expressions which constrain 
the manipulation of fully propositional conceptual representations does not of itself 
provide us with adequate heuristic criteria by which to identify exponents of 
procedural encoding at phase three. If the theoretical distinction is to be of use in 
descriptive linguistics we must be able to identify linguistic expressions which encode 
procedural information constraining phase three of utterance interpretation; 
specifically we require criteria by which to distinguish procedural encoding from 
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conceptual encoding, and constraints on implicatures from constraints on higher-level 
explicatures. 
2,3_2 Procedural encoding at phase three: a descriptive characterisation 
In this section, I shall propose criteria by which exponents of procedural encoding at 
phase three of utterance interpretation may be distinguished from their conceptually 
encoded counterparts. 
Figure 7 below illustrates the types of linguistically encoded information which must 
be distinguished descriptively as well as in the theory: 
Figure 7: Possible types of linguistically encoded information. 
linguistically 
encoded 
conceptually procedurally 
encoded encoded 
contributes to bo constraints on constraints on 
explicatures is explicatures implicatures 
contributes to contributes to constraints on constraints on 
proposition higher-level proposition higher-level 
expressed explicatures expressed explicatures 
The subcategory of conceptually encoded information which contributes to 
implicatures has been ruled out following my argument in §2.1.1 against the existence 
of exponents of this subcategory. Therefore, the subcategory of linguistically encoded 
constraints on implicatures (of which so, well and information packaging are 
exponents) has no direct conceptual counterpart. 
In contrast to exponents of procedural encoding constraining higher-level 
explicatures, such as non-declarative word order in English and the je interrogative 
marker in Kiswahili, Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 16-19) posit a class of conceptually 
encoded expressions which contribute to higher-level explicatures; these include 
illocutionary adverbials such as seriously, frankly and confidentially, and attitudinal 
adverbials such as unfortunately: 
83 
(2.50) a. Seriously, I can't help you. 
b. Frankly, I can't help you. 
c. Confidentially, I can't help you. 
d. Unfortunately, I can't help you. [W&S 1993a (18)] 
Whereas exponents of procedural encoding constraining higher level explicatures 
contribute to the truth conditions of neither the associated proposition nor the 
propositional attitude, the higher-level explicatures to which illocutionary and 
attitudinal adverbials contribute are "conceptual representations, capable of entailing 
and contradicting each other and representing determinate states of affairs. Though 
true or false in their own right, they do not generally contribute to the truth conditions 
of their associated utterances. " (Wilson & Sperber 1993a: 16) These conceptual 
expressions are preserved in indirect reported speech (unlike interrogative word order 
in most dialects of English and je/ je in Kiswahili); illocutionary adverbials appear as 
their "synonymous manner-adverbial counterparts" (W&S 1993a: 17) and contribute 
not to higher-level explicatures but to the proposition expressed: 
(2.51) a. Mary told Peter seriously that she couldn't help him. 
b. Mary said frankly to Peter that she couldn't help him. 
c. Mary informed Peter confidentially that she couldn't help him. 
[W&S 1993a (19)] 
whilst attitudinal adverbials continue to contribute to higher-level explicatures: 
(2.51) d. Mary told Peter that, unfortunately, she couldn't help him. 
They are also semantically complex in comparison to procedural illocutionary force 
indicators. The distinction between procedural constraints on higher-level 
explicatures and conceptual contributions to higher-level explicatures in English with 
respect to semantic complexity is illustrated in (2.52): 
(2.52) a. Seriously, are you leaving? [W&S 1993a (20)] 
b. She asked me seriously whether I was leaving. 
c. She asked me to tell her seriously whether I was leaving. 
Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 18) point out that if (2.52a) is interpreted as a request to 
tell, seriously is ambiguous in that it can modify either the requesting or the telling; 
these alternative interpretations are reflected in (2.52b) and (2.52c) respectively. 
Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 18) conclude: "It is not obvious how this ambiguity could 
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be handled in procedural terms. " The theoretical characterisation of procedural 
encoding at phase three provided in §2.3.1 explains why it is not obvious how this 
ambiguity could be handled in procedural terms. Given that procedural encoding 
gives rise to logical selection frames providing information about the manipulation of 
conceptual representations within their scope, it is necessary for the extent of that 
scope to be specified (either within the logical selection frame itself or by associated 
syntactic or intonational information). Hence, all procedural encoding must specify, 
(a) information about the manipulation of any conceptual representation(s) within its 
scope, and (b) the precise extent of that scope, including the nature of the conceptual 
representation about which information is provided. The illocutionary adverbials fail 
to specify (b) and hence any attempt to characterise them in procedural terms will 
encounter problems. 
2.3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the notion of a distinction between conceptual and procedural 
encoding was introduced, and it was suggested that this distinction must, if 
linguistically encoded, be represented within the language of thought. Conceptual 
information was viewed as contributing to the construction of conceptual 
representations, whilst procedural information was viewed as constraining the 
manipulation of conceptual representations. The exponents of procedural encoding 
which I discussed in §2.2 aid the addressee in the identification of implicatures and 
higher-level explicatures. This has the effect of reducing inferential processing effort 
at phase three of utterance interpretation and hence contributes to relevance (the 
smaller the amount of processing effort required to process an utterance the greater its 
relevance). In chapter 31 shall defend the theoretical characterisation of procedural 
information as constraining the manipulation of conceptual representations and 
consider in particular the manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual 
representations to constrain the proposition expressed. 
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3 PROCEDURAL ENCODING AT PHASE TWO 
In this thesis, utterance interpretation has been viewed as a three-phase process: a 
modular decoding phase results in a semantically underdetermined logical form 
which is inferentially enriched to give rise to a fully propositional form, this is then 
contextualised in a subset of the addressee's existing assumptions resulting in 
contextual effects. In §2.2 1 characterised a variety of lexical and syntactic 
constructions as exponents of procedural encoding at phase three, and demonstrated 
how these constrain the interpretation of fully propositional conceptual 
representations by constraining the inferential contextualisation process. In this 
chapter I shall discuss procedural encoding at phase two, which constrains the 
inferential enrichment of sub-propositional conceptual representations. In §2.1.2 we 
saw that, in principle, it is possible for linguistically encoded constraints on 
interpretation to constrain the interpretation of elements within a logical form. Given 
that logical forms are blueprints for propositions, individual elements within logical 
forms must be sub-propositional, hence any procedural encoding which ranges over 
the interpretation of such elements manipulates sub-propositional conceptual 
representations. The manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual representations 
constrains the construction of propositions, which is the output of what I have termed 
phase two of utterance interpretation; I shall therefore speak of such linguistically 
encoded constraints on interpretation as procedural encoding at phase two (in contrast 
to procedural encoding at phase three). 
Thus far, procedural information at phase two has simply been posited without 
reference to the kinds of expressions which might encode it. Wilson & Sperber 
(1993a) have suggested that (English) personal pronouns be viewed as exponents of 
procedural encoding at what I have termed phase two. This claim will be addressed 
and it will be shown that, in the absence of a satisfactory truth-conditional account of 
the semantics of pronouns, a procedural account provides a viable alternative. This 
procedural analysis of English personal pronouns will be applied to the analysis of 
pronouns in Kiswahili and extended to encompass tense, aspect and (in chapter 4) 
modality, which have also defied adequate characterisation in directly truth- 
conditional terms. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that a procedural account of tense 
and aspect (derived from a procedural analysis of pronouns) is viable, and 
satisfactorily accounts for the use of tense and aspect markers in discourse. I shall 
demonstrate for each of pronouns, tense and aspect, that these cannot be directly 
truth-conditionally interpreted, since they significantly underdetermine the 
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propositional forms to which they contribute. The precise identification of an 
intended propositional form is largely dependent on pragmatic considerations, and I 
will suggest that the function of pronouns, and tense and aspect markers is to 
constrain the inferential (pragmatic) processes involved in the identification of 
propositional form. 
The detailed outline of this chapter is as follows: §3.1 provides a characterisation of 
pronouns as exponents of procedural information, incorporating Ariel's Accessibility 
Hierarchy and extending the procedural analysis of pronouns to Kiswahili. Whilst 
pronouns constrain the interpretation process with respect to discourse entities, tense 
aspect and modality markers are involved in the interpretation of situations and 
events. §3.2 provides a theoretical introduction to how situations and events are 
represented through the interaction of sub-propositional conceptual representations, 
procedural information, and the utterance interpretation context. In §3.3, the role of 
tense and aspect markers in the determination of temporal reference will be discussed, 
and I will propose that these encode procedural information constraining the 
interpretation of sub-propositional conceptual representations of situations and events. 
In §3.4 1 shall summarise the findings of the previous three sections prior to providing 
a procedural analysis of the modal auxiliaries may, can, must and should in chapter 4. 
J. Pronouns 
Introduction 
The use of pronouns is linked to the more general problems of reference assignment 
and anaphora resolution. There are numerous theories of anaphora resolution, but it is 
recognised that this cannot be reduced to syntactic considerations alone (GB simply 
states that pronouns are free within their governing category) or resolved apart from 
inferential (pragmatic) considerations. 26 In addition, pronouns are variables which are 
not directly truth-functionally interpretable; truth-conditions are properties of 
propositions, and pronouns only contribute to propositions once the inferential 
process of reference assignment has taken place (unless they remain within the scope 
of quantifiers as is the case with 'donkey sentences'). 
26The concept of anaphora and the question of anaphoric reference assignment (including how to 
account for reference assignment in regard to pronominal anaphors lacking explicit linguistic 
antecedents) have been addressed within the relevance theoretic framework by Kempson (1988b, 
1988c. 1994a, 1994b) and Reboul (1994; and references therein, in particular to the work of Kleiber). 
The relation between syntax and pragmatics as this affects the binding of pronouns is discussed in 
Reinhart (1983) and, from a relevance theoretic perspective, Foster-Cohen (1994). 
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That reference assignment is a largely inferential process, is evident from Chinese; 
although it is a pro-drop language, verbs in Chinese do not mark agreement 
morphologically, so in the interpretation of an utterance of a sentence with a zero- 
pronoun (the majority of third person pronouns are unrealised), reference assignment 
is purely pragmatic (Li & Thompson 1979). This is also illustrated in the following 
English examples, the interpretation of which depends on the addressee's knowledge 
of the typical behaviour of people who are happy or who see others in distress: 
(3.1) a. Janet hugged Maryj because shei was happy. 
b. Janet hugged Maryj because shej was crying. 
However, there are restrictions on reference assignment to pronouns which appear to 
be conventionalised, hence the unstressed she in (3.2) is coindexed with Jane rather 
than with Mary or some other female not mentioned in the discourse: 
(3.2) Janet hugged Maryj and then she j/*j/*k hugged Harry. 
In the absence of a directly truth-conditional analysis of pronouns, I suggest that a 
satisfactory characterisation of the semantics of pronouns can be formulated only if 
the conceptual/procedural distinction is taken into account. Below, I shall outline an 
account of pronouns which analyses restrictions on reference assignment such as 
those in (3.2) as resulting from procedural information encoded by pronouns. Since 
reference assignment contributes to the propositional form recovered, pronouns will 
be treated as exponents of procedural encoding at phase two of utterance 
interpretation. 
Wilson & Sperber's (1993a) procedural account of pronouns (which forms part of the 
typology of information types introduced in §2.1.1) will be assessed and integrated 
with Ariel's Accessibility Hierarchy (Ariel 1988,1990,1991,1994). 
I] A procedural account of pronouns 
The idea that pronouns and other types of referring expression might encode 
procedures predates W&S (1993a). For example, Hawkins (1978: 17, cited in Matsui 
1995: 10) suggested that "the use of the definite article acts as an instruction to the 
hearer to locate the referent of the definite NP" by searching for it in "the appropriate, 
pragmatically identifiable, set" (ibid. ), and Ariel, whose theory of Accessibilty I shall 
shortly discuss, proposed that, 
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"instead of claiming that an expression of type x is processed in a 
certain way... we view the processing procedure associated with each 
form as its inherent definition. In other words, referring expressions 
are no more than guidelines for retrievals. " 
(Ariel 1988: 68) 
A similar account is suggested from a philosophical perspective by Kaplan 
(1989: 523), who claimed that pronouns encode rules "which determine the content 
(the propositional constituent) for a particular occurrence of an indexical. But they are 
not pcirt of the content (they constitute no part of the propositional constituent). " 
Wilson & Sperber (1993a) adopt Kaplan's argument (without buying into any theory 
of Direct Reference) and interpret it as a claim that pronouns encode procedural 
information. The justification for this characterisation of pronouns rests on the 
following argument (given in full): 
"the claim that 'I' means 'the speaker' has different consequences 
depending on whether it is conceptually or procedurally understood. 
Suppose that David Kaplan says (3.3): 
(3.3) 1 do not exist. 
Then if 'I' is treated as encoding the concept the speaker, (3.3) will 
express the proposition in (3.4): 
(3.4) The speaker of (3.3) does not exist. 
But if 'I' is treated merely as encoding an instruction to identify its 
referent by first identifying the speaker, then (3.3) will express the 
proposition in (3.5): 
(3.5) David Kaplan does not exist. 
These two propositions differ in their truth conditions. (3.5) is 
true in any state of affairs in which David Kaplan does not exist. (3.4) 
is true in any state of affairs in which (3.3) is uttered and its speaker 
does not exist. Since such a state of affairs is impossible, if (3.3) 
expressed the proposition in (3.4), it would be necessarily false. 
Kaplan argues that although (3.3) is false whenever it is uttered, it is 
not necessarily false. The proposition it expresses is true in any state of 
affairs in which David Kaplan does not exist. In other words, (3.3) 
must be understood as expressing (3.5) and not (3.4). " 
(Wilson & Sperber 1993a: 20) 
Kaplan is correct in claiming that (3.3) is not necessarily false, but the argument cited 
simply stipulates this, but does not prove that (3.3) is not necessarily false. Kaplan's 
argument can be made more explicit as follows. Suppose that I (Steve Nicolle) go to 
the local tax office and find that there is no record of my National Insurance number. 
If, on recounting this story to a friend, I utter (3.3), this will be felicitous if 
understood as (3.6): 
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(3.3) I do not exist. 
(3.6) The individual named Steve Nicolle does not exist 
as far as the tax office is concerned. 
For this interpretation to be recovered, the pronoun I must encode procedural 
information which licenses the addressee not just to identify the referent of I as 'the 
speaker', but to go beyond this and identify the speaker as a particular individual (i. e. 
the individual named Steve Nicolle). In other words, the pronoun I tells the addressee 
"to identify its referent by first identifying the speaker. " (ibid. ) If I encoded the 
concept the speaker, (3.3) would express the proposition expressed in (3.4), which 
would be infelicitous even in the scenario just described. 
However, the above characterisation of the semantics of pronouns fails to address the 
following question: given, as argued in §2.1.2, that procedural encoding at phase two 
(of which pronouns are exponents) encodes information about the manipulation of 
sub-propositional conceptual representations, what kind of sub-propositional 
conceptual representations are being manipulated by pronouns? 
It is tempting to suggest that the sub-propositional conceptual representation whose 
interpretation a pronoun manipulates is a mental representation of the intended 
referent. However this position is untenable. The intended referent is indeed 
represented in the mind of the addressee, but as an element of the utterance 
interpretation context. Pronouns simply guide the addressee to the intended referent; 
once this has been established the role of the pronoun is complete. 
So what is the sub-propositional conceptual representation whose interpretation is 
constrained by a pronoun, and where does it originate? One potential solution is to 
deny that there is any conceptual representation to be manipulated; this is the 
approach adopted in W&S (1993a). Whilst Wilson &Sperber (1993a: 2) begin by 
suggesting that there might be a category of procedural expressions which encode 
information about the manipulation of conceptual representations, they conclude by 
proposing that these procedural expressions "constrain the inferential phase of 
comprehension by reducing the hypothesis space to be searched in arriving at the 
intended interpretation" (W&S 1993a: 21). This latter characterisation of procedural 
encoding, in which no mention is made of the manipulation of conceptual 
representations is intended to supersede that in which the manipulation of conceptual 
representations is invoked (Deirdre Wilson p. c. 28/10/95). 
However, there are good reasons for preferring the model in which conceptual 
representations are manipulated over the model proposed in (W&S 1993a: 21) in 
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which no mention is made of conceptual representations. Firstly, an account of 
pronouns in which no mention is made of conceptual representations predicts ill- 
formed and incomplete logical forms. Kokolakis (1994: 15) suggests (in line with 
W&S 1993a: 10) that (3.7) has a logical form of the type (3.8), which is well formed: 
(3.7) Peter told Mary that the weather was nice. 
(3.8) x told y at tl that the weather was nice at t2 
If pronouns encode only procedural information, however, an utterance of (3.9) would 
have a logical form of the type (3.10) which is ill-formed and cannot therefore act as 
the input to logical inference rules or enter into relations of entailment or 
contradiction: 
(3.9) He told her that the weather was nice. 
(3.10) [procedure] told [procedure] at tl that the weather was nice at t2 
Now, Kokolakis (1994) does not state what logical forms consist of, so his argument 
that (3.10) is not a well-formed logical form is incomplete. However, in §2.1.2 I 
argued, in line with Groefsema (1992), that any information represented in a logical 
form must capable of being represented in the language of thought. On this view, 
procedural information consists of semantic representations providing information, 
not about the semantic content of the expressions which encode them, but about 
conceptual representations within the scope of these expressions. Thus, (3.10) can be 
shown to be ill-formed because it is not stipulated what the conceptual representations 
are whose interpretations the two [procedure]s constrain. 
Secondly, in §1.2.1 1 observed that Sperber & Wilson (1986: 66,75) and Wilson & 
Sperber (1986a) claim that an account of utterance interpretation offers an insight into 
other, more complex functions of the central systems, such as scientific theorising 
(and presumably of less specialised but more general problem solving activities) 
hence, the inferential phases of communication are manifestations of more general 
inferential abilities which are employed not only in utterance interpretation but in 
other problem solving activities. In addition to this, Handley & Buck (1995) 
demonstrated experimentally that people's general inferential problem solving 
abilities function through the manipulation of conceptual representations. We would 
expect, therefore, that the manipulation of conceptual representations would feature 
throughout the utterance interpretation process also. 
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Two points can be drawn from the above discussion: first, that pronouns encode 
procedural information licensing an addressee to identify a particular individual as the 
intended referent; and second, that there must be some class of conceptual 
representations whose interpretations pronouns constrain. I have reviewed some of 
the evidence in favour of retaining the manipulation of conceptual representations as 
integral to my characterisation of procedural encoding, and have rejected as a possible 
candidate a mental representation of the intended referent, but I have still not 
answered the question asked earlier about the nature and origin of the sub- 
propositional conceptual representation which is manipulated by a pronoun. 
Recall that in §2.1.2 it was suggested that, in principle, a single expression might 
encode both conceptual and procedural information. Could it be that pronouns encode 
both information types: conceptual, providing the conceptual representation to be 
manipulated, and procedural, providing constraints on the manipulation of this 
conceptual representation? Pronouns in English encode information concerning 
person, number, gender and case. However only person is encoded by all the personal 
pronouns in English: you specifies that an instance of second person reference is at 
stake, but fails to distinguish number, gender or case (this latter being specified 
structurally). Given that the procedural information encoded by I takes the form of an 
instruction to identify its referent by first identifying the speaker (i. e. the first person), 
information concerning person must be procedural. Since you encodes no more 
information than that concerning person, it must be an exponent of procedural 
encoding alone, and so this pronoun at least encodes no conceptual information. 
Instead, 1 propose that the conceptual representations which are manipulated in line 
with the procedural information encoded by pronouns are projected from the logical 
entries of predicates, which specify what the predicate needs to combine with to yield 
a well-formed logical form (see §1.3.1). The lexical entries of concepts also specify, 
among other things, syntactic co-occurrence restrictions in the form of strict 
subcategorization frames, but, as Groefsema (1995b) demonstrates through a 
consideration of implicit arguments in English, it is only the logical selection 
restrictions of a predicate which determine its arguments. 
27 For example, the logical 
entry of TELL specifies that TELL is a predicate which requires an agent (to do the 
telling), an instance of a patient (what is told) and an instance of a recipient (the 
person who is told). The patient can be left implicit if it is highly accessible in the 
27 Whether an argument can be left implicit depends on whether the logical entry of a predicate plus 
the utterance interpretation context gives rise to an interpretation in accordance with the principle of 
relevance. For discussion in relevance theoretic terms of the role of verb subcategorization in utterance 
interpretation see also Groefsema (1992) especially chapter 3. 
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utterance interpretation context, such as during a discussion of some piece of news 
('Mary told me _'). 
Thus, told in (3.9) (repeated below) projects an extremely 
semantically underdetermined conceptual representation of an agent into the subject 
position of the clause and a patient and/or recipient into the direct and/or indirect 
object position. The identification of the intended discourse referents is constrained 
by the procedural information encoded by the pronouns in subject and object 
positions. 
(3.9) He told her that the weather was nice. 
(3.11) [Agent] told [recipient] at tl that the weather was nice at t2 
On this account, the absence of an overt pronoun in subject position in pro-drop 
languages causes no problem, since subjects in logical forms are projections of the 
predicate; this account is in line with the emergent Minimalist Programme (Chomsky 
1991,1993,1995) in which lexical items and their morphology are inserted `ready 
made' into syntactic structure, where inflectional nodes, rather than adding inflections 
simply check them. 
In addition to procedural information concerning person, case, etc. which differs 
between pronouns, all members of the set of pronouns (in a given language) encode 
procedural information relating to the relative accessibility of intended discourse 
referents. This takes the form of an instruction to find a highly accessible discourse 
entity within the utterance interpretation context, which is compatible with both the 
specific procedural information encoded by a particular pronoun and the conceptual 
representation projected by the logical entry of the relevant predicate. 28 This 
information is subsumed by the particular procedural information encoded by first 
and second person pronouns (an instruction to identify the intended referent by first 
identifying the speaker or addressee) since speakers and addressees are always highly 
accessible within an utterance interpretation context. In the case of third person 
pronouns, however, the general procedural information relating to accessibility 
distinguishes the referents of pronouns from those of descriptions, names, 
demonstratives, emphatic pronouns, etc. In §3.1.2 below, I shall discuss the notion of 
accessibility. 
28 Such a characterisation of pronouns is in line with the experimental evidence, such as that relating to 
the'repeated name penalty', cited in the discussion of the status of unstressed pronouns in information 
packaging (§2.2.2), and evidence from cross-modal priming experiments reported in Nicol & Swinney 
(1989) (cited in Groefsema 1995b: 155) that possible referents in a context are immediately activated 
when a pronoun is processed. 
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312 Accessibility 
The notion of accessibility is taken from Accessibility theory (Ariel 1988,1990, 
1991,1994), according to which, referring expressions, including pronouns, encode 
the relative degree of accessibility of mental representations. 29 The accessibility, or 
salience, of mental representations of discourse entities is determined by a 
combination of various factors; Matsui (1995: 45-60) reviews a number of studies 
which address the effect of order of mention, recency of mention, syntactic position, 
thematic role, and the semantics of the main verb on accessibility; topicality, the 
number of possible alternative referents and physical saliency may also play a role. 
Matsui (1995: 53-4) also mentions experimental evidence from Sanford et al (1988) 
that discourse entities are more salient or accessible when described by a proper name 
than when described by a role (a definite description). One of the experiments 
assessed the effect of manner of mention (i. e. name or role) on the time taken a) to 
read a target sentence containing an anaphoric pronoun, and b) to answer a question 
referring to one of the discourse entities either by name or by role: 
(3.12) Mr. Bloggs/The manager was dictating a letter. 
Clare/The secretary was taking shorthand. 
It was getting to be late in the afternoon. 
He/She was beginning to feel hungry. (Target sentence) 
Question: Was Clare/the secretary carrying out filing? 
Sanford et al found that reading times for targets introduced or referred to by proper 
names were significantly shorter than for those introduced or referred to by role 
descriptions. 
According to Ariel, however, referring expressions do not determine the relative 
degree of accessibility of mental representations, rather the relative degree of 
accessibility of a representation (partially) determines the referring expression to be 
used. In other words, whilst various factors (such as those mentioned above) affect 
the degree of accessibility of mental representations relative to each other, these 
relative degrees of accessibility are encoded by different markers of accessibility. 
How then are Sanford et al's results to be explained? The explanation lies, I suggest, 
largely in the fact that the test materials were not genuine discourses; in (3.12) above, 
neither Mr. Bloggs nor Clare were previously known to the subjects, and so the 
referring expressions used did not in fact refer to genuine discourse entities. The 
29 To avoid confusion, Aricl's term 'mental representation' will be adopted to refer to representations of 
discourse entities, as distinct from the term 'conceptual representation' which I will continue to use to 
refer to what is manipulated by procedural information. 
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effect might arise not as a direct result of the referring expression used, but as a result 
of the fact that named entities tend to be discourse topics, and discourse topics are 
highly salient, whereas described entities are less likely to refer to discourse topics 
and hence are less salient. By using a name to refer to a previously unknown entity, 
the author of (3.12) gives the effect of introducing a discourse topic (this is a common 
stylistic device); because of the nature of discourse topics, the experimental subject is 
expecting there to be continuity of topic, and so is primed for the pronoun in the 
target sentence to refer to the named referent rather than to the described referent. 
It appears, then, that linguistic systems exploit the fact that mental representations of 
discourse entities differ in their relative accessibility, by ranking referring expressions 
according to some kind of hierarchy; language users can then exploit the linguistic 
system in situations where mental accessibility is yet to be determined, for example at 
the start of narratives. According to Ariel (1991: 449) referring expressions enter into 
the following accessibility hierarchy (abbreviated): 
LOW ACCESSIBILITY 
Full name 
Definite description 
Last name 
First name 
Distal demonstrative (+ Modifier) 
Proximal demonstrative (+ Modifier) 
Stressed pronouns + Gesture 
Stressed pronouns 
Unstressed pronouns 
Zeros 
HIGH ACCESSIBILITY 
Markers of low accessibility, such as names, are typically highly informative, 
relatively long phonologically and easily refer uniquely, whilst markers of high 
accessibility are typically uninformative, phonologically attenuated, and do not refer 
uniquely; zeros are an extreme example of this (Ariel 1994: 32). Ariel (1988: 82-83) 
argues that this is to be expected given the principle of relevance: low accessibility 
markers are costly to process both linguistically and in terms of extending the 
utterance interpretation context to include encyclopaedic knowledge; high 
accessibility markers, on the other hand, require a small amount of processing effort 
to decode, and signal that the addressee is to use the currently most accessible 
utterance interpretation context in the search for an intended referent, thus reducing 
the processing effort involved in contextual extension. Thus, the principle of 
relevance predicts that speakers should use the highest possible accessibility marker 
in a given referring expression in order to minimise the addressee's processing effort. 
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Which one the speaker chooses will depend on her assessment of the relative 
accessibility of the appropriate mental representation in the addressee's memory, 
hence some free variation in use and interpretation of accessibility markers is to be 
expected (Ariel 1994: 38). 
For example, according to the Accessibility hierarchy, zeros are markers of higher 
accessibility than pronouns. The principle that speakers should use the highest 
possible accessibility marker predicts that a zero should be used in preference to a 
pronoun when coindexed with the subject of the clause in which it occurs, since this 
has the highest possible accessibility level of any discourse referent. Hence 
Accessibility theory predicts that pronouns must be free in their governing categories: 
(3.13) Johns wants O /him*i to win the prize. 
Similarly, unstressed pronouns are markers of higher accessibility than stressed 
pronouns. The principle that speakers should use the highest possible accessibility 
marker predicts that if an unstressed pronoun is used in a context where there are two 
highly accessible possible discourse referents, it should be coindexed with the more 
accessible referent, but that if a stressed pronoun is used, it should be coindexed with 
the less accessible referent. This prediction is born out in the following examples 
(from Ariel 1988: 79) in which 'Jane' is more accessible than 'Mary', being topical 
(recency of mention is not an overriding factor here since both 'Jane' and 'Mary' occur 
within the same clause): 
(3.14) a. Janet kissed Maryj and then she kissed Harry. 
b. Janet kissed Maryj and then SHEj kissed Harry. 
[Ariel 1988 (17a) and (16a)] 
In summary, as the accessibility hierarchy makes clear, pronouns are markers of 
relatively high accessibility (with further distinctions made in English through 
intonation and in languages like Kiswahili through the alternation between free and 
bound pronominal morphemes). A pronoun will therefore be used only when a 
speaker judges that the mental representation of the entity to which it refers is highly 
accessible to the addressee, relative to alternative mental representations. This claim 
is discussed in further detail below, with respect to the Kiswahili object marker. 
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The Kiswahili Object Marker as an exponent of procedural encoding 
The procedural analysis of pronouns will be illustrated by reference to the Kiswahili 
`object marker' (OM), the distribution and interpretation of which are conditioned by 
syntactic, semantic and discourse factors. 
Introduction 
Kiswahili is a noun class language; the noun classes manifest themselves 
morphologically in various ways: within tensed VPs, the noun class or person/number 
of any arguments may be indicated by the SP ('subject prefix') and OM ('object 
marker'). In tensed, affirmative, indicative verb complexes the following 'slots' are 
filled (obligatorily in bold, optionally in normal type): 
SP I tense I relative pro. I OM I verb stem I suffix(es) I indicative 
In addition to these morphologically bound forms, there are four types of 
morphologically free pronominals: emphatic personal pronouns (see table 1, below), 
and three types of emphatic demonstrative pronouns (roughly, 'that/those already 
referred to', 'this/these here' and 'that/those there) in concord with the noun classes: 
Table 1: SP and OM concords; emphatic personal pronouns 
Person Noun Class SP OM Emphatic 
Ist sing. 
1st pl. 
2nd sing. 
2nd pl. 
3rd sing. 
3rd p1. 
(infinitive) 
(locative) 
(locative) 
(locative) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11/14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
ni- 
tu- 
u- 
m- 
a- 
wa- 
u- 
i 
ii- 
ya- 
ki- 
vi- 
i- 
zi- 
u- 
ku- 
pa- 
ku- 
mu- 
-ni- 
-tu- 
-ku- 
-wa- 
-wa- 
-u- 
-i- 
-li- 
-ya- 
-ki- 
-vi- 
-i- 
-zi- 
-u- 
-ku- 
-pa- 
-ku- 
-mu- 
mimi 
sisi 
wewe 
ninyi 
yeye 
wao 
As table 1 illustrates, there are two partially overlapping systems in evidence: one 
based on person and number with corresponding emphatic personal pronouns, and 
another based on the noun classes (with corresponding referential, proximal and distal 
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demonstratives, not represented); these systems overlap in the case of the 3rd person 
and class 1/2.30 
The SP and OM take precedence over syntactic considerations (the relative order of 
morphologically free lexical items) in determining the proposition expressed. The 
following examples from Khamisi (1972: 8) illustrate this (subscripted numbers on 
nouns indicate noun classes): 
(3.15) a. nyundo i+ me + li + vunj +a jiwe 
hammerg SP9 PERF OM5 break INDIC stones 
the hammer broke the stone 
b. nyundo li + me +i+ vunj +a jiwe 
hammer9 SP5 PERF OM9 break INDIC stones 
the stone broke the hammer 
The `subject prefer' 
As table 1 illustrates, the SP and OM for each noun class except class I are 
phonologically identical; morpho-syntactically, however, they are distinct. Before 
discussing the OM in any detail I shall briefly describe the factors affecting the 
distribution of the SP. The SP, despite its name, need not agree with the semantic 
subject of the clause in which it occurs. In informal conversation, where there is 
sufficient discourse support for the intended interpretation, the SP may agree with the 
semantic object. This occurs in the case of quasi-passives (Russell 1985; see also 
Whiteley & Mganga 1969) which "can be considered as the result of topicalising, by 
subjectivising NP2 in NPI-V-NP2 structures, but without the formal trappings of 
passivisation i. e. there is no passive marker -w- in the verb, and no preposition na to 
mark the agent" (Russell 1985: 478). (3.16) below is an example of a quasi-passive; 
the SP u- is in concord with the preverbal NP wimbo, which is a topicalised semantic 
object (the semantic subject, wate mia, occurs after the verb): 
(3.16) wimbo u+ to + imba watu mia 
song, ) SPI I FUT sing people hundred 
A hundred people will sing the song (it will be a special performance). 
SP agreement can thus be said to be with the topic (defined loosely as prominent 
information); it is no surprise that in practice the SP usually agrees with the subject, 
since subject has been defined as an aggregate function formed from topic and agent 
30 Classes I and 2,3 and 4,5 and 6,7 and 8, and 9 and 10 correspond to singular and plural 
distinctions; the plural of those members of class 11/14 which are not abstract nouns are in class 10. 
There is one further OM, the reflexive prefix -ji- which is not in concord with any noun class. 
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(Givän 1976: 152, Comrie 1981: 101). Locatives can also function as topics, as in 
(3.17) below: 
(3.17) a. Nyumba + ni pale pa + li + fika mgeni 
House LOC16 that16 SP16 PAST arrive guests 
At that house arrived a guest 
b. Pa + li + fika mgeni nyumba + ni pale 
SP16 PAST arrive guests house LOC16 that16 
There arrived a guest at that house 
but Givön's claim (1976: 174) that class 16/17/18 (locative) agreement is obligatory 
with preposed locatives is contradicted by the acceptability31 of (3.18) where the SP 
agrees with the noun class of the agent: 
(3.18) Nyumba + ni pale a+ li + fika mgeni 
House LOC16 that16 SP1 PAST arrive guests 
At that house a guest arrived 
Whatever it agrees with, the SP is obligatory, occurring either with or without an 
overt coreferential NP. It can be unrealised when the MTA marker -ka- is used; the 
most common use of -ka- is in narrative to mark an event as subsequent to and often 
contingent upon a previous event. When discourse structure constrains the context to 
a sufficient degree, such that the subject of a -ka- marked clause is so highly 
accessible that it need not be overtly marked, the SP may be unrealised. In the 
following narrative, the omitted SP (a-) refers to the topic, `Seif', who is the most 
recently mentioned entity in each instance: 
(3.19) Wa + li + kuta Seif 0+ ka + funga mlango wake bado na i+ li + onekana 
SP2 PAST find Seif - ASP close door3 his still and SP9 PAST seem 
ha +u+ to + funguliwa tena. Pili a+ li + gonga mlango kwa nguvu lakini 
NEG SP3 FUT be opened again Pili SP1 PAST knock door3 in strength but 
Seif 0+ ka + nyamaa makusudi kama yeye ni kiziwi. Wa + li + ita tens 
Seif - ASP be silent intention as if he is deaf SP2 PAST call again 
lakini Seif ndio kwanza kama 0+ ka + zibwa masikio kwa pamba. 
but Seif it is first as if - ASP be closed ears with cotton 
They found Seifs door still locked and it seemed it would remain like that. Pili 
knocked hard on the door but Seif pretended to be deaf. They called (him) 
again and again but Seif remained quiet as if someone had blocked his ears 
with cotton wool. 
(j p. 6, cited Moshi 1985: 60-61) 
31 According to Bwana Ameir Haji of the Taasisi ya Kiswahili na Lugha za Kigeni. Zanzibar. 
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In all the examples cited in Moshi (1985) of VPs of the form 0+ ka + verb as well 
as in other instances not cited in Moshi (1985) the 'missing' SP is the third person 
singular/class 1 prefix a-. This, together with the fact that other phonological 
transformations occur in the same morphological environment (e. g. ni + na + verb is 
often realised as na + verb) suggests that, rather than being morphologically absent, 
the SP may simply be phonologically unrealised according to the following morpho- 
phonological elision rule, which allows the SP a- to be optionally realised as 0: 
a (morphspi) --ý 0- ka (morphMTA) 
When this option is exercised depends primarily on discourse factors. To summarise, 
the SP is obligatory, but may be phonologically unrealised in certain contexts; it can 
occur either with or without an overt coreferential NP; and this NP is a topic, which 
need not be the semantic subject of a clause. 
A grammatical analysis of the OM 
In contrast to the SP, which is obligatory, the OM is usually absent, except where the 
object of the clause is animate (Maw 1976: 399) - i. e. when the OM is one of the 
personal pronominal forms, including those in the third person, which correspond to 
noun class 1/2. An OM is obligatory, however, when the semantic object has been 
topicalised and occurs in a pre-verbal position: 
(3.20) Kikombe, ni + li + ki + vunja 
cuP7 I PAST OM7 break 
The cup, I broke it 
(3.21) * Kikombe, ni + li+ vunja 
When the OM does occur, either with or without an overt object NP, its occurrence is 
constrained by various syntactic and discourse factors. Various characterisations of 
the OM have been proposed in order to account for its distribution; below I shall 
briefly discuss three differing accounts of the morpho-syntactic status of the OM. 
According to Moshi (1985) there are only two grammatical roles in Kiswahili - 
subject and object - and these are determined with reference to the SP and OM as 
follows. A subject is defined either as the NP in concord with the SP, or, in the 
absence of an overt NP, as the SP itself. A 'subject NP' can be either pre- or post- 
verbal, but the pre-verbal position dominates. Similarly, Moshi defines an object 
either as the NP in concord with the OM, or, in the absence of an overt NP, as the OM 
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itself. An 'object NP' can be both pre- and post-verbal, but the post-verbal position 
dominates. 
Examples of objects according to Moshi's definition are the underlined expressions in 
the examples below (N. B. the suffix -a is the indicative suffix): 
(3.22) Ni + li +m+1+ ish +i+a mwanamke watoto 
I PAST OM1 eat CAUS PREP woman, children2 
I fed the children for the woman 
(3.23) ni + Ii + wa +1+ ish +a watoto 
I PAST OM2 eat CAUS children2 
I fed the children 
(3.24) Ni+li+wa+1+ish+a 
I PAST dm-2 eat CAUSATIVE 
I fed them 
(3.20) Kikombe, ni + li + ki + vunj +a 
cups I PAST OM7 break 
The cup, I broke it 
(3.25) Ni + li + vunj +a kikombe 
I PAST break cup 
I broke a cup 
The NP mwanamke is in concord with the OM -m- (class 1) in (3.22) and is therefore 
the object according to Moshi's definition; the NP watoto (class 2) is not the object in 
(3.22) since it is not in concord with an OM (Kiswahili does not permit more than one 
OM in a single VP), but in (3.23) watoto is in concord with the OM -wa- (class 2) and 
is therefore the object. There is no overt NP in concord with the OM -wa- in (3.24), 
so the OM itself is the object. The object NP in (3.20), kikombe, is pre-verbal, but in 
(3.25) the absence of the OM -ki- means that kikombe is not the object. 
I shall reject Moshi's analysis on the following grounds: First, whilst the OM is 
morphologically unitary in that its position in the VP and its phonological realisation 
remain constant, Moshi posits a distinction between the OM as object (3.24) and the 
OM as agreement marker [(3.22) (3.23) and (3.20)]. Secondly, Moshi's analysis 
allows the NP kikombe to be the object in (3.20) but not in (3.25), where it is 
unspecified for a grammatical relation; what the grammatical status of kikombe is in 
(3.25) is unclear. 
In contrast, Bresnan & Mchombo (1987: 15) claim that "the OM, which at first glance 
looks like an object agreement marker, is actually an incorporated object pronoun. " In 
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conjunction with the uniqueness condition of Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG), 
which allows only one instance of a given grammatical role within a single clause, 
this analysis entails that in the absence of an OM an object NP will genuinely be an 
object, but that when an OM is present such a NP will be something other than an 
object. Bresnan & Mchombo (1987: 15-6) suggest that a NP in concord with an OM is 
a floating topic32 NP to which the OM is anaphorically linked. 
They argue that the object NP in the absence of an OM is obligatorily post-verbal so 
as to maintain the order <Verb Object> (in fact the order is <Tense Object> since the 
OM, which is an incorporated object pronoun according to Bresnan & Mchombo, 
occurs after the MTA prefix but before the verb stem): 
(3.25) c. Ni + li + vunj +a kikombe <Tense Object> 
I PAST break cup 
I broke a cup 
(3.21) * Kikombe, ni + li+ vunja * <Object Tense> 
Topic NPs (in concord with an OM), on the other hand, are free of such word order 
restrictions, being outside the clause; topic NPs and subject NPs are optional and 
unordered with respect to each other and to the VP, hence word order is free within a 
sentence containing an OM. 33 
A morpho-syntactically unitary characterisation of the OM is also proposed by Seidl 
& Dimitriadis (1996), but whereas Bresnan & Mchombo (1987) characterise the OM 
as an incorporated object pronoun, Seidl & Dimitriadis characterise it as an 
inflectional affix (that is, an agreement marker) capable of licensing null objects. 
They argue from the principle of lexical integrity that if the OM is an incorporated 
pronoun, then the SP and MTA markers must also be clitics; this, they claim, is 
implausible since the SP and MTA marking are obligatory and therefore part of the 
verb. Seidl & Dimitriadis (1996) argue that if the OM is an inflectional affix, then co- 
occurring object NPs occur in verb complement position, whilst object marked verbs 
without overt object NPs are instances of pro-drop, that is, they have a null object as 
the argument of the verb. 
32 The term 'topic' has already been used in relation to SP agreement; however, as used in Bresnan & 
Mchombo (1987) 'topic' refers to an NP in concord with the OM. Henceforth, all references to 'topic' 
assume this latter usage of the term. 
33 A similar analysis is given in Allan (1983) where it is claimed that the OM is always a pronoun and 
in particular that, when coreferential with an overt NP, the OM is a cataphoric resumptive pronoun. 
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e 
Seidl & Dimitriadis claim that a null object can only occur in the presence of an OM, 
and hence that an OM is required to license null objects. For a verb to be considered 
genuinely transitive in Seidl & Dimitriadis (1996), it had to meet any of the following 
criteria: 1) there was an overt object either following or preceding the verb, 2) there 
was an OM in the VP, 3) in English, the verb could not appear without an object 
(which would show that an object was not semantically required). However, examples 
of transitive verbs used without either an overt object NP or an OM are common in 
spoken Kiswahili: 
(3.26) A Umeleta chakula? 
B Ni + me + leta Bwana. 
1 sing PERF bring 
Have you brought (the) food? 
I have brought it, sir. 
(Ashton 1947: 45) 
(3.27) A Je, una watoto? 
B Bado. 
A U+to+pata 
2sing FUr get 
(3.28) A Chai na sukari? 
B Si+tumi+i 
Ising use NEG 
Do you have (any) children? 
Not yet. 
You will do. (Lit. You will get. ) 
Tea with sugar? 
I don't take sugar. (Lit: I don't use. ) 
The examples above are clearly transitive by criterion 3, yet they do not contain either 
OMs or overt object NPs, hence it is not the case (as Seidl & Dimitriadis claim) that 
null objects must be licensed by OMs. Because the discourse referents in the above 
examples are very highly accessible (being explicitly mentioned in the preceding 
clauses) markers of very high accessibility (i. e. zeros) may be used. 
In addition, both Seidl & Dimitriadis (1996) and Bresnan & Mchombo (1987) fail to 
account for the fact that it is not always necessary to have a coreferential OM in order 
to topicalise a semantic object. When there is an animate indirect object, and an 
inanimate direct object which is also a discourse topic, the direct semantic object can 
be topicalised even when the OM is in concord with the animate indirect semantic 
object, as in (3.29B) (A establishes kitabu as the discourse topic): 
(3.29) A Kitabu nilichokuwa nasoma jana kimeibiwa, sikioni. 
The book which I was reading yesterday has been stolen, I can't see it. 
B Kitabu7, Juma alimlpa Mariamul, hakikuibiwa. 
The book, Juma gave it to Mariamu, it hasn't been stolen. 
Furthermore, some informants rejected (3.30a) in which the OM is in concord with 
the topicalised NP (see below for discussion of animacy and informant judgements): 
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(3.30) a. * Kitabu7, Juma aliki7pa Mariamul, hakikuibiwa. 
b. * Kitabu7, Juma alipa Mariamu1, hakikuibiwa. (no OM) 
In the above examples, it appears that an OM must be present in order for the NP 
kitabu to be topicalised, but that this OM need not be in concord with the topicalised 
NP (indeed cannot be when the topicalised NP is an inanimate semantic direct 
object). One possible explanation of this constraint is that Kiswahili only recognises 
one grammatical object (as Moshi 1985 claims), and that in double object 
constructions this is the indirect object (see below for further evidence for this claim). 
The semantic direct object is therefore not a grammatical object at all, and so is free 
of the grammatical <Subject Tense Object> word order restriction and can, if the 
discourse supports it, be topicalised in the absence of a coreferential OM. 
Leaving aside this consideration, it is difficult to distinguish empirically between 
Seidl & Dimitriadis' analysis of the OM as an inflectional affix and Bresnan & 
Mchombo's analysis of the OM as an incorporated object pronoun. The differences 
stem from the fact that Seidl & Dimitriadis (1996) assumes a Principles and 
Parameters framework while Bresnan & Mchombo (1987) assume LFG. Which 
analysis is to be preferred depends largely on which framework is adopted. However, 
I shall adopt Bresnan & Mchombo's terminology, and call the OM an incorporated 
pronoun, since, as Seidl & Dimitriadis found (in line with Hyman & Duranti 1982 
and Allan 1983), the distribution of the OM resembles that of a pronoun rather than 
an inflectional affix. For example, the OM need not agree with the noun class of the 
NP with which it is anaphorically linked: 
(3.31) a. A+ li + ki + ona kitoto 
SPI PAST OM7 see baby7 
b. A+ li + mw + ona kitoto 
SPI PAST OM 1 see babY7 
S/he saw a/the baby 
In (3.31a) the agreement is based on noun class, but in (3.31b) it is semantic - class 1 
being the class of singular animates. This phenomenon is discussed further in 
Reynolds & Eastman (1989). 
The OM in discourse 
Aside from syntactic constraints, the distribution of the OM is constrained by 
semantic and discourse factors. Like unstressed personal pronouns in English, the SP 
and OM are both markers of high accessibility. This can be demonstrated in 
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comparison with emphatic personal pronouns34 (parallel to the comparison of 
unstressed and stressed personal pronouns in English): 
(3.32) a. Mojal a; +li+mj+kumbatia Pilij, halafu a1+li+mk+kumbatia Tatuk. 
Mojal hugged Pilij, then he hugged Tatuk. 
b. Mojai a; +li+mý+kumbatia Pili " halafu yeyej aj+li+mk+kumbatia Tatuk. 
Mojai hugged Pili j then HEB 
hugged Tatuk 
(3.33) a. Mojai ai+li+mj+kumbatia Pilij, halafu Tatuk ak+li+mj+kumbatia35 
Mojal hugged Pilij, then Tatuk hugged him 
b. Moja; ai+li+mý+kumbatia Pilij halafu Tatuk ak+li+m; +kumbatia yeye; 
Moja; hugged Pilij, then Tatuk hugged HIM1 
A discourse referent can become highly accessible as the result of various cognitive 
and discourse processes (as mentioned in §3.1.2). For example, definites tend to be 
more accessible than indefinites, and animates tend to be more accessible than 
inanimates. It has been widely claimed that the OM marks definite objects, and is 
obligatory with animates, but both these claims are incorrect. I shall address each in 
turn before discussing those factors which do affect the distribution of the OM and 
increase the relative accessibility of discourse referents. 
The claim that the OM marks definites is common (cf. Wilson 1970: 186, Driever 
1976: 23, Givön 1976, Hinnebusch 1979: 218, Rugemalira 1991: 207), however Wald 
(1979) cites examples where an OM is present but the coreferential NP is indefinite 
(and in the case of (3.35) below nonreferential also): 
(3.34) akamlkuta mzeet mwingine ndugu wa yule 
then she met another old lady, sister of the first one (Wald 1979: 512) 
(3.35) nao mahala wanapoweza kutoa lile dukuduku ni kumipiga mtut 
and the only way they can get rid of their frustration is to hit somebody 
(ibid. 513) 
Conversely, Allan (1983: 325) cites examples of definite NPs (underlined) with no 
coreferential OM: 
(3.36) Huwezi kununua motokaa hii bila fedha nyingi. 
You can't buy this car without a lot of money. 
34 Emphatic personal pronouns can occur alone, but when occurring in a sentence a corresponding SP 
or OM must be present, entailing that, on the present analysis, emphatic personal pronouns are always 
topic NPs. 
35 This is the interpretation of Kassim Abdullah (Queen's University Ontario), whilst Rchema Rajabu 
(University of York, England) found this example ambiguous. 
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(3.37) Asma alishonesha nguo zake Nairobi. 
Asma had her dresses sewn in Nairobi. 
(3.38) Tulipokwenda Dar tulitembelea chuo kikuu. 
When we were in Dar we visited thel*a university. (there is only one) 
Animacy has also been proposed as a determining factor in the occurrence of the OM. 
Wald (1979: 508) and Rugemalira (1991: 204) argue that 1) only an animate NP may 
be object marked when there is more than one semantic object to the verb, and 2) that 
if both NPs are animate, the prepositional or indirect object must be marked 
(Kiswahili does not allow multiple object marking): 
(3.22) a. ni + li +m+1+ ish +i +a mwanamke watoto 
SP1 PAST OPI eat CAUS PREP woman, children2 
I fed the children for the woman. 
b. * Ni + li + wa +1+ ish +i+a mwanamke watoto 
SPI PAST OP2 eat CAUS PREP woman children2 
The first constraint may well reduce to the second since in double object 
constructions with animate and inanimate NPs, the animate NP is usually the indirect 
object since its referent is likely to be a recipient or beneficiary. The second constraint 
also provides support for the claim made above that Kiswahili only allows one 
grammatical object per clause, and that this will be the semantic indirect object in 
double object constructions. 
Allan (1983: 332) goes further in claiming that the OM is obligatory with animate 
coreferential NPs of class 1/236 even when the NP is indefinite and nonreferential 
(this is widely taught as a grammatical `rule'): 
(3.39) a. Simwloni mtul yeyote. I don't see anyone. 
b. ? Sioni mtu yeyote. 
i7oni kitu7 chochote. I don't see anything. (3.40) a. Sik 
b. Sioni kitu chochote. 
The problem with Allan's stronger claim is that informant judgements are 
inconsistent and often at odds with actual usage where animacy is concerned. For 
36 The exception being when "the focus of information falls on the predicate, such that the 
combination of Verb and ONP [object NP] has a semantic unity reminiscent of phrasal verbs. " (Allan 
1983: 332) E. g 
(6) a. Nilijona mganga. I saw the doctor. 
b. Niliona mganga. I sought medical advice. 
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example, while one informant rejected (3.41b) with the OM coreferential with an 
inanimate NP, Khamisi (1972: 15) has both (3.42a) and (3.42b), where the latter has 
an OM in concord with maziwa ('milk') rather than with Saidi (a person and therefore 
class 1); (3.42b) is the marked form, however, and is only acceptable in a context 
where there is contrastive emphasis on maziwa. 
(3.41) a. Kitabu7, Juma alimlpa Mariamul. 
The book, Juma gave it to Mariamu. 
b. * Kitabu7, Juma aliki7pa Mariamul. 
(3.42) a. Musa amem1letea Saidil maziwa5. 
Musa brought Saidi some milk. 
b. Musa ameyletea Saidil maziwa5. 
Musa brought the milk (not the water etc. ) for saidi. 
Corpus based analyses confirm that, although there is a tendency for animate objects 
to be object marked, the occurrence of an OM is not obligatory: for example, Seidl & 
Dimitriadis (1996) found that whilst 104 animate NPs were object marked in their 
data of modern narrative texts, 40 were not. Rather, the conditioning factor on the 
occurrence of an OM is that the referent of the OM must be highly salient, where 
salience is defined in terms of frequency of mention (Moshi 1985) or recency of 
mention (Seidl & Dimitriadis 1996). Saliency, being a relative term, is further defined 
in comparison to entities overtly marked by object NPs alone. This finding 
corresponds with a characterisation of the OM as a marker of relatively high 
accessibility compared with object NPs; mental representations of entities which have 
been mentioned frequently or recently will be more accessible to an addressee than 
those which have not, therefore a high degree of salience as measured by Moshi 
(1985) and Seidl & Dimitriadis (1996) correlates with high relative accessibility as 
given in Ariel's (1991) accessibility hierarchy. 
That animates tend to be more salient than inanimates is uncontroversial: in one 
narrative (from MWK) Moshi (1985: 73) found two humans both mentioned 51 times, 
whilst the next most salient referent (chembe `match') was mentioned only nine 
times. The effects of definiteness and animacy on the distribution of the OM can be 
subsumed under the relation of the OM to highly accessible, or salient, discourse 
entities, as Moshi (1985: 79) explains: 
"Because discourses are overwhelmingly about animates (human 
mostly) the tendency for more animate than inanimate nominals to 
appear in discourse [i. e. to be salient] and for these animates to be 
definite is not a surprise to us. It is a reflection of discourse tendencies 
rather than a general rule of grammar to which speakers have to abide 
when constructing their discourses. " 
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Given this, it is more plausible to claim that animates in discourse tend to be topic 
NPs, that is, representations of highly accessible entities (a discourse notion) rather 
than, as Moshi (1985) claims, that animate as opposed to inanimate NPs tend to be 
grammatical objects (a discourse independent notion). 
This said, the high frequency of animate (class 1/2) OMs can also be related to the 
claim that Kiswahili allows only one grammatical object per clause, and that this must 
be the indirect semantic object in double object constructions. Since the OM is itself 
always a grammatical object whether it occurs with or without an overt coreferential 
NP, it is to be expected that the OM will be coreferential with the indirect semantic 
object when there is a choice. Since animates tend to be indirect objects and also tend 
to be more salient than inanimates, grammatical and discourse constraints work 
together to favour the occurrence of animate (class 1/2) OMs over other, inanimate 
OMs. 
Occasionally, however, grammatical and discourse constraints are at odds, for 
example when the direct semantic object is highly salient. In such cases, informant 
acceptability judgements vary: apparently some speakers allow discourse constraints 
to override grammatical constraints (and therefore find (3.42b) acceptable, given an 
adequate supporting context) whilst others maintain the grammatical constraint on 
indirect objects only being object marked (as in (3.41b)). 
Summary 
The distribution and interpretation of the OM can be accounted for if the OM is 
viewed as an exponent of procedural encoding. The procedural information encoded 
by the OM relates both to noun class and to accessibility. The OM marks highly 
accessible discourse entities, as the contrast between the OM and emphatic personal 
pronouns in example (3.33) demonstrates. Because the OM marks highly accessible 
discourse entities, these must be part of the GROUND (that is old or background 
information) rather than the FOCUS (new or foreground information) in the sense of 
Vallduvf's information packaging (see §2.2.2). The following examples (repeated 
from §2.2.2) illustrate this. 
(2.33) A: What did you do? 
B: ni + li + vunja kikombe 
SP PAST break CUP7 
I broke a cup 
formational structure ALL-FOCUS 
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All of the information conveyed by B's utterance in (2.33) is new, so the formational 
structure is ALL-FOCUS; the cup is not an accessible discourse entity, since its first 
mention is by B, and so there is (and can be) no OM. In the following examples, the 
cup is highly accessible, having been previously mentioned; a corresponding class 7 
OM is therefore possible, either with or without an overt NP. 
(2.34) A: What did you do to the cup? 
B: ni + li + ki + vunja 
SP PAST OM7 break 
I broke it 
formational structure ALL-FOCUS 
The OM in (2.34) is not a LINK because it is assumed that the addressee is already at 
the appropriate address, that is, the cup is highly accessible; the OM therefore plays a 
similar informational role to pronouns in English, which is to be expected given the 
above characterisation of the OM as an incorporated object pronoun. 
(2.35) A: What happened to the cup? 
B: (kikombe) ni + li + ki + vunja 
cup? SP PAST OM7 break 
(the ciup) I broke it 
formational structure (LINK) FOCUS 
(2.36) A: What happened to the cup? 
B: ni + li + ki + vunja (kikombe) 
SP PAST OM7 break cups 
I broke it (the cup ) 
formational structure FOCUS (TAIL) 
In both (2.35) and (2.36) the object marked VP nilikivunja (I broke it) is the FOCUS 
since it constitutes new information not presupposed by A's previous utterances. 
Although it is usually the FOCUS which, because of its informational importance, is 
emphasised, elements of the GROUND may also receive emphasis. In contrast to the 
OM, the use of the overt NP kikombe (the cup) is optional (as the brackets indicate), 
but its occurrence in conjunction with the corresponding OM has the effect of 
redirecting the addressee towards the currently most accessible address and hence 
emphasising it. Additionally, the OM allows the overt NP to achieve syntactic 
prominence, since only if an OM is present can the NP function as a syntactic topic 
which, being free of restrictions on word order, is able to be topicalised, as in (2.35) 
where the NP kikombe occurs in the highly salient sentence initial position. 
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314 Conclusion 
Referring expressions other than pronouns encode conceptual information; for 
example, a proper name gives access to a concept the content of which includes 
encyclopaedic knowledge relating to the individual denoted by that name, and 
descriptions consisting of a determiner (which is procedural - see §2.1.2) and a NP 
encode conceptual information in the NP, such as the concept (DOG) to which the 
NP dog gives access in the phrase the dog. Pronouns, unlike other referring 
expressions, encode only procedural information; that is, they encode processing 
instructions by which an addressee can identify an intended referent, but they do not 
give rise to any conceptual information. 
According to the principle of relevance, addressees aim to interpret a given utterance 
as efficiently as possible; for this reason, addressees will, in the first instance, process 
new information within the currently most accessible utterance interpretation context, 
and will only extend or revise this if adequate contextual effects can not be computed, 
or if there is some indication that the current context will prove insufficient (for 
example through the use of the discourse connective well - see §2.2.1). Pronouns 
reflect and exploit this procedure by constraining the addressee's search for intended 
referents to the set of highly accessible discourse entities. Characterisation of the 
Kiswahili OM in this way accounted neatly for its distribution and discourse 
functions. Individual pronouns in different languages also narrow the search by 
encoding information relating to one or more of number, person, gender, case, noun 
class, etc. The use of a pronoun over a marker of lower accessibility also reduces 
processing effort at phase one, where the frequency of mention and phonologically 
and semantically reduced nature of pronouns renders them easy to decode. 
In the following section, I shall consider other types of linguistically encoded 
information which could be considered to encode procedural information at phase two 
of utterance interpretation. Given the parallels drawn in the literature between 
pronominal and temporal anaphora (Partee 1973,1984; Carston 1988b) and between 
pronominal anaphora and modality (Roberts 1989), I shall extend the discussion of 
procedural encoding at phase two to incorporate tense, aspect and modality markers 
which, like pronouns, are indexical expressions which help determine propositions. 
Whereas pronouns constrain the manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual 
representations of entities projected from the lexical entries of predicates, tense, 
aspect and modality markers constrain the manipulation of sub-propositional 
conceptual representations of situations or events. The way in which they do this and 
the aspects of the, utterance interpretation context whose construction is thereby 
constrained are discussed below. 
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Situations and Events 
3.2.0 Introduction 
All of the examples of procedural encoding which we have so far considered (at 
phases two and three) have had the effect of constraining the hypothesis space to 
be 
searched by the addressee during the inferential phases of utterance interpretation. 
Procedural information functions, I have claimed, by relating some conceptual 
representation to a specific aspect of the utterance interpretation context. In the case 
of a nominal referring expression, the hypothesis space is constrained in regard to the 
supposed relative degree of accessibility (in the mind of an addressee) of the mental 
representation of the intended referent. 
However, it is not only mental representations of discourse entities, with varying 
degrees of relative accessibility, that the utterance interpretation context contains, but 
also representations of the situations or events in which these entities participate. An 
addressee entertains assumptions concerning, for example, the existential and 
temporal status of these situations and events, that is, whether these are to be 
represented as actual (i. e. verified or verifiable) or 'irrealis' (i. e. unverified and hence 
potential, hypothetical, conditional, etc. ), and as occurring - in reality or potentially - 
at some time. This suggests that modality-tense-aspect37 (MTA) markers might 
constitute a class or classes of procedurally encoded expressions. If this were the case, 
MTA markers would constrain representations of situations and events with respect to 
modal, temporal and aspectual features of contexts, in a similar way to that in which 
pronouns and other types of referring expression constrain the identification of 
discourse entities according to the supposed accessibility of their mental 
representations in the mind of an addressee. 
Take, for instance, the temporal reference of (3.42): 
(3.42) Jane kissed Mary. 
Both 'Jane' and 'Mary' encode concepts indicating that an instance of a particular 
individual is at stake, and 'kiss' also encodes a concept, expressing an event of a 
particular kind involving at least two individuals and occurring at a place and a time. 
37 In this I follow the 'natural' order identified by Bybee (1985), although Bickerton (1981,1984) and 
Muysken (1981) claim that the usual order in (plantation) creoles is TMA, realised as [+anterior), 
[+irrealis], [+non-punctual] (a view challenged by Kihm's 1995 study of Tayo, a New Caledonian 
plantation creole). I shall also use the term 'modality' in preference to the more common 'mood' given 
that'mood' has already been used with reference to sentence type (declarative, interrogative etc. ) and 
also serves to distinguish verbal categories such as indicative and subjunctive. 
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In contrast, the past tense suffix, -ed, does not encode information about itself so 
much as about the interpretation of the event expressed by (3.42), namely that the 
event [Jane kiss Mary] is to be interpreted as occurring at some time in the past. This, 
I shall argue in §3.3, is procedural information. In the same way that in (3.13a) and 
(3.13b): 
(3.13) a. Janet kissed Maryj and then shed kissed Harry. 
b. Janet kissed Maryj and then SHEj kissed Harry. 
reference assignment to 'she' and 'SHE' helps to determine the proposition expressed 
((3.13a) is truth-conditionally distinct from (3.13b)), so the past tense suffix, -ed, 
helps determine the truth-conditions of (3.42) and therefore functions at phase two of 
utterance interpretation. 
In order to provide a viable analysis of MTA markers in procedural terms, two things 
must be specified: the nature of the conceptual representations of situations and 
events which MTA markers manipulate, and those features of the utterance 
interpretation context in relation to which these representations are manipulated. I 
shall address each in turn. 
3.2.1 Situation representations and operators 
In this subsection, I propose a characterisation of sub-propositional conceptual 
representations of situations and events as 'situation representations', based on Klinge 
(1993). Klinge (1993: 320-321) proposes a model in which a logical form consists of a 
'propositional content' (PC) plus various 'operators; 38 these encode conceptual and 
procedural information respectively. Operators have the PC within their scope, as 
follows: 
(3.43) OPERATORS [PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT] 
Thus each of the sentences (from Klinge 1993: 320): 
(3.44) John buys Mary's ticket. 
(3.45) John bought Mary's ticket. 
[Klinge's (17)] 
38 The use of the term 'operator' has been extended (on a par with the extension of this term in e. g. 
Cobb (1995) to discussions of scope within autosegmental phonology) to designate procedural 
information with scope over conceptual representations in the language of thought; its use here is not 
restricted to the first auxiliary in a verb phrase. 
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(3.46) Did John buy Mary's ticket? 
(3.47) John will buy Mary's ticket. 
can be represented as: 
(3.48) OPERATORS [JOHN BUY MARY'S TICKET] [Klinge's (18)] 
The PC, [JOHN BUY MARY'S TICKET] still needs to be inferentially enriched, for 
example to distinguish between possible interpretations of 'Mary's' such as 'for Mary', 
'from Mary', etc. The inferentially enriched PC Klinge calls a 'situation representation' 
(SR). A SR is still not fully propositional, that is, a SR alone cannot be truth- 
conditionally determined since it is a representation of a situation or event devoid of 
modal, temporal, or aspectual information. 39 
However, the status of SRs is unclear in Klinge (1993) which presents two 
incompatible views of SRs. On the one hand Klinge (1993: 320) suggests that SRs are 
propositional since they combine directly with elements of the context ({C)) to 
achieve contextual effects, that is, they provide the input (P) to phase three of 
utterance interpretation: 
"... I will call the propositional form a sentence gives rise to a 
SITUATION REPRESENTATION.... It is the SITUATION 
REPRESENTATION, not the linguistic semantic input, which an 
addressee can combine with existing knowledge and assumptions 
about the state of affairs referred to to form new assumptions. " 
(Klinge 1993: 320) 
On the other hand, Klinge (1993: 321) claims that SRs are derived solely from PCs (i. e. 
minus operators) and must therefore be sub-propositional: 
"It is the PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT that undergoes enrichment, 
disambiguation and reference assignment to turn it into a conceptual 
representation of a SITUATION. " 
(Klinge 1993: 321) 
These characterisations of SRs are only compatible if operators do not contribute to 
propositions and thus affect truth conditions, in which case all procedural information 
would function at what I have termed phase three of utterance interpretation - as early 
work on the conceptual/procedural distinction (e. g. Blakemore 1987) assumed. This 
39 A similar assumption is made in DRT also. In DRT, truth-conditional interpretation only occurs 
once a DRS has been constructed, which involves anaphora resolution and specification of the 
temporal relations among the situations and events represented. Thus neither pronouns nor tense and 
aspect markers are directly truth-conditionally interpretable in DRT, rather, a discourse is truth- 
conditionally interpretable only via a series of DRSs (cf. e. g. Reyle & Gabbay 1994). 
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situation results from Klinge's conflation of the two inferential phases of utterance 
interpretation, (much as in Wilson & Sperber (1993a: 1), see footnote 18); Klinge 
includes not only syntactic mood as an operator (as the non-declarative word order in 
example (3.46) above illustrates) but also tense and modality markers. Whilst 
syntactic mood functions at phase three of utterance interpretation and takes whole 
propositions within its scope (as, for example, does the Kiswahili interrogative je and 
the discourse connectives so and well), the use of a particular tense to locate an event 
in time contributes to the identification of a proposition, and therefore functions at 
phase two. The distinction between these two types of procedural information is lost 
by classifying them both as examples of a single undifferentiated semantic type: 
'operator'. 
In contrast to the wide range of elements which Klinge counts as operators, PCs 
consist of a highly restricted set of elements. The sense in which Klinge uses the term 
'propositional content' (which is also the sense which this study will adopt) contrasts 
with the use of the same term in Wilson & Sperber (1988: 133), although in both 
accounts propositional content is independent of context: 
Figure 8: uses of the term propositional content 
Klinge (1993) operators propositional content 
includes: tense, modals, syntactic mood 'content words' 
Wilson & Sperber (1988) propositional attitudes propositional content 
includes: syntactic mood tense, modals, 'content words' 
To avoid any terminological confusion, the use of the terms 'operator' and 'situation 
representation' in this thesis will be specified as follows. 'Operator' will be used 
exclusively to refer to linguistic elements (specifically modality, tense and aspect 
markers) functioning procedurally at phase two of utterance interpretation (that is, in 
a more restricted way than Klinge 1993). SRs are more complicated to characterise; 
this will be done first negatively in terms of what SRs are not, and then positively, 
stating what they are. 
Firstly, a SR is distinct from the propositional form of an utterance (contra Klinge 
1993: 320), which consists of the inferentially enriched PC interpreted in accordance 
with the procedural information encoded by all of the associated operators. This is 
illustrated in the following example: the utterance (3.49a) is represented in the 
language of thought as (3.49b) which is a representation of the type OPERATOR [PC]; 
the PC is then inferentially enriched through reference assignment of the pronouns and 
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disambiguation of the genitive to give (3.49c) which is a representation of the type 
OPERATOR [SR]; the SR, which is not a propositional form, is then manipulated in line 
with the procedural information encoded by wi1140 to give rise to the fully 
propositional (3.49d): 
(3.49) a. He will buy her ticket. 
b. WILL [HE BUY HER TICKET] 
C. WILL [JOHN BUY A TICKET FOR MARY] 
d. John will (at some future time) buy a ticket for Mary. 
At the most basic level of definition, a SR is a conceptual representation of a situation 
or event which is manipulated by an operator relative to some feature of the utterance 
interpretation context. However, a SR need not be derived solely from the inferentially 
enriched PC (contra Klinge 1993: 321), since operators differ with respect to their 
relative scope. In English, as in many other languages (Bybee 1985), modal markers 
have wider surface syntactic scope than temporal markers which in turn have wider 
surface syntactic scope than aspectual markers, and this is reflected in the language of 
thought by the relative scope of the corresponding operators: 
(3.50) a. Mary will have been working. 
b. WILL [ANTERIOR [PROGRESSIVE [SR MARY WORK]]] 
C. WILL [ANTERIOR [SR MARY BE WORKING]] 
d. WILL [SR MARY HAVE BEEN WORKING] 
In (3.50b) the progressive aspect operator has scope over the SR [MARY WORK], 
derived from the PC MARY WORK] inferentially enriched to identify the intended 
'Mary'. The temporal (anterior) operator in turn has scope over the resulting SR 
(3.50c), and finally (3.50d), the modal operator has scope over the SR derived from 
the inferentially enriched PC, the aspectual operator and the temporal (anterior) 
operator. 
This entails that a SR is only defined relative to the operator which has immediate 
scope over it. Therefore, whilst we can talk of the (unique) PC encoded by an 
utterance we cannot talk of the (unique) SR (unless only one operator is encoded in 
the utterance). The PC in any utterance consists purely of linguistically encoded 
conceptual information, whereas a SR within the scope of a given operator, 0, 
consists of the conceptual information encoded by the PC inferentially enriched in line 
40 Arguments for viewing will, as an operator are provided in §6.1; for the moment this is simply 
assumed. 
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with the procedural information encoded by any other operators with narrower scope 
than 0. 
When a particular operator manipulates a SR, it does so in relation to some specific 
feature of the utterance interpretation context. This, the second element of a 
procedural account of MTA markers in need of specification, will be discussed below. 
3.2_2 Domains 
An utterance interpretation context is, as we have seen, a complex construction, 
consisting of various assumptions entertained with varying degrees of certitude. A SR 
may be interpreted relative to any of these assumptions at phase two of utterance 
interpretation, as may propositional forms at phase three. There are, however, features 
of the utterance interpretation context relative to which only the sub-propositional SRs 
may be interpreted, since they contribute directly to the recovery of propositional 
form. These are the features of context which specify existential, temporal and 
aspectual information, and it is in relation to these, which I shall term domains, that 
most MTA markers constrain the interpretation of SRs. The distinction between 
expressions which relate SRs to cognitive domains and those which relate SRs to other 
aspects of the utterance interpretation context will be important in distinguishing will 
and shall from the other modals. It will be shown in chapter 4 that can, may, must and 
should relate SRs to assumptions in the utterance interpretation context and in chapter 
6 that will and shall relate SRs to a cognitive domain (will to the irrealis domain 
discussed below, and shall to the irrealis and temporal domains). 
The term domain is derived from Langacker's use of this term within the framework 
of cognitive grammar (Langacker 1983: 155-162). 41 According to Langacker 
(1983: 155) "every predicate is characterized relative to one or more domains, 
collectively called its matrix. " In my use of the term, it is contexts rather than 
predicates which are characterised relative to domains. In relation to the 
representation of situations and events, domains specify the existential, temporal, and 
aspectual parameters within which a SR can be interpreted; that is, domains specify 
whether an event is to be interpreted as verified or unverified, the time of (actual or 
potential) occurrence of an event, and the nature of that occurrence - whether it occurs 
once, continuously or iteratively, is completed or incomplete, etc. Only once values 
have been assigned to all of these parameters, i. e. when a SR has been related to all of 
the relevant domains (the matrix), can a propositional form be said to have been 
41 Klinge (1993: 325-329), in line with Durst-Andersen's Mental Grammar (1986,1992), suggests that 
operators relate SRs to various 'indices', which fulfil asimilar role to that of domains in my account. 
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recovered. Domains can thus be viewed as providing the cognitive framework within 
which propositions are constructed. 
The relating of SRs to domains is an inferential process occurring at phase two of 
utterance interpretation. In the absence of any explicit indication to the contrary, an 
addressee will interpret a SR relative to the currently most accessible domain. In the 
case of the existential status of an event the default assumption will usually be that the 
SR represents a verified rather than an unverified event (speakers are more likely to 
talk about events which they know have occurred or are occurring than about 
potential or hypothetical events). This default assumption can, however, be 
overridden; procedural information concerning the intended interpretation of a SR 
with respect to a given domain may be encoded by a speaker in the form of one or 
more operators. Hence, operators relating SRs to the realis (actual, verified) domain 
are rare, since this is taken as a default parameter; in contrast, operators relating SRs 
to the irrealis (potential, hypothetical) domain, such as markers of modality, are 
attested in the majority of languages (Bybee et al 1994) 42 This process parallels that 
which Ariel described with respect to nominal referring expressions and their relation 
to context: 
"Note that by itself, Relevance predicts that a context search be 
conducted according to degree of context Accessibility, automatically 
giving priority to the more accessible context compatible with Optimal 
Relevance. Accessibility theory, however, offers a marking system 
which eliminates this default assumption in favour of a clearer 
instruction of the speaker to the addressee regarding 'where' to retrieve 
the background information required. " 
(Ariel 1990: 171) 
Domains can be characterised as either 'basic' or 'abstract'. Basic domains cannot be 
fully reduced to any other domain. For example neither the temporal domain nor the 
irrealis domain can be defined in terms of any other domain, and are therefore basic. 
A concept characterised relative to one or more basic domains can itself function as 
the domain for a number of other concepts, which can in turn function as domains for 
further concepts, and so on indefinitely. These non-basic domains are termed 'abstract 
domains'. For example, both the temporal domain and the irrealis domain are 
involved in the representation of future time reference, since a situation or event in 
the future is also logically irrealis, that is, it is non-actual and unverified. The future 
can therefore be viewed as an abstract domain defined relative to the temporal and the 
42 In positing a basic binary distinction between realis and irrealis I follow e. g. Chung & Timberlake 
(1985) who also make a distinction between 'realis' and 'irrealis', the latter including what Leech 
(1971: 112) calls 'theoretical' and 'hypothetical' and what Matthews (1989: 196) calls 'potentialis' 
(potential) and 'irrealis' (unreal). The alternative position (adopted by Leech 1971 and Matthews 1989) 
is to posit a basic three way distinction between real (factual), potential and hypothetical. 
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irrealis domains. The relation between the temporal and irrealis domains with respect 
to the future is illustrated in a simplistic form in figure 9, which shows the 
impossibility of an event or situation being both future and realis: 
Figure 9: 
past / realis present / realis 
past / irrealis present / irrealis future / irrealis 
This is reflected in many languages, such as Takelma (Sapir 1912) which combines a 
realis form of the verb stem with the non-future form of a suffix indicating person and 
number, and an irrealis form of the verb stem with the future form of a suffix 
indicating person and number: 
(3.51) yanä-t'e 
go (IRR)- ISG (FUT) 
I will go 
(3.52) yän-t'e? 
go (REALIS)-1 SG (NONFUT) 
I went/am goinglarn about to go 
(Chung & Timberlake 1985: 204-5) 
In English, the intrinsic correlation between future time reference and the irrealis 
domain is reflected in the use of modal markers and progressive (imperfective) aspect 
in the expression of future time (see below). 
Additionally, the various basic domains can be characterised in terms of 
dimensionality (Langacker 1983: 157-158); time is one-dimensional, in contrast with, 
for example, space which can be two- or three-dimensional. The irrealis domain will 
be characterised as two-dimensional as it denotes varying degrees of likelihood of 
occurrence of events which may be either potential or hypothetical. 
32 mm"r 
In this section, three theoretical constructs have been introduced: situation 
representations (SRs), operators and domains. These have been defined as follows: 
Situation representations 
A SR is a sub-propositional conceptual representation of a situation or event and is 
determined relative to the operator with immediate scope over it. A SR consists of the 
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propositional content of an utterance, that is, the conceptual information encoded in 
that utterance, inferentially enriched in accordance with the principle of relevance and 
any operators also within the scope of the operator relative to which the SR is 
determined. 
Operators 
An operator is any expression which encodes procedural information constraining the 
interpretation of a SR. 
Domains 
A domain is an element of the utterance interpretation context relative to which a SR 
is manipulated. Domains specify whether a SR is to be interpreted as a representation 
of an unverified event (the irrealis domain), as a representation of a past, present or 
future event (the temporal domain), and the manner in which an event occurs (various 
aspectual domains). The irrealis and temporal domains are basic, being irreducible to 
any other domain, whereas future time reference is an abstract domain, being defined 
in terms of both the temporal and the irrealis domains. 
In the following section, the relation between SRs, operators and domains will he 
described with respect to the use of temporal and aspectual expressions in discourse. 
Modal auxiliaries are discussed in chapter 4. 
1.2 Tense. Aspect and Time 
3.3.0 Introduction 
I shall continue the discussion of MTA markers as exponents of procedural encoding 
at phase two, first by addressing the role of inference in temporal reference (3.3.1) 
and then that of tense (3.3.2) and aspect, in particular unmarked and progressive 
aspect in the expression of future time reference in English (3.3.3). In each case it will 
be shown that any account of the semantics of tense and aspect markers which views 
these as fully determining the truth-conditional content of their associated utterances 
is untenable (as is the case with pronouns). An alternative account, in which tense and 
aspect markers are analysed as encoding procedural information, will be proposed. 
3.3.1 Temporal reference 
Just as most pronominal expressions underdetermine their intended referents, so do 
tenses (in all the languages for which evidence is available) significantly 
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underdetermine the location of situations and events in time. 43 Even when a tense or 
aspect marker is used, pragmatic considerations (that is, assumptions derivable from 
the utterance interpretation context) still play a substantial role in determining the 
intended temporal reference of a situation or event. For instance, the temporal 
reference of the events in the following examples is determined largely as a result of 
pragmatic considerations or temporal adverbials (such as just in example (3.56)) 
rather than by the past or the 'present perfect' alone: 
(3.53) A: Did you remember to lock the door? 
B: No. 
B: When? 
(3.54) A: Have you eaten? 
B: No. 
B: ? Yes, frequently. 
On a traditional Reichenbachian, truth-conditional account, (3.53) and (3.54) simply 
locate the events (E) [You remember to lock the door] and [You eat] respectively at a 
time prior to the temporal reference point (R), which in the absence of contextual 
information to the contrary is assumed to be the moment of speaking (S). Both (3.53) 
and (3.54) can be represented on this account by the following model: 
Figure 10: a time-line analysis of the role of the past/present perfect 
past s future 
ER 
B's response "No" to both questions is true only if E did not occur at some point in the 
past. The most relevant interpretation of the questions in (3.53) and (3.54), however, 
is the one in which the time interval expressed through the past or present perfect has 
present relevance, hence B's response "No" to both questions would not ordinarily be 
taken to be false, even if B had in fact forgotten to lock the door a month previously. 
Evidence that the relevant time interval is inferred rather then encoded by the past or 
the present perfect comes from B's alternative responses: "When? " in (3.53), which 
indicates that the precise time reference was not encoded in A's utterance, and "Yes, 
frequently" in (3.54), which would ordinarily be taken to be literally true but 
infelicitous. (As Father Brown put it, "All language is used like that; you never get a 
43 Some languages, including Chinese, do not have tense markers (Janet Chan 22/5/96). In Chinese, 
temporal adverbials may, but need not, be used; in the absence of temporal adverbials, temporal 
reference, like pronominal reference with pro-drop in Chinese, is pragmatically determined. 
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question answered literally, even when you get it answered truly. " G. K. Chesterton 
The Invisible Man) In (3.55), on the other hand the time interval between the 
occurrence of the event and the moment of speaking would ordinarily be assumed to 
be greater than that in (3.54). Being pragmatically determined, this can be overridden, 
for example by the addition of the temporal adverbial just which is truth conditional, 
as (3.56) illustrates. (For further discussion cf. Smith 1990,1993 and Moeschler 
1994). 
(3.55) Mary has climbed Everest. 
(3.56) ? Mary has just climbed Everest; she did it ten years ago. 
Such evidence demonstrates that tense and aspect do not fully determine the temporal 
truth-conditions of the propositions of which they form part. This follows from the 
fact that tense and aspect are semantically underdetermined, hence there are 
"pragmatic aspects of what is said" in the expression of temporal reference, just as 
there are in the use of and for clausal conjunction. 44 (This semantic 
underdetermination of tenses has led Moeschler (1994) to view tense as non-truth- 
conditional which clearly contradicts "the standard semantic practice of calling a 
construction truth-conditional if and only if it contributes to the proposition 
expressed" (W&S 1993a: 6) since tenses contribute to propositions even if they do not 
fully determine their temporal truth-conditions. A compromise position is adopted by 
Dahl (1985: 13-14) who views truth conditions as partly accounting for the semantics 
of tense and aspect, which are primarily governed by conditions of use. This is the 
view towards which I shall tend; semantically tense and aspect are truth-conditional 
in the sense of contributing to truth-values (hence they function at phase two of 
utterance interpretation: the recovery of propositional form), but it is primarily 
pragmatic considerations or explicit temporal adverbials which determine the use and 
interpretation of tenses in discourse and the truth-value of an associated proposition. ) 
We have seen that inference plays a significant role in the determination of temporal 
reference. Temporal reference is not always wholly determined by inference, 
however; the inferential process can be constrained linguistically by the use of tense 
and aspect markers. In other words, tense and aspect markers encode procedural 
information constraining the inferential process of utterance interpretation with 
44 In § 1.3.3 it was shown that the causal and temporal relations between clauses conjoined by and are 
pragmatically determined (since not encoded by and) but truth-conditional nonetheless: 
(1.12) a. What happened was not that Peter left and Mary got angry, 
but that Mary got angry and Peter left. 
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respect to the location of situations and events in time. Below, I shall briefly outline a 
procedural account of tense and aspect. 
33-2 Tense 
In this section, an account of temporal reference will be proposed in which tense 
markers are viewed as semantically underdetermined operators which manipulate any 
SR within their scope relative to the temporal cognitive domain, with the result that 
the event or situation described comes to be represented as occurring at some moment 
or period in time. Figure 11 below represents the function of a past tense marker, such 
as the English -ed suffix: 
Figure 11: the function of the past tense45 
temporal domain 
past present future 
However, a SR does not always require a tense marker in order to be related in a 
particular way to the temporal domain; this can be achieved by inference alone. This 
is what happens when non-past or unspecified tense is used in English: the addressee 
simply uses the most accessible context and the principle of relevance to determine 
the intended event time. 46 The English MTA system exploits this principle by 
assuming as part of a default context the most accessible temporal reference 
compatible with Optimal Relevance: 
(3.57) I work in the city, so I have to leave the house pretty early. This 
morning, I go out to the garage as usual but the car isn't there! 
The unspecified tense forms of 'work' and 'leave' are interpreted as habitual 
occurrences, given what we know about jobs and daily routines, but the unspecified 
45 The time line is represented by dashes in the future to illustrate that the future is necessarily irrealis 
46 The use of non-past tense forms to refer to past time events is, however, restricted to certain highly 
constrained contexts, such as narratives (3.57) and jokes (3.58), and its use in past time contexts is 
marked. This is because past tense marking in English can be in 'harmony' with the context in which it 
is used, with the result that it can be semantically redundant and unmarked when used in conjunction 
with past temporal adverbials (see §5.1.2). For this reason I shall continue to talk of 'non-past' or 
-'unspecified' tense. 
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tense forms in the second sentence assume the temporal context set up by "This 
morning" and receive a definite past time interpretation. 
Morphological tense in English takes the form of a binary opposition between past 
and unspecified (or non-past) tense constructions. The use of an unspecified tense 
construction indicates, as we have seen, that the addressee is to relate the situation or 
event in question to the currently most accessible temporal context, whereas the use 
of a past tense construction overrides this default assumption in favour of a past time 
interpretation (that is, the use of a past tense construction provides an explicit 
instruction to an addressee to relate a SR to the past time sector of the temporal 
cognitive domain). Further refinements arise from the use of modal auxiliaries, 
temporal adverbials, or perfect and/or progressive aspect in opposition to the simple 
or unspecified aspect. 
Below, this characterisation of tense and temporal reference will be compared with a 
more traditional study of tense (Declerck 1989) 47 In the absence of a sufficiently 
powerful pragmatic theory, Declerck overstates the role of tense in determining 
temporal reference and understates the role of inference. The discussion will also 
incorporate aspects of an alternative relevance theoretic model of temporal reference 
(Moeschler 1994). 
Declerck (1989) claims that English divides time into two 'time-spheres': past and 
non-past, corresponding to the two morphologically marked tenses in English; the 
non-past time-sphere includes to and the past time-sphere excludes to (where to is the 
zero-point or temporal reference point which is usually, but need not necessarily be, 
the time of utterance). Declerck divides the non-past time-sphere into three 'sectors' 
relative to to, giving four 'absolute sectors' in English. Each of these sectors 
corresponds to an absolute tense (Comrie 1985), that is, a tense in a direct rather than 
an indirect relation to to, as represented in figure 12, based on Declerck (1989: 11-14): 
Figure 12: Declerck's (1989) time-spheres and sectors 
time-sphere s=ector 
past past 
"pre-present" = present perfect 
present present = present tense 
"post-present" = future tense 
47 See also Declerck (1991) for essentially the same analysis. 
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Declerck then distinguishes between literal and metaphorical uses of the four absolute 
tenses: when used literally, absolute tenses express time within their corresponding 
sector; however, 
"Apart from this basic use, the absolute tenses are also used to 
represent a situation as if it belonged to a particular sector. In this use 
(in which there is a shift of temporal perspective to a sector that is 
different from the one to which the situation actually belongs) there is 
only a metaphorical relation between tense and time. " (Declerck 1989: 83) 
Two main objections to Declerck's model can be raised within the relevance theoretic 
framework: First, Declerck's claim that each of the three non-past time sectors 
corresponds to an absolute tense which can be used literally or metaphorically is 
incorrect. To begin with, whilst accepting his past versus non-past distinction, 
Declerck's inclusion in the four absolute sectors of a future tense (i. e. will) is 
unfounded given the evidence of §6.1. More importantly, even disregarding the claim 
made in § 1.4.4 that it is impossible to uphold a psychological distinction between 
literal and metaphorical uses of language (cf. especially Gibbs 1989), it is incorrect to 
talk of literal and metaphorical uses of the present (i. e. non-past) tense. The non-past 
or unspecified tense construction simply licenses the addressee to relate a situation or 
event to the most accessible sector of the temporal domain. The fact that the most 
accessible temporal reference point is not always the present (i. e. the moment of 
speaking) does not entail a metaphorical usage. For example, the use of the 
unspecified tense construction in the 'historic present' requires that the most accessible 
context excludes present time considerations: 
(3.58) Here's a joke -a man walks into a pub and says... 
(See also the examples in §3.3.3 below of the so-called 'present tense' with simple and 
progressive aspect used for future time reference. ) 
The unspecified tense construction also occurs in the 'present perfect', in the have 
auxiliary with morphologically non-past tense marking, in conjunction with the past 
participle form of the following verb. Here again the use of the unspecified tense 
indicates that the most accessible context is sufficient for optimally relevant utterance 
interpretation; however, the event in question is taken to have occurred prior to the 
reference time (E < R) owing to the past participle. Thus in (3.54) and (3.55) repeated 
below, although the events described occurred in the past, to achieve optimal 
relevance the utterances must be processed against the most accessible temporal 
assumptions at the moment of speaking; a restricted period of recent time in (3.54) 
but a potentially much longer prior period in (3.55). 
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(3.54) Have you eaten? 
(3.55) Mary has climbed Everest. 
I now turn to the second objection to Declerck's model. Moeschler (1994) has argued 
from a relevance theoretic perspective against the assumption (central to Lyons 1977, 
Comrie 1985 and Declerck 1989) that tense is intrinsically a deictic category. 
Moeschler (1994), on the basis of a comparison of the simple past and imperfect 
tenses in French, suggests that "it seems preferable to talk of anaphoric or deictic use 
of a tense rather than of intrinsically deictic or anaphoric tenses" (Moeschler 1994: 88, 
my translation). For example, in (3.59) [Moeschler 1994 (97)] the simple past is being 
used deictically whilst the imperfect is being used anaphorically, whereas in (3.60) 
[Moeschler 1994 (98)] the roles are reversed: 
(3.59) Lorsque Marie entra, Jean telephonait. 
When Marie came in, Jean was on the phone. 
(3.60) Alors que les joueurs discutaient avec 1'arbitre, une bagarre dclata entre 
spectateurs. 
Whilst the players were arguing with the umpire, a fight broke out 
in the crowd. 
In (3.59) the temporal reference point, R, is the deictic centre, to, and the event El, 
'Marie entra' (in the simple past), is located prior to R. The event E2, 'Jean t6lephonait' 
(in the imperfect), is anaphoric in that it is determined by reference to E1, such that 
E2 contains El. (3.59) can therefore be represented schematically as follows: 
(3.59') R= to; El < R; El E2 
In (3.60) the temporal reference point, R, is again the deictic centre, to, and the event 
El, 'les joueurs discutaient' (in the imperfect), is located prior to R. The event E2, 'une 
bagarre eclata entre spectateurs' (in the simple past), is anaphoric being determined by 
reference to E1, such that E2 is contained in El. (3.60) can also be represented 
schematically as follows: 
(3.60') R= toi; EI < R; EI c E2 
Moeschler (1994: 93) concludes that the referential functions of tenses are deictic by 
default rather than being intrinsically deictic, with the result that in principle any 
temporal indicator (temporal adverb, date etc. ) can function as a reference point and 
that only in the absence of such indicators is a deictic interpretation, i. e. an 
interpretation relative to the time of utterance (to), necessary. This gives rise to the 
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following "interpretation procedure for temporal indicators" (paraphrased from 
Moeschler 1994: 94): 
Look for a temporal indicator from which to determine the intended 
temporal reference; if this fails, use the utterance interpretation 
context. 
This 'interpretation procedure' is followed because explicit temporal indicators are 
more salient than the default context, which need not be the moment of speaking. 
Although derived from analysis of past tenses in French, Moeschler's interpretation 
procedure can also be applied to the use of the so-called simple present and present 
progressive in English with future time reference. 
13 ,2 Aspect and 
future time reference 
The following empirical analysis demonstrates that not only does tense significantly 
underdetermine temporal reference, but that there are constraints on the use of the 
unmarked and progressive aspect in English ('simple present' and 'present 
progressive') for future time reference which, were they semantically determined, 
would give rise to far too rich an ontology. The analysis below demonstrates that, 
given the appropriate relevance theoretic framework, there is no need for such a rich 
ontology, since these constraints arise from the interaction of pragmatic factors with 
the semantics of the two aspectual forms. 
The semantics of the English aspectual system is less determinate than has been 
assumed. For example, Hatav (1993) characterises the English aspectual system in 
purely truth-conditional terms as a function from the intervals between reference time 
(R) and event time (E) to truth values, as follows: in simple aspect RcE (reference 
time contains event time), in progressive aspect RE (reference time is contained 
within event time), and in the perfect R>E (event time occurs prior to reference 
time). This, however, makes the wrong prediction for the interpretation of the 
progressive with future time reference in (3.61a) (the event time does not contain the 
reference time) and wrongly predicts that (3.61a) and (3.61b) are truth-conditionally 
distinct: 
(3.61) a. She is leaving tomorrow. 
b. She leaves tomorrow. 
Whilst (3.61 a) and (3.61b) are not truth-conditionally distinct, there are constraints on 
the use of unmarked and progressive aspect with future time reference which 
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condition their distribution and interpretation. These will be discussed below, first in 
relation to unmarked aspect and then in relation to the progressive aspect. 
The use of the 'simple present' form of a main verb for future time reference is 
conditioned by three constraints: 
i) With the exception of stylised usage such as that of weather forecasts, the simple 
present can only be used with reference to events that are planned or absolutely 
certain, hence the unacceptability of (3.62) and (3.63) which can be neither planned 
nor absolutely certain: 
(3.62) ? It rains in a minute. 
(3.63) ? You get better tomorrow. 
ii) It must co-occur with an explicit future time adverbial, otherwise the default 
context (often present time) is assumed: 
(3.64) a. I work nights as of next week. 
b. I work nights. (obligatory habitual interpretation) 
iii) The situation referred to is one over which the subject (not, as Wekker 1976: 82 
claims, the speaker) has no control: 
(3.65) Mary has a birthday next week. 
(3.66) ? Mary has a party next week. 
(3.67) It's the best news I've had since midsummer. Tomorrow we celebrate! 
(3.68) 1 have done my business, Sam. We return to Lyme tomorrow. 
(3.69) Now go to the house, all of you. I have phone calls to make, work to 
do. Tomorrow we leave. 48 
Although (3.60) to (3.62) appear to contradict this constraint, the situations referred to 
are ones over which the speaker alone, rather than the subject (inclusive we, that is 
addressees plus speaker), has control; that is, they are arrangements imposed on the 
addressees by the speaker. In this connection, Klinge (1993: 326) notes that a future 
situation or event can be brought about either by "the motivated production of an 
activity with the intention of bringing a consequent state about" (Klinge, p. c. 7/10/94) 
48 (3.67) Tolkein, J. R. R. 1977 The Fellowship of the Ring Toronto, Methuen (page reference lost); (3.68) Fowles J. 1973 The French Lieutenant's Woman New York, Signet p. 256; (3.69) Bradbury, R. 
1969 Dandelion Wine New York, Bantam p. 183. Cited in (Hurtle & Curat 1986: 56). 
127 
(what he calls an 'agent-event'), or by some situation in the world without any 
intentional activity (that is, a 'world-event'). I would suggest that the simple present 
with future time reference cannot be used to represent agent-events in which the agent 
and the subject of the clause are coreferential. 
The use of the 'present progressive' form of a main verb for future time reference is 
similarly conditioned by three constraints: 
i) similar to the simple form, the progressive can only be used with events which are 
planned, hence the unacceptability of (3.70) and (3.71) but not of (3.72) or (3.73) 
below: 
(3.70) ? It is raining in a minute. 
(3.71) ? You are getting better tomorrow. 
(3.72) Are you giving a paper? (said over lunch at the start of a conference) 
(3.73) Mary's having a party next week. 
ii) it must either co-occur with an explicit future time adverbial, or the utterance 
interpretation context must preclude a present time interpretation (i. e. the most 
accessible temporal reference point must not be the present): 
(3.72) Are you giving a paper? (said over lunch at the start of a conference) 
(3.73) Mary's having a party next week. 
iii) "The future use of the present progressive is limited to actions brought about by 
human endeavour. " (Quirk et al 1985: 215) In other words, the progressive can not be 
used to represent a future world-event, that is an event brought about by some 
situation in the world without any intentional activity : 
(3.46) ? Mary's having a birthday next week. 
Overriding this is the restriction on the use of the progressive with verbs of state or 
achievement (Vendler 1967: Chapter 4) which have no continuous aspect: 
(3.47) ? I'm being here all day tomorrow. 
The third constraint on both forms (that the 'simple present' cannot be used to 
represent agent-events where the agent and the subject are coreferential, and that the 
'present progressive' cannot be used to represent world-events) is applicable only with 
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future time reference. The principle of relevance accounts for this in that the 
additional cognitive effort necessitated by the effort needed to choose (for the 
speaker) between the various future expressions in English and to decide (for the 
addressee) why one form was used in preference to another, is offset by additional 
contextual effects. The additional contextual effects available with present time uses 
of the two forms (habitual occurrence versu's current and ongoing occurrence, etc. ) are 
not applicable to future time reference, so different contextual effects arise. These 
effects are illustrated in the following minimal pairs: 
(3.48) a. I have an extra day off next week. 
(3.49) a. I'm having an extra day off next week. 
The simple present implies an arrangement imposed on the subject, whereas the 
present progressive implies an arrangement made by the subject: 
(3.48) b. I have an extra day off next week because the office is closed. 
(3.49) b. I'm having an extra day off next week to go to a friend's wedding. 
In summary, the first constraint on the use of both the 'simple present' and the 'present 
progressive' for future time reference falls under Moeschler's interpretation procedure 
for temporal indicators. In the case of a representation of an event using the 'simple 
present' form of a verb, the time reference may be universal ('Oil floats on water'), 
habitual ('I cycle to work'), etc. depending on the nature of the event and any 
accompanying adverbials. For this reason, a future time temporal adverbial must be 
actualised or understood for the 'simple present' to refer to the future. 
The progressive, on the other hand, is typically used to represent events which are 
ongoing and actual; when such an interpretation is ruled out by the context/cotext, 
future time reference may be inferred even in the absence of a future time adverbial. 
This is due not to progressivity per se so much as to the fact that the 'progressive' 
form in English expresses imperfectivity (that an event is not yet completed or 
finished). The fact that, in its future time uses, the 'present progressive' does not 
always represent situations or events as ongoing, is evidence for treating the 
'progressive' as semantically an imperfective marker. In the spirit of Modified 
Occam's razor, there is no need to posit a further progressive sense. 
If the 'present progressive' is viewed as an imperfective marker, its future time uses 
come as no surprise. Bybee et al (1991), in a cross-linguistic study, identify three 
major types of future, one of which is a future based on aspectual forms "whose main 
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function is to mark imperfective, and, in the rare case, perfective, but which can also 
be used for statements about the future. " (1991: 18) They continue: 
"For both groups, we suspect that the future reading is only obtained 
when the context warrants it; that is, the semantics of the gram49 does 
not explicitly contain the features 'prediction' or 'future time reference', 
but is much more general, and allows future interpretation if it is 
supported by the context. " 
(Bybee et al 1991: 21) 
As we have seen, this is the case for English; furthermore, I suggest that the reason 
why a future time interpretation is possible in the absence of a temporal adverbial 
only with the imperfective (progressive) form lies in the (inferential) relation between 
imperfective aspect and the irrealis domain, which, as we saw in §3.2.2 is one of the 
basic cognitive domains to which the abstract future domain reduces. This is 
demonstrated through the "imperfective paradox" in which "the problem is to give an 
account of how [John was drawing a circle] entails that John was engaged in a 
bringing-a-circle-into-existence activity but does not entail that he brought a circle 
into existence" (Dowty 1977: 46). The ontology of the imperfective does appear to 
require the additional stipulation that for future time reference, the situation or event 
referred to must be the result of an agent-event, not a world-event, given (3.46) and 
(3.73): 
(3.46) ? Mary's having a birthday next week. 
(3.73) Mary's having a party next week. 
Inferences to the irrealis domain can also be made on the basis of the use of modal 
expressions, and in chapter 4I shall argue that attempts to characterise the semantics 
of the English modal auxiliaries in model theoretic terms involving possible worlds 
and modal logic are unsatisfactory. Before discussing modal auxiliaries, however, I 
shall summarise the findings of the current chapter and discuss the prospects for a 
procedural account of modal expressions. 
49 An abbreviation of `grammatical marker': "Formally, grammatical morphemes may be affixes, stem 
changes, reduplication, auxiliaries, particles, or complex constructions such as English be going to. We 
refer to all of these types equally as grammatical morphemes and for convenience shorten this term to 
"gram". " (Bybee et al 1994: 2) 
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1.4 Summary and Prospects 
3.4 .0 Introduction 
In §3.1 and §3.3 I demonstrated that pronouns and tense and aspect markers are not 
directly truth-conditionally interpreted. It was shown that the truth-conditions of 
utterances containing either nominal, temporal or aspectual indexical expressions are 
to a large extent inferentially determined. The function of pronouns, and tense and 
aspect markers is simply to constrain the inferential processes leading to the 
identification of propositional form. Pronouns, tense markers and aspect markers 
therefore encode procedural information manipulating (that is, constraining the 
inferential interpretation of) sub-propositional conceptual representations. I shall 
briefly review some of the arguments which led to these conclusions. 
3.4.1 Summary 
Pronouns 
In the case of pronouns, we saw that reference assignment is a largely inferential 
process, as illustrated in (3.1) and (3.2), but that there are restrictions on the discourse 
entities with which pronouns can be coindexed, as (3.3) illustrates: 
(3.1) Janet hugged Maryj because shed was happy. 
(3.2) Janet hugged Maryj because shej was crying. 
(3.3) Janet hugged Maryj and then shej/*j/*k hugged Harry. 
I concluded that pronouns encode procedural information concerning the level of 
relative accessibility of (mental representations of) their intended referents, in line 
with Accessibility Theory. According to the Accessibility hierarchy (Ariel 1991: 449) 
pronouns are markers of relatively high accessibility and will therefore be used only 
when a speaker judges that the mental representation of the entity to which it refers is 
highly accessible to the addressee, relative to alternative mental representations. 
This was illustrated with reference to Kiswahili, in which bound pronominals (the SP 
and OP) are markers of higher accessibility than emphatic pronouns and full NPs; this 
enables them not only to function referentially in the absence of an overt NP but also 
to topicalise a coreferential NP when one is present. 
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Tense markers 
Inference plays an important role in determining the intended temporal reference of a 
situation or event, as examples (3.53), (3.54) and (3.55) demonstrate. In (3.53) and 
(3.54), unlike (3.55), it is not enough simply to locate the events described at some 
unspecified moment in the past to recover the intended proposition: 
(3.53) Did you remember to lock the door? 
(3.54) Have you eaten? 
(3.55) Mary has climbed Everest. 
The role of tense markers is to constrain the inferential processes involved in the 
determination of temporal reference. More precisely, tense markers were 
characterised semantically as operators which manipulate any SR within their scope 
relative to the temporal cognitive domain, as represented with respect to the past tense 
in figure 11: 
Figure 11: the function of the past tense 
temporal domain 
future 
Aspect markers 
I demonstrated that a directly truth-conditional account of aspect, such as that 
proposed by Hatav (1993) which analyses simple aspect as encoding RcE (reference 
time contains event time), and progressive aspect as encoding RE (reference time 
is contained within event time) wrongly predicts that (3.61a) and (3.61b) are truth- 
conditionally distinct: 
(3.61) a. She is leaving tomorrow. 
b. She leaves tomorrow. 
The use of unmarked aspect for future time reference requires an explicit future time 
adverbial, but imposes constraints on the event in question (it must be certain and 
must be an event over which the subject of the clause has no control). The use of the 
imperfective aspect for future time reference requires that the utterance interpretation 
context preclude a present time interpretation, but the use of the imperfective aspect 
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past present 
also imposes constraints on the event (it must be planned and its occurrence be due to 
an agent-event in which the subject of the clause is the agent). These constraints are 
not truth-conditional, since (3.61 a) and (3.61b) are not truth-conditionally distinct, 
nonetheless they affect the distribution and interpretation of futurate situations and 
events expressed through unmarked or imperfective aspect. 
3 . 4.2 Prospects: Modality 
The current chapter has demonstrated, with respect to pronouns, and markers of tense 
and aspect, that the conceptual/procedural distinction can be usefully extended to 
phase two of utterance interpretation. In chapter 41 shall illustrate this in greater 
detail with respect to the English modal auxiliaries, and in chapter 5 elaborate the 
conceptual/procedural distinction at phase two to accommodate semantic change and 
variation. 
In chapter 4, I will demonstrate that, like pronominal referring expressions and tense 
and aspect markers, modal expressions also underdetermine the truth-conditions of 
propositions derived from utterances in which they occur. Given the analyses 
proposed above of pronouns, tense markers and aspect markers as exponents of 
procedural encoding, we would expect a procedural account to offer some prospect of 
providing a satisfactory account of the modal auxiliaries as well. Such an account will 
be proposed for can, may, must and should, drawing primarily on Groefsema (1995a). 
These English modal auxiliaries will discussed in some detail, in part owing to the 
complexity of the functions and distributions of the various modal auxiliaries, and 
also to provide a link to the more detailed discussion of grammaticization and the 
expression of future time reference in English in chapters 5 and 6. 
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4 THE ENGLISH MODAL AUXILIARIES 
I shall begin this chapter by discussing the inadequacies first of purely truth- 
conditional accounts of the English modal auxiliaries based on the application of 
modal logic to the characterisation of linguistic expressions of modality, and then of 
traditional descriptive accounts, both polysemous and monosemous. I shall then 
consider and reject two relevance theoretic accounts of the modal auxiliaries, and 
conclude by developing an alternative relevance theoretic model based on a 
procedural analysis of can, may, must and should. 
41 Theoretical Preliminaries 
4. l .0 
Introduction 
In this section I shall demonstrate that attempts to characterise the English modal 
auxiliaries in directly truth-conditional terms fail to provide satisfactory accounts of 
the interpretation of utterances in which they occur. I shall begin by rejecting the 
possible worlds metaphor as a satisfactory basis for a semantic characterisation of any 
of the modals, and will then also reject traditional descriptive accounts of the modals 
which are not based explicitly on the notion of possible worlds. I shall conclude that 
only a semantic/pragmatic theory which takes into account the semantically 
underdetermined nature of the modals and allows for pragmatically determined 
aspects of truth-conditional content can hope to provide an adequate characterisation 
of the English modal auxiliaries. 
4 Logical analyses of the modals 
Although both the temporal and the irrealis domains are cognitive, they have been 
represented in model theoretic terms on the basis of possible worlds. For example, the 
branching futures model (Thomason 1970, Dowty 1977, Tedeschi 1981) views time 
as branching out into a number of alternative worlds subsequent to the moment of 
utterance (S); this is represented schematically in Figure 13 (taken from Matthews 
1989: 190, based on Dowty 1977: 63): 
Figure 13: the branching futures model of time 
f 
u 
past St 
u 
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The possible worlds in the branching futures model are located temporally at a time 
subsequent to the moment of speaking, but this model can be adapted to take into 
account possible worlds existing simultaneously with the actual world by making 
reference to alternative worlds posited at some prior moment. An alternative model is 
the 'parallel worlds' model devised by Matthews (1989: 197ff. ). According to this 
model, a speaker at time S may entertain a number of parallel 'intensional' worlds (the 
realis world plus a number of irrealis - or for Matthews 'potentialis' and 'irrealis' - 
worlds), for which the temporal specifications of events within these worlds are 
variable. Unlike the branching futures model, in which possible worlds diverge from 
the actual world at some point on the time line, the parallel worlds model "allows 
events, (whether factual or fictional) to be placed on or against the time line while 
viewing them, from the point-of-view of the speaker, as real, potential or unreal. " 
(Matthews 1989: 198) 
Three basic approaches to possible worlds can be distinguished (Haack 1978: 190-1): 
the linguistic approach which views possible worlds as maximally (syntactically or 
semantically) consistent sets of sentences (e. g. Hintikka 1969); the conceptualist 
approach which talks in terms of how we could conceive the actual world to be 
different (Kripke 1972); and the realist approach which views possible worlds as real 
abstract entities, independent of either language or thought (Lewis 1973 chapter 4). 
My argument is that any appeal to the notion of possible worlds, however 
characterised, provides an inadequate basis for a satisfactory analysis of the modals. I 
shall begin by outlining some of the philosophical problems encountered by the 
possible worlds metaphor and then demonstrate the inability of this metaphor to 
account for the behaviour of the modal auxiliaries. 
The possible worlds metaphor is closely connected with modal logic. The first modal 
logic was developed (Lewis 1918), not to provide a formal treatment of modality, but 
in response to a dissatisfaction with the notion of material implication. The problem 
was that intuitively, for p to imply q it is not enough to say that it is not the case that p 
is true and q is false, but rather that p could not be true and q false. To capture this 
intuitive notion, strict implication was proposed, defined as follows: 
A -< B= df L(A --) B), where LA = df -M-A 
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where L is a modal operator (to be read as 'in all possible worlds') which can be 
defined in terms of the other primitive modal operator M (to be read as 'in at least one 
possible world'). 50 
One problem facing modal logic is that modal contexts are 'referentially opaque 
(Quine 1961). For example, the use of 'the number of planets' to refer to '9' is not 
purely referential, that is, it does not refer directly in certain contexts. In conjunction 
with a propositional attitude, for instance, substitution of '9' for'the number of planets' 
turns the true (4.1) into the false (4.2): 
(4.1) Peter believes that the number of planets is eight. 
(4.2) Peter believes that 9 is eight. 
Referential opacity afflicts modal contexts as well. Each of the modal systems 
developed is self-contained with the result that a given modal logic, say T, can neither 
interact with another modal logic, say S5, nor with a non-modal system. To combine 
two incompatible systems results in failure of substitutivity, as the following 
argument from Quine (1961) demonstrates. Given the two true premises (4.3) and 
(4.4), substitutivity on the basis of true identities results in the falsehood (4.5): 
(4.3) L (9 > 7) 
(4.4) The number of planets =9 
(4.5) L (The number of planets > 7) 
As a result of the referential opacity of modal contexts, we cannot quantify into them; 
that is, we cannot go from (4.3) to (4.6) by a process of existential generalisation: 
(4.6) (Bz) L (x > 7) 
Attempts to overcome the problem of quantification into modal contexts (cf. Linsky 
(ed) 1971) have focused on the notion of 'essentialism', that is, the idea that objects 
have some of their properties necessarily, and others only contingently, akin to 
Fregean ordinary sense and reference (Frege 1892) respectively. The claim is that, 
50 However, strict implication still seems inappropriate as the formal counterpart of our intuitive 
notion of implication given the 'paradoxes' of strict implication: 
Lp -* (9 -< p) and L-p -4 (p -< 9) 
"i. e. a necessary proposition is strictly implied by any proposition whatever, and an impossible 
proposition strictly implies any proposition whatever. " (Haack 1987: 197) Such considerations led to 
the development of 'relevance logics' (cf. Anderson & Belnap 1975) which remain distinct from 
relevance theory. 
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when quantifying into modal contexts, substitutions should only be made on the basis 
of essential properties, that is, only substitution on the basis of identity of sense is 
permissible. Quantification into modal contexts becomes permissible given some 
form of essentialism, since (4.6) can be paraphrased as "there is an x which, in all 
possible worlds, is greater than 7"; this entails that being greater than 7 is essential to 
an entity being the x of (4.6). Furthermore, only by stipulating that referring 
expressions have constant reference in all possible worlds can propositions such as 
(4.7) below make any sense, otherwise there is no constraint keeping the referent of a 
variable from changing as we pass from one possible world to another: 
(4.7) (ax) M (x = the number of planets) 
In short, some form of essentialism is necessary for quantification into modal 
contexts, but this places strict limits on what can count as a possible world, and hence 
strict limits on what counts as permissible quantification into modal contexts. 
The failures of substitutivity noted by Quine, which derive from combining 
incompatible systems within a single argument, do not occur when sentences 
incorporating modal auxiliaries and non-modal sentences are combined in natural 
language, however. The fact that utterances containing modal auxiliaries are easily 
combined with non-modal utterances demonstrates that the modal auxiliaries do not 
express a self-contained logical system. Whilst (4.5) (L(The number of planets > 7)) 
is ruled out by the fact that (4.4) ('The number of planets = 9') is not essential to the 
identity of the number of planets, (4.8) below, in which the ordinary language term 
must has replaced the logical operator L, is an acceptable conclusion given the same 
two premises: 
(4.3) L (9 > 7) 
(4.4) The number of planets =9 
(4.8) The number of planets must be greater than 7. 
(4.8) does not express (4.5), rather it expresses that, given the truth of the premises 
(4.3) and (4.4), the proposition that the number of planets is greater than seven can be 
deduced and is therefore true in the actual world. The use of must in (4.8) is a 
comment on the validity of the argument rather than on the necessity of its 
conclusion. 
Despite these problems with modal logic and the mismatch between modal logic and 
its supposed natural language (English) counterpart, the system of modal auxiliaries, 
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the possible worlds model has continued to be invoked. To conclude this section, I 
shall discuss the problems encountered by a relevance theoretic account of the modals 
may, can and must (Papafragou 1995) based on the possible worlds metaphor. 
Papafragou (1995: 3) invokes the possible worlds model in the following way: 
"A state of affairs represented by a given proposition p will be possible 
in view of the speaker's knowledge if and only if there is a world w2 
which is accessible from wI and the state of affairs holds in w2. A state 
of affairs represented by a proposition p will be necessary in view of 
the speaker's knowledge if and only if the state of affairs holds in all 
worlds accessible from wl. " 
In addition to the constraints imposed on possible worlds in order to allow 
quantification into modal contexts, Papafragou (1995) places additional cognitive 
constraints on the possible worlds relative to which the semantic characterisations of 
the modals are determined. A possible world which is accessible from w, (the actual 
world) must be compatible with the speaker's knowledge, which is defined as 
differing in terms of a minimal number of assumptions only. What constitutes a 
'minimal' number of assumptions here is unspecified. 
Aside from this problem, two important objections can be raised against Papafragou's 
account. First, while it is clear how may and must relate to the possible worlds model, 
it is not stated how can (let alone any of the other modals) relate to it. May, can and 
must are defined as follows (Papafragou 1995: 3): 
May: It is possible that p. 
Can: It is potential that p. 
Must: It is necessary that p, or: It is not possible that not-p. 51 
In relation to the possible worlds model, may p expresses that there is at least one 
possible world accessible from wI such that p holds in it, and must p expresses that p 
holds in all the possible worlds accessible from w1. Since it is not stated how a 
situation in which p is potential (rather than possible or necessary) relates to any 
possible worlds, it is unclear how can is intended to be determined within the possible 
worlds model. 
51 Note that Papafragou's characterisation of must in terms of may (possible) exactly corresponds to the 
definition of the logical operator L in terms of M: LA = df -M-A. 
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The second objection to Papafragou's account is that it is not stated whether wl itself 
is permissible as a possible world. In other words, is it possible that wi = w2? Given 
(4.9) it would seem that this must be possible: 
(4.9) He may be a university professor, but he sure is dumb. 
[Papafragou 1995 (24)] 
This suggests that if p is necessary then it is true in wl as well as in every other 
possible world accessible from wl. In the case of analytic sentences (sentences which 
are true by definition) this is obviously the case: 
(4.10) A bachelor must be unmarried. 
(4.11) A bilabial nasal must be made with the lips closed. 
In non-analytic sentences, however, must often reduces the strength of a speaker's 
commitment top in comparison to simply stating p in a non-modal expression: 
(4.12) Knock, knock "That must be the postman. " 
(4.13) Knock, knock "That's the postman. " 
Whilst (4.13) is felicitous in a situation in which the speaker can see the postman 
standing outside the front door holding a parcel, (4.12) is not. (4.12) suggests that the 
speaker has deduced that the postman has just knocked on the basis of incomplete 
evidence (e. g. it is early in the morning, the postman always knocks twice, it is not a 
Sunday, etc. but excluding direct visual evidence). Surely, on the basis of such 
evidence there is a possible world accessible from wl in which it is not the postman 
knocking at the door, and hence to characterise must p . as 
'true in every possible 
world' is to make too strong a claim. 
In conclusion, any attempt to characterise the semantics of the modal auxiliaries in 
terms of a possible worlds model faces considerable, if not insurmountable 
difficulties. Papafragou (1995) will be discussed further (in §4.2) in relation to the 
question of whether modal auxiliaries should be characterised as encoding conceptual 
or procedural information. To conclude this section, I shall discuss non-relevance 
theoretic analyses of the modals which do not make explicit reference to the possible 
worlds metaphor. 
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4.1.2 Traditional descriptive analyses of the modals 
Traditional accounts of the modal auxiliaries can be divided broadly into those which 
propose polysemous analyses (Leech 1971,1987; Coates 1983; Palmer 1979,1986; 
Quirk et al 1985; and Hermeren 1978 who identifies twenty distinct modal meanings 
for nine modal auxiliaries) and those which propose monosemous (unitary) analyses 
(Ehrman 1966; Lyons 1977; Kratzer 1977,1981; Perkins 1982,1983; Sweetser 
1982). 52 
Walton (1991: 326) observes that under the polysemy approach, the meanings of can 
are usually given as 'possibility', 'permission' and 'ability', corresponding neatly to the 
three categories of logical modality: epistemic - the modality of knowledge and 
belief, deontic - the modality of permission and obligation, and dynamic - the 
modality of ability and willingness. However, not all polysemous accounts 
distinguish between the various meanings or uses of the modals according to this 
three-way division (e. g. Palmer 1979,1986, and Sweetser 1989). Problems arise 
when the interpretation of a modal in a given sentence cannot be paraphrased in terms 
of any one of the proposed meanings derived from the logical modalities. Walton 
(1991: 332) argues that semantic considerations alone are incapable of determining 
whether an utterance of a sentence like (4.14): 
(4.14) Freddie can recite a poem. 
expresses 'possibility', 'permission' or 'ability', or even some combination of these 
(Freddie is willing and able to recite a poem, for example). If the modals were 
genuinely ambiguous between distinct meanings, we would expect to be able to 
disambiguate them, but this is clearly not the case. 
The polysemy approach also encounters problems in accounting for uses of modals 
which are neither indeterminate between any of their proposed meanings, nor 
interpretable as a combination of any of these. Groefsema (1995a: 57) suggests the 
following example: 
(4.15) You must come to dinner sometime. 
52 An intermediate position is adopted by Sweetser (1989) in which the root (deontic and dynamic) 
meanings of the modals are taken as basic and are metaphorically mapped from the external to the 
mental world yielding epistemic interpretations. Grocfsema (1995a: 58-60) discusses Sweetser (1989) 
in some detail. 
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and observes that an utterance of this sentence would not normally be interpreted as 
(4.16) or as (4.17) but rather as (4.18), or something similar: 
(4.16) It is necessary that you come to dinner sometime. 
(4.17) You are obliged to come to dinner sometime. 
(4.18) We would like you to come to dinner sometime. 
The interpretation of utterances containing modals is therefore highly context 
dependent. In the spirit of Modified Occam's Razor, and in view of the fact that the 
various meanings attributed to the modals in polysemous analyses "invite an 
explanation which stresses their unity, since we intuitively link them" (Walton 
1991: 327), a monosemous (semantically unitary) approach is to be preferred. 
The traditional monosemous analyses cited above suffer from the lack of an adequate 
pragmatic theory by which to account for the role played by context in utterance 
interpretation. More fundamentally, the role which is assumed for pragmatics is 
essentially Gricean, and can be summarised in Gazdar's equation (Gazdar 1979: 2): 
pragmatics = meaning - truth-conditions. As the arguments presented in § 1.3.3 
demonstrated, this delimitation of pragmatics is untenable. The following analysis 
demonstrates this with respect to the modal can. The sentence in (4.14) is capable of 
being used to express more than one proposition: 
(4.14) Freddie can recite a poem. 
(4.19) Freddie has the ability to recite a poem. 
(4.20) Freddie is permitted to recite a poem. 
Given that can is not polysemous, the differences in propositional content between 
(4.19) and (4.20) must be pragmatic in origin. As a result, only a pragmatic theory 
which, like relevance theory, recognises pragmatic aspects of 'what is said' can hope 
to provide an account of how utterances of sentences like (4.14) are interpreted. 
4.1.3 Summary 
We have seen that attempts to characterise the modals in a directly truth-conditional 
way are unsatisfactory, whether this is attempted through translation into a modal 
logic defined in terms of possible worlds, or through the development of a rich 
ontology for each of the modals. Attempts to translate modal auxiliaries into a modal 
logic defined in terms of possible worlds encounter problems, both internal to modal 
logic (referential opacity and the debate over essentialism), and empirically when 
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modal auxiliaries are characterised as the natural language counterparts of a logical 
system (even as regards the most obvious candidates for such an account, may and 
must). Alternative analyses of the modals as polysemous encounter problems over 
how to account for indeterminacy in interpretations of utterances containing modals; 
and previous monosemous accounts, in the absence of an appropriate pragmatic 
theory, failed to account for pragmatically determined aspects of truth-conditional 
interpretation. 
Given the relevance theoretic analyses, provided in chapter 3, of tense and aspect 
markers (which also defy adequate description in purely truth-conditional terms), it is 
possible that the English modal auxiliaries might be adequately described within a 
procedurally based account. This analysis will be given in §4.2 in which two 
relevance theoretic accounts of modality (one purely procedural and one purely 
conceptual) will be rejected in favour of a procedural reformulation of Groefsema's 
(1995a) relevance theoretic analysis of may, can, must and should. 
41 Can. May. Must and Should 
4.2 .0 Introduction 
The aim of this section is to provide an explicit procedural account of the use and 
interpretation of a subset of the modal auxiliaries. For the time being, I shall not 
address the relation between procedural encoding at phase two of utterance 
interpretation and grammaticization; rather, I shall provide a purely synchronic 
procedural analysis of can, may, must and should taking account of the systematic 
semantic/pragmatic interdependence of these forms. 53 To this end, I shall briefly 
review two recent relevance theoretic accounts of the English modals: Klinge's (1993) 
procedural account of the modals as encoding potentiality, and Papafragou's (1995) 
conceptual account of the modals in which epistemic uses of may and must are 
viewed as contributing to higher-level explicatures. These will be rejected in favour 
of Groefsema's (1995a) analysis of may, can, must and should which, although 
agnostic concerning the conceptual/procedural distinction, will be reformulated in 
procedural terms. The primary purpose of this section is not to provide a 
comprehensive account of the semantics and pragmatics of the modals may, can, must 
and should, nor even to refine the relevance theoretic proposals discussed; my 
intention is simply to determine whether these modals encode procedural information, 
53 For historical accounts of the English modal auxiliaries see, for example, Lightfoot (1979,1991) 
and Warner (1983,1993). 
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and if so how they constrain the interpretation of situations and events described in 
utterances containing them. 
4.2.1 Modals as procedural markers of potentiality: (Klirr eg 1993) 
Klinge (1993) provides an account of the 'central' modals - can, may, will, shall and 
must - in purely procedural terms. The semantics of these modals according to Klinge 
(1993) consists of two parts, both procedural. First, common to all of the modals is 
the notion of potentiality, by which Klinge (1993) means that all of the modals 
represent a situation or event as having the potential either to be or not to be an actual, 
verified situation or event (a WORLD SITUATION -distinct from a `world event'). 
Klinge proposes a unitary account of the semantic category MODAL, as represented in 
figure 14, first as a generalisation, and-second as a representation of (4.21): 
(4.21) a. John I modals buy Mary's ticket. 
b. MODAL [JOHN BUY MARY'S TICKET] 
Figure 14: the semantics of MODAL 
WORLD SITUATION 
POTENTIAL 
WORLD SITUATION 
JOHN BUY MARY'S TICKET 
POTENTIAL 
-JOHN BUY MARY'S TICKET 
(Klinge 1993: 324,325) 
In terms of the cognitive domains posited above, all the modals encode procedural 
information instructing an addressee to override the usual default assumption that 
situations and events described are realis. (actual, verified), and interpret any SR 
within the scope of a modal auxiliary as irrealis. sa 
The second element of the semantics of modals concerns the modals individually. 
Each individual modal is characterised as encoding procedural information which 
stipulates the potential relation between a SR within its scope and reality. For 
example, Klinge (1993: 335-6) draws on a suggestion from Van der Auwera (1986) 
54 See §3.2.1 for a discussion of the differences between Klinge's definition of SRs and that proposed 
in this thesis. 
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that may represents what is 'neither true nor false' nor 'either true or false' (the logical 
notion of 'indeterminacy'). Klinge (1993: 336) applies this approach to the 
interpretation of (4.22) as follows: 
(4.22) So she may be telephoning you. (Palmer 1990: 52) 
What information does an utterance of (4.22) convey to the addressee? It does not 
provide the addressee with the information that the person who called will call at a 
subsequent time, but neither does it provide the addressee with the information that 
she will not call at a subsequent time. Nonetheless, (4.22) leads the address to hope 
that the person will call. Klinge accounts for this interpretation of (4.22) as follows. 
(4.22) is assigned the structure in (4.23): 
(4.23) MAY [SHE BE TELEPHONING YOU] 
where MAY is an operator and [SHE BE TELEPHONING YOU] is a potential SR which 
either turns out to be a true description of a WORLD SITUATION or turns out not to be a 
true description of a WORLD SITUATION. This is illustrated as figure 15: 
Figure 15: The semantics of may (Klinge 1993: 336) 
POTENTIAL 
SITUATION REPRESENTATION 
OR 
-SITUATION REPRESENTATION 
The semantics of may above is constructed on the framework given in figure 14 for 
the general category MODAL; similarly, Klinge's semantics for the other modals is 
also built on this framework. For example the semantics of must is illustrated in figure 
16 with the accompanying paraphrase: 
Figure 16: The semantics of must (Klinge 1993: 351) 
SITUATION REPRESENTATION 
POTENTIAL 
^"SITUATI ESENTATION 
"The SITUATION REPRESENTATION does not turn out 
not to be a true description of a WORLD SITUATION. " 
144 
Klinge (1993) undoubtedly provides an insightful and innovative analysis of the 
central modals, and the analysis of shall in §6.2 is heavily indebted to it. However, it 
is not without its problems. One relatively minor point is that it is difficult to see how 
the framework proposed for the general category MODAL could accommodate the 
other modals (could, might, would, should and ought) without proposing a single 
underlying lexical semantics for each of will/would, shall/should etc., which is in fact 
what Klinge implies (1993: 348; p. c. 7/10/94). Were this approach adopted, a response 
would have to be formulated to Warner (1993), which argues that what looks like the 
verbal category 'finite' (e. g. should = shall + past tense) is not in fact inflectional in 
auxiliaries, but lexically specified, hence should is semantically independent of shall. 
A more fundamental problem with Klinge's analysis, from the perspective of this 
thesis at least, is that a procedural characterisation of the semantics of the modals (I 
exclude will and shall for the time being) based on a general category MODAL 
characterised as 'potential', is untenable. The reason for this is that any account which 
incorporates the notion of 'potential' (or irreality) into the semantics of must faces 
problems in accounting for the use of must in the expression of analytic propositions 
such as those repeated below: 
(4.10) A bachelor must be unmarried. 
(4.11) A bilabial nasal must be made with the lips closed. 
Analytic propositions are not potential since their very expression constitutes their 
verification. The interpretation assigned to must in utterances of analytic sentences is 
akin to the logical modal operator L. The definition of L in terms of the other 
primitive modal logical operator M (LA = df -M-A) is close to Klinge's paraphrase 
of the semantics of must: "The SITUATION REPRESENTATION does not turn out not to 
be a true description of a WORLD SITUATION" (1993: 351), except that this whole 
paraphrase is subject to the additional feature 'potentiality', which is absent from 
analytic sentences. If potentiality plays no part in the semantics of must, then the 
sense of potentiality in the interpretation of sentences such as (4.12) must be inferred: 
(4.12) Knock, knock "That must be the postman. " 
An utterance of (4.12) would normally be interpreted as a deduction from partial 
evidence (e. g. the postman always knocks twice, etc. ), and as such is unverified in 
contrast to a conclusion based on direct acquaintance. (How the interpretation process 
functions in such cases will be discussed in §4.2.3 and §4.2.4 below. ) 
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The use of must in the expression of analytic propositions often occurs in the protasis 
(the if-clause) of conditional sentences. Situations and events represented in the 
protasis are presented as hypothetical, and hence the default assumption concerning 
their existential status is that they are unverified (irrealis) in contrast to the usual 
default assumption that situations and events described are realis. For example, the 
speaker of (4.24) is not claiming that it is raining, but simply hypothesising about the 
consequences of going out if it were to rain: 
(4.24) If it rains, we will get wet. 
In contrast, if an analytic proposition is presented in the protasis, it is necessarily 
verified. The use of must in the protasis helps the addressee to override the 
assumption set up by the if-clause that hypothetical events are irrealis. It does this by 
representing the proposition with which it is associated as being based on a deduction, 
thereby drawing the addressee's attention to its analytic character. In (4.25), for 
example, the assumption is that the sum of all three corners in triangles is 180°, rather 
than just that it might be: 
(4.25) If the sum of all three corners in triangles must be 1800, 
then there's no way I got the geometry test right. 
[Papafragou 1995 (80a)] 
The conclusion to be drawn is that Klinge's characterisation of the semantics of the 
general category MODAL as 'potential' plays no part in the semantics of must: As a 
result, if 'potential' does not figure in the semantics of must, then the existence of a 
unitary semantics for the general category MODAL is put in doubt. This does not entail 
that must is not procedural, simply that it cannot function procedurally by 
manipulating the interpretation of an SR in its scope relative to the irrealis domain. 
Arguments against a procedural analysis of the modals of any kind are given in 
Papafragou (1995), which is considered below. 
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2,2 Modals as exponents of conceptual encoding (Papafragou 1995) 
Consideration of conditional sentences incorporating a modal auxiliary, such as 
(4.25), leads Papafragou (1995) to conclude that, when interpreted epistemically, 
modal auxiliaries encode conceptual information contributing to higher-level 
explicatures. Her argument is recreated here. In §2.3.2, higher-level explicatures were 
defined as "conceptual representations, capable of entailing and contradicting each 
other and representing determinate states of affairs [which] though true or false in 
their own right ... 
do not generally contribute to the truth conditions of their 
146 
associated utterances. " (Wilson & Sperber 1993a: 16) Since higher-level explicatures 
do not contribute to the truth-conditions of their associated utterances, placing 
epistemic must and may within the scope of logical operators results in infelicity; 
(4.25) expresses dynamic modality and (4.26) expresses epistemic modality: 
(4.25) If the sum of all three corners in triangles must be 180°, 
then there's no way I got the geometry test right. 
(4.26) ? If John must have a high IQ, then his teachers should 
treat him carefully. 
[Papafragou 1995 (80a) and (81 a)] 
The use of must in (4.25) receives a dynamic interpretation - it is a statement about 
the way things are in the world without any expression of the speaker's commitment 
to the truth of the assertion; hence, there is only a single antecedent proposition in 
(4.25) which therefore has a well-formed logical structure of the form p -' q, where p 
= 'the sum of all three corners in triangles must be 1800' and q= 'there's no way I got 
the geometry test right'. In (4.26) however, only an epistemic interpretation can be 
recovered, since 'John must have a high IQ' can be neither deontic (? 'John is obliged 
to have a high IQ') nor dynamic (? 'John is predisposed to have a high IQ'). (4.26) is 
infelicitous according to Papafragou (1995) because an epistemic interpretation does 
not contribute to the truth conditions of the associated utterance, that is to the truth 
conditions of p in the argument p -) q. This can be accounted for by viewing an 
epistemic interpretation as giving rise to a higher-level explicature; this higher-level 
explicature has its own truth conditions, but these are not part of p and therefore do 
not enter into the relation of entailment from p to q. 
Similarly, treating the epistemic interpretation of may as contributing to higher-level 
explicatures could explain why (4.27a) below is felicitous if interpreted deontically 
(4.27b) but not epistemically (4.27c): 
(4.27) a. If I may go to the Ball, I will meet Prince Charming. 
b If I am permitted to go to the Ball, I will meet Prince Charming. 
c. ? If it is possible that I go to the Ball, I will meet Prince Charming. 
(4.27a) has the form p -) q. Under a deontic interpretation, where p1 = 'I am 
permitted to go to the. Ball', may contributes to the truth conditions of p1 which can 
therefore enter into a relation of entailment with q ('I will meet Prince Charming'). 
With an epistemic interpretation, on the other hand, there are two sets of truth- 
conditions: one associated with p2, ('I will go to the Ball'), and another associated 
with a higher-level explicature, (p3) '(1 believe) it is possible that p2'. Under an 
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epistemic interpretation, (4.27a) has the form p3 --4 q, rather than p2 -* q, and since 
p3 does not entail q, an epistemic interpretation of (4.27a) is infelicitous. 
On the basis of such considerations, Papafragou (1995) concludes that epistemic 
interpretations of utterances containing must and may are derived from conceptual 
information encoded by must and may contributing to higher-level explicatures; this 
same conceptual information in another utterance may be interpreted as contributing 
to the utterance expressed. She distinguishes between the epistemic and the non- 
epistemic uses of must and may, not in terms of any semantic difference between an 
epistemic and a non-epistemic must or may (this would be to fall back into polysemy), 
but in terms of differences in the logical scope of must and may when interpreted 
epistemically rather than non-epistemically. In the discussion of the illocutionary 
adverbials seriously, frankly and confidentially (2.3.2), it was shown that in indirect 
reported speech these are interpreted as their "synonymous manner-adverbial 
counterparts" (W&S 1993a: 17) which contribute to the proposition expressed rather 
than to higher-level explicatures. It is not the semantics of seriously, frankly or 
confidentially which changes, but their scope relations relative to other elements of 
the associated utterance (encoded or inferred). Similarly, Papafragou (1995) proposes 
that it is not the semantics of must or may which changes when a deontic or dynamic 
interpretation is recovered rather than an epistemic one, but simply the scope relations 
between must or may and other elements of the utterance. On an epistemic 
interpretation, must or may is outside the proposition (p) and therefore cannot enter 
into an entailment relation of the form p -4 q. On a non-epistemic interpretation, 
however, must or may is inside the proposition p and can thus fall within the scope of 
the logical operator -a. This suggests that epistemic and non-epistemic interpretations 
are derived from distinct logical forms. 
There are problems with Papafragou's (1995) arguments, however. First, it is not 
always the case that the use of must or may with an epistemic interpretation in the 
protasis of a conditional is infelicitous: 
(4.28) If Dhara may be here for another week, I won't invite Alison to stay. 
The situation is one in which Dhara, our lodger has informed us that it will be at least 
a week before his houseboat is in York; this leads me to believe that he will be with 
us for at least another week and so the spare room will be occupied. The epistemic 
interpretation of may in (4.28) clearly contributes to the proposition which entails I 
won't invite Alison to stay'. Since it is not correct to say that in this case the epistemic 
interpretation of may does not contribute to the proposition expressed, it is doubtful 
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whether this epistemic interpretation is a higher-level explicature at all, given Wilson 
& Sperber's definition (1993a: 16). 
Returning to the earlier examples, the reason an epistemic reading of (4.27a) is 
infelicitous is simply that q ('I will meet Prince Charming') does not follow from p ('it 
is possible that I go to the Ball'). If 'might' is substituted for 'will' in q, an epistemic 
reading becomes acceptable: 
(4.27) a. ? If I may go to the Ball, I will meet Prince Charming. 
c. ? If it is possible that I go to the Ball, I will meet Prince Charming. 
(4.29) a. If I may go to the Ball, I might meet Prince Charming. 
b. If it is possible that I go to the Ball, I might meet Prince Charming. 
Where must occurs in the protasis of a conditional sentence, its unacceptability is not 
due simply to the fact that it is epistemic; compare (4.26) with epistemic must, and 
(4.30) with epistemic may: 
(4.26) ? If John must have a high IQ, then his teachers should 
treat him carefully. 
(4.30) If John may have a high IQ, then his teachers should 
treat him carefully. 
So, rather than claim, as Papafragou (1995) does, that an utterance with must or may 
encodes higher-level explicatures when epistemically interpreted (which don't enter 
into entailment relations when placed within the scope of a logical operator) whilst 
non-epistemic must and may encode propositional information (capable of entering 
into entailment relations), I propose that the identification of a particular type of 
modality (epistemic, deontic or dynamic) is inferred. Specifically, I propose that 
modals are operators with scope over SRs. Once a SR has been interpreted in 
accordance with the procedural information encoded by an operator, various 
explicatures and implicatures may be recovered; these may concern higher-level 
propositional attitudes, for example the degree of speaker commitment to the 
resulting proposition or speech act information, resulting in epistemic or deontic 
interpretations. 
In order to predict the nature of the implicatures inferred from utterances containing a 
given modal, an explicit semantics of that modal is required which licenses the 
relevant interpretation. Such an analysis is provided by Groefsema (1995a), at least 
for the modals can, may, must and should. I shall briefly review Groefsema's account, 
with the following aims in mind: first, that it provides the basis of a counter-argument 
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to one final claim in Papafragou (1995) in support of the view that epistemic 
interpretations of modals are higher-level explicatures; secondly, that it provides a 
viable alternative to the 'possible worlds' model of modality; and finally, that it can be 
recast in explicitly procedural terms (although without reference to cognitive 
domains). 
4.2 .3 Towards a procedural analysis of the modals: 
(Groefsema 1995a) 
Groefsema (1995a: 62) characterises the basic meanings of four of the modals as 
follows: 
Can: p is compatible with the set of all propositions which have a bearing on p. 
May: There is at least some set of propositions such that p is compatible with it. 
Must: p is entailed by the set of all propositions which have a bearing on p. 
Should: There is at least some set of propositions such that p is entailed by it. 
(where p is the proposition expressed by the rest of the utterance). 
Informally, the propositions which have a bearing on p constitute the evidence for p. 
This could be further refined as stating that they constitute the evidence for the set of 
assumptions according to which the optimal relevance of p is determined. Must 
expresses that all the evidence entails p, whilst should expresses that at least some of 
the evidence entails p; can expresses that all the evidence does not entail -p, whilst 
may expresses that at least some of the evidence does not entail -p. 
Groefsema (1995a) explains in some detail the role played by the above 
characterisations of the modals in the utterance interpretation process, and this will 
not be repeated here, except in regard to the relation between negation and epistemic 
interpretations of must and may. Papafragou (1995: 4) argues that epistemic uses of 
must and may do not exhibit compositionality with elements belonging to the 
proposition expressed, such as negation (need not and cannot may be used instead), 
and that this provides evidence for viewing epistemic must and may as being outside 
the proposition (and hence as contributing to higher-level explicatures): 
(4.31) a. * He must not find Mozart exciting. (epistemic) 
b. He need not find Mozart exciting. 
(4.32) a. * He may not be his tutor. (epistemic) 
b. He cannot be his tutor. 
[Papafragou 1995 (84) and (83)] 
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Groefsema (1995a: 74-8) accounts for this phenomenon as follows, first in relation to 
must and then in relation to may. When an utterance containing must is negated, the 
negation affects the main predication, as in (4.33), rather than the modal predication 
as in (4.34): 
(4.33) -p is entailed by the set of all propositions which have 
a bearing on p. 
(4.34) It is not the case that p is entailed by the set of all propositions 
which have a bearing on p. 
[Groefsema 1995a (49) and (48)] 
This explains why the negation of (4.35a) is not (4.35b): 
(4.35) a. John must be thirty. 
b. ? John mustn't be thirty. 
(4.35b), on an epistemic interpretation with the logical form of the kind given in 
(4.34) where p= 'John be thirty', is infelicitous simply because it is not very 
informative. It leaves open the possibility that some but not all of the evidence entails 
p, or that p is compatible with some of the evidence, or that p is incompatible with 
some of the evidence. These propositions could be expressed by using should, may 
and can't respectively: 
(4.36) John should be thirty. 
(4.37) John may be thirty. 
(4.38) John can't be thirty. 
(4.35b) is not used because it is subsumed under any of (4.36) to (4.38), and therefore 
a speaker aiming for optimal relevance will utter the more informative (4.36), (4.37) 
or (4.38) rather than (4.35b). When an utterance containing must is negated, only a 
non-epistemic interpretation with the logical form given in (4.33) is possible. Why 
then can't the negative of epistemic must be expressed using must not with the logical 
form in (4.33)? Groefsema (1995a: 76) suggests that if the speaker knows that -p, then 
there is no need to draw the addressee's attention to any possible evidence for p, and 
relevance is best served simply by stating -p; if, on the other hand, the speaker knows 
that -p because there is some piece of evidence which is incompatible with p, this is 
more precisely expressed through the use of can't, hence can't supplies the missing 
negative for epistemic must. 
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Where may not is concerned, epistemically it negates the main verb, as in (4.39), 
while deontically the modal is negated, as in (4.40): 
(4.39) There is at least some set of propositions such that 
-p is compatible with it. 
(4.40) It is not the case that there is at least some set of propositions 
such that p is compatible with it. 
[Groefsema 1995a (58) and (59)] 
Groefsema accounts for this as follows: 
"Imagine that Mary has been invited to a party, and she thinks that she 
has to go, but doesn't feel like it. Her mother walks in and says: 
(4.41) You may not go to the party. 
Because a logical form along the lines of (4.40) does not yield a 
relevant interpretation (i. e. Mary has the assumption that she has to 
go), Mary is entitled to go for the logical form (4.41'): 
(4.41') There is at least some set of propositions such that [p it is not 
the case that I go to the party] is compatible with it. 
This then communicates to Mary that her mother has reason to think 
that it may be alright for her not to go (i. e. a possibility interpretation). 
Now imagine a situation in which Mary has been invited to a party, 
and she wants to go, but she expects that her parents won't let her. 
Again her mother walks in and says (4.41). In this case the logical 
form in (4.41') will not yield a relevant interpretation because Mary 
already knows that there is some evidence which is compatible with her not going to the party so that the only interpretation she can go for 
is based on the logical form in (4.41 "): 
(4.41 ") It is not the case that there is at least some set of proposi- 
tions such that (p I go to the party] is compatible with it. 
[... ] Because Mary wants to go to the party, the logical form in (4.41 ") 
gives rise to a contradiction. However, because it is her mother 
speaking to her, assumptions about her authority become easily 
available so that Mary can conclude ... that her mother is not allowing her to go to the party [and] that her own wishes are not taken into 
consideration. " 
(Groefsema 1995a: 77-8) 
In §4.2.4, I shall bring Groefsema's account of can, may, must and should into line 
with the model of procedural encoding proposed in §3.2; that is, I shall demonstrate 
how these modals can be characterised as operators with scope over SRs whilst 
retaining the insights into their behaviour captured by Groefsema (1995a). This 
reformulation will be more explicit in that it captures the distinction between phases 
two and three of utterance interpretation. I shall not attempt, however, to extend the 
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analysis provided in Groefsema (1995a) to other modals; Groefsema (1995a) 
characterises can, may, must and should in terms of a closed set of oppositions which 
defines the semantics of these modals as expressing that p is compatible with/entailed 
by all/some of the propositions that have a bearing on p. It is not clear how this 
system could be extended to accommodate the other modal auxiliaries. 
4.2.4 A procedural analysis of can. may must and should 
In order to bring Groefsema's account into line with the procedural model described 
above, I shall begin by reading SR where Groefsema (1995a) has p. In my analysis, 
what Groefsema (1995a) terms p is not fully propositional since its existential status 
and (often) its temporal reference are not known prior to enrichment in accordance 
with the information encoded by a modal; Groefsema (1995a), on the other hand, 
treats p as fully propositional. For example, (4.42) has the logical form in (4.43) 
which is explicitly given as (4.43') according to my analysis, but according to the 
analysis provided in Groefsema (1995a: 66) the logical form of (4.42) is (4.43"): 
(4.42) John may smoke. 
(4.43) MAY (JOHN SMOKE] 
(4.43') There is at least some set of propositions such that [SR John smoke] 
is compatible with it. 
(4.43 ) " There is at least some set of propositions such that [p John smoke at 
time t] is compatible with it. 
Now, [JOHN SMOKE] is not a proposition, since it is indeterminate between a realis, 
atemporal reading [John smokes habitually], an irrealis, atemporal reading 
[potentially John smokes habitually] and a future time (and therefore irrealis) reading 
[potentially John smokes at tj where t> > to]. Logical forms derived from utterances 
lacking explicit temporal adverbials do not give rise to propositions such as [John 
smoke at time t] until phase two of utterance interpretation has occurred. Thus the 
modals constrain the interpretation of SRs rather than propositions and will therefore 
be treated as operators according to the definition given in 3.2.3, repeated below: 
An operator is any expression which encodes procedural information 
concerning the interpretation of a SR. 
As with all procedural encoding, the modals constrain the inferential phases of 
utterance interpretation. Inference in phase two of utterance interpretation involves 
interpreting SRs and elements within SRs (such as the conceptual information encoded 
by nominal referring expressions) with respect to the utterance interpretation context. 
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The mandatory inferential processes at phase two of utterance interpretation include 
reference assignment (of nominal referring expressions to discourse entities) and the 
interpretation of SRs relative to cognitive domains (basic or abstract). The modals 
(can, may, must and slwuld) do not constrain the interpretation of SRs with respect to 
any domains (at least not directly), but rather with respect to the other assumptions 
which constitute the utterance interpretation context (the propositions which have a 
bearing on the SR, or the 'evidence') and this occurs at phase two of utterance 
interpretation. At this phase, no particular assumptions are identified by the 
addressee; the semantics of the modals are underdetermined in this respect, and 
merely state that some or all of the assumptions in the utterance interpretation context 
are compatible with or entail the SR. However, at phase three, an addressee may 
identify a particular assumption and thereby enrich the proposition to which the 
modal contributes to recover the intended contextual effects, including, where 
appropriate, the type of modality expressed. This process can be illustrated with 
regard to the interpretation of (4.14), repeated below, which gives rise to the logical 
form in (4.44) with the explicit paraphrase (4.44'): 
(4.14) Freddie can recite a poem. 
(4.44) CAN (FREDDIE RECITE A POEM] 
(4.44') (SR Freddie recite a poem] is compatible with the set of assumptions 
which have a bearing on (SR Freddie recite a poem]. 
The precise interpretation of (4.14) depends on the utterance interpretation context 
and the assumptions contained in it. If the utterance interpretation context includes the 
assumptions that the speaker is Freddie's father and that Freddie is asleep in bed, 
(4.14) will be interpreted as (4.19) in which the modal can is inferentially enriched to 
yield a dynamic interpretation: 
(4.19) Freddie has the ability to recite a poem. 
If the utterance interpretation context includes the assumptions that the speaker is 
Freddie's teacher, Freddie has the ability to recite a poem and Freddie wants to recite 
a poem in the school play, the crucial assumption is that the speaker is giving 
permission for Freddie to recite his poem, and (4.14) will be interpreted as (4.20) in 
which can is inferentially enriched to yield a deontic interpretation: 
(4.20) Freddie is permitted to recite a poem. 
In this reformulation of Groefsema's analysis, the semantics of can. may, must and 
should are not connected directly with the irrealis domain, but with assumptions in 
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the utterance interpretation context. My claim is that when a situation or event 
expressed through an utterance containing one of these modals is interpreted as 
irrcalis, this is inferred. The modals can, may, must and should do not encode 
procedural information constraining this inference, that is, the relation of the SR to the 
irrealis domain is not procedurally encoded by these modals. We have already seen 
that must is not always used in the expression of irrealis situations, since it can be 
used to express analytic propositions. Even may is used to talk about situations and 
events which are not irrealis: 
(4.9) He may be a university professor, but he sure is dumb. 
If (4.9) were uttered in a context where both the speaker and the addressee know that 
'he' refers to Gordon and that Gordon is a university professor, may is used in the 
expression of an actual, verified and therefore realis proposition [Gordon is a 
university professor] without infelicity. How is this achieved? The clause 'He may be 
a university professor' gives rise to the logical form in (4.45): 
(4.45) There is at least sonne set of assumptions such that [SR Gordon 
be a university professor] is compatible with it. 
As it stands this is highly uninformative, since it is mutually manifest that Gordon is a 
university professor. It is the addition of the following clause 'but he sure is dumb', 
that indicates how (4.9) is intended to achieve relevance. The conjunct but signifies 
that the following proposition is intended to weaken any conclusions drawn from the 
preceding proposition (in 1.4.1 we saw that new information cart achieve contextual 
effects through the strengthening of existing assumptions; but indicates that new 
information to be presented is intended to weaken rather than strengthen existing 
assumptions). From an utterance of 'he sure is dumb' the addressee can easily deduce 
[Gordon is not intelligent]. Now, [Gordon is intelligent] is one of the assumptions 
compatible with [Gordon is a university professor], so the addressee can infer that the 
speaker wishes to convey that one particular assumption, namely [Gordon is 
intelligent], is not compatible with the assumption [Gordon is a university professor]. 
Thus, (4.9) is interpreted as follows: 
(4.46) There is at least some set of assumptions such that [Gordon is a 
university professor] is compatible with it, but the assumption 
[Gordon is intelligent] is not a member of this set. 
This said, utterances of analytic sentences and sentences like (4.9) are rare in 
comparison with utterances in which modal expressions are used to represent irrealis 
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situations and events; SRs within the scope of a modal are usually interpreted as 
representations of irrealis situations and events. This is the result of inference 
(functioning on the basis of the principle of relevance and the utterance interpretation 
context) not of any procedural information encoded by can, may, must or should. 
4 'ummary and Prospects 
mm 
I began by demonstrating that directly truth-conditional accounts of the modal 
auxiliaries, whether logical or descriptive, fail to account for their interpretation and 
distribution. The problem with such accounts is that they do not recognise that modal 
auxiliaries significantly underdetermine the interpretation of utterances in which they 
occur, and that utterance interpretation is a largely inferential process as regards 
modality, as it also is with temporal reference and aspectual information. I therefore 
proposed that the function of the modal auxiliaries might parallel that of tense and 
aspect markers, by constraining the inferential determination of modality, just as tense 
and aspect markers constrain the interpretation of temporal reference and aspectuality. 
Since the specification of the modal status of a situation or event contributes to the 
proposition expressed, it is the manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual 
representations of situations and events which the modal auxiliaries constrain. Like 
tense and aspect markers therefore, modal auxiliaries could also be characterised as 
operators, that is, exponents of procedural encoding at phase two with scope over 
situation representations. 
If the modals constrain the manipulation of SRs, the parameters in relation to which 
this occurs must be stipulated. By discussing and rejecting Klinge's (1993) proposal 
that the modals can, may and must encode potentiality, I demonstrated that if these 
modals do in fact constrain the manipulation of SRs, it is not with respect to the 
irrealis cognitive domain. In contrast, Papafragou (1995) argued that, when 
interpreted epistemically, may and must encode conceptual information contributing 
to higher-level explicatures. Papafragou's analysis (which is based on a possible 
worlds semantics, against which I argued in §4.1.1) was rejected when it was shown 
that epistemic modality need not fall outside of propositional scope. Instead, I 
suggested that can, may and must encode constraints on the interpretation of any SR 
within their scope, and that once a SR has been interpreted in accordance with these 
constraints, other information, such as whether the modality is epistemic, deontic or 
dynamic, may be inferred. 
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The precise nature of the constraints on interpretation encoded by can, may, must and 
also should were determined by a reanalysis in procedural terms of Groefsema 
(1995a): 
Can: p is compatible with the set of all propositions which have a bearing on p. 
May: There is at least some set of propositions such that p is compatible with it. 
Must: p is entailed by the set of all propositions which have a bearing on p. 
Should: There is at least some set of propositions such that p is entailed by it. 
where p was redefined as the SR over which the modal operator has scope, and the 
propositions which have a bearing on p were specified as those which constitute the 
evidence for the set of assumptions according to which the optimal relevance of p is 
determined. 
This analysis accounted for the data which falsified both Klinge (1993) and 
Papafragou (1995). Unlike Papafragou (1995) the analysis presented in §4.2.4 does 
not depend on reference to a possible worlds model, and characterises can, may, must 
and should in purely procedural terms. Unlike Klinge (1993) reference to potentiality 
or the irrealis cognitive domain does not constitute part of the semantic ontology of 
any of the four modal auxiliaries discussed; rather, can, may, must and should relate 
SRs in their scope to assumptions in the utterance interpretation context, leaving 
irreality to be inferred where appropriate. 
4 . 3.2 Prospects 
In this chapter, I have proposed an analysis of can, may, must and should as 
exponents of procedural encoding at phase two of utterance interpretation with scope 
over situation representations. The account offered here, like the other accounts 
discussed, characterises each modal auxiliary as a member of a set, and recognises 
that the interpretation and distribution of each member of that set can not be divorced 
from the dynamics of the set as a whole. There are, however, certain properties of 
should and must in particular, which are not accounted for by Groefsema's analysis or 
by my reformulation of it (nor by any other analysis which I have encountered). 
Should is distinguished not only from can, may and must, but from all of the modals 
by its 'optimistic' nature, which renders (4.47a) but not (4.48a) felicitous, in contrast 
to the acceptable (4.47b) and (4.48b) where other modals are used: 
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(4.47) a. The Linguistics Department fancy dress party should be fun. 
b. The Linguistics Department fancy dress party may/could/will be fun. 
(4.48) a. ? The Linguistics Department fancy dress party should be boring. 
b. The Linguistics Department fancy dress party may/could/will be 
boring. 
This 'optimistic' interpretation of should is overridden in the protasis of conditional 
sentences, where other modals are usually infelicitous: 
(4.49) a. If it should rain, we will have to stay at home. 
b. ? If it may/could/will rain, we will have to stay at home. 
Certain features of the semantics of must manifest themselves most clearly as 
differences in interpretation between must and have to. Apart from the differences 
concerning the relative scope of these expressions and negation, which may be 
syntactic in origin, the interpretation of utterances containing must and have to differ 
in the following ways: 
(4.50) a. You must be very intelligent to understand Labelled Deduction. 
b. You have to be very intelligent to understand Labelled Deduction. 
(4.51) a. I must find out more about Labelled Deduction. 
b. I have to find out more about Labelled Deduction. 
(4.50a) suggests that the addressee does understand Labelled Deduction (and is 
therefore very intelligent), whereas (4.50b) conveys no such suggestion, the 
interpretation being simply that to understand Labelled Deduction it is necessary to be 
very intelligent. Other differences in interpretation arise between (4.51a) and (4.51b); 
whereas (4.51a) suggests that the compulsion to find out more about Labelled 
Deduction is internal, for example the speaker's own curiosity, (4.51b) suggests an 
external compulsion, say, an examination syllabus. 
Also not discussed, are variations in usage concerning the modal auxiliaries and their 
historical development. (Such considerations fall beyond the scope of the preceding 
analysis, which is concerned purely with the procedural information encoded by the 
modals can, may, must and should. ) Linguistic variation and change are closely 
linked, and will be discussed in chapter 5 in relation to the conceptual/procedural 
distinction at phase two. In chapter 6 an account öf the grammatical markers will, 
shall and be going to will be provided which incorporates both synchronic and 
diachronic considerations. 
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5 GRAMMATICIZATION AND PROCEDURAL ENCODING 
Grammaticization (also known as 'grammaticalization'), a term introduced by Meillet 
(1912), refers to the process whereby "words from major lexical categories, such as 
nouns, verbs and adjectives, become minor, grammatical categories such as 
prepositions, adverbs and auxiliaries, which in turn may be further grammaticalised 
into affixes. " (McMahon 1994: 160) 
Grammaticization results in semantic, syntactic, morphological and phonological 
changes in the grammaticizing expression ('gram'). Semantically, the developing gram 
moves from encoding a specific semantic content, appropriate to a restricted range of 
contexts, to encoding a very generalised, reduced semantic content, appropriate in an 
increasingly wide range of contexts, and increasingly dependent on contextual factors 
for its interpretation. This is termed 'semantic bleaching' (following Givön 1975a). An 
example of semantic bleaching is afforded by the change from Old English willan 
with a specific sense of desire and volition and selecting only animate subjects, to 
Modern English will with a more general meaning and highly variable interpretation 
with no selection restrictions on appropriate subjects. The increased dependence of a 
gram on context for its interpretation can eventually lead to redundancy, as in the co- 
occurrence of the past tense suffix -ed with temporal adverbials expressing past time 
reference. 
Syntactically, increased grammaticization leads to increased rigidity in syntactic 
position and scope relations (see §3.2.1), leading in some cases to affixation. 
Affixation is frequently accompanied by phonetic reduction as the gram ceases to be 
stressed, as in the bound allomorphs of will: as a suffix to a subject NP [1] (e. g. you'll) 
and affixed to the reduced allomorph of not (itself a gram), as won't. Affixation is not 
a prerequisite for phonetic reduction as gonna [gäna] - the reduced form of going to - 
illustrates (the accompanying form of the auxiliary be in the be going to construction 
also tends to be affixed to the preceding NP with accompanying phonetic reduction). 
The specific type of grammaticization to be discussed here is the process whereby 
operators (grams encoding procedural information constraining the inferential 
interpretation of SRs within their scope) develop from lexical verbs. Operators, such 
as the tense, aspect and modality markers discussed in chapter 3 are all grams, and so, 
from the perspective of the conceptual/procedural distinction, grammaticization 
involves a shift from conceptual encoding to procedural encoding in a single 
expression over time. Given the arguments concerning inferential enrichment of 
elements within logical forms (§1.3.2) and the problems encountered by polysemous 
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accounts of the modal auxiliaries (§3.4.2), I shall maintain a unitary, monosemous 
semantics for every operator. 
The model of procedural encoding developed in this thesis must be reconciled with 
the following aspects of grammaticization. First, a clear distinction has been drawn 
between conceptual and procedural encoding; there is no information type 
intermediate between conceptual and procedural information. This claim must be 
reconciled with the fact that formal grammaticization is a gradual process with many 
individual expressions occupying intermediate positions on a continuum between 
fully lexical and fully grammaticized, whilst there exist modal expressions in 
languages other than English, which behave semantically in a similar way to the 
English modal auxiliaries (that is they often give rise to similar interpretations, lack 
selection restrictions on permissible subjects, are highly context dependent, etc. ) yet 
which do not exhibit the formal features of grammaticization. Secondly, procedural 
encoding has been characterised as constraining the inferential phases of utterance 
interpretation. We would therefore expect to see a link between the onset of 
grammaticization and the inferential processes of phase two of utterance 
interpretation; I shall therefore investigate the causes of grammaticization. Finally, I 
will take into consideration the fact of semantic retention, whereby conceptual 
information encoded by the lexical source expression of a gram is still accessible in 
the use of that gram in certain contexts (e. g. the volitional interpretation of will which 
may be recovered in questions: Will you do the washing up? i. e. 'Are you willing to 
do the washing up? '). I shall address each consideration in turn. 
I shall exemplify grammaticization with reference to the modal auxiliary will. In 
§3.2.1, will was cited, without any attempt at justification, as an example of an 
operator; it was simply assumed, on the basis of surface syntactic structure, that will 
encodes procedural information with wider scope than tense and aspect markers. The 
motivation for viewing will as an operator (encoding procedural information 
constraining the manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual representations) 
derives from the evidence presented in §4.1 that the modals are not directly truth- 
conditionally interpretable. I shall continue to discuss will in chapter 6. 
J. The gradualness of grammaticization 
51 0 Introduction 
lt is generally accepted within the literature that grammaticization is a gradual process 
(see for example Lichtenberk 1991: 37, Hopper & Traugott 1993: 94-129, and Bybee 
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et al 1994: 6). The shift from lexical to grammatical expression is often viewed as a 
continuum, along which grammaticized and grammaticizing expressions are 
distributed, clustering at certain points (as auxiliaries or affixes for example). It is 
further assumed that the various changes involved in grammaticization - both formal 
and semantic - occur in parallel: 
"both types of formal change in grammaticization parallel the main 
types of semantic change in grammaticization. Phonetic reduction - the 
loss of specific phonetic properties - parallels [semantic] reduction or 
generalization, which is also the loss of specific properties. The fusion 
of a developing gram to adjacent lexical material in affixation is 
parallel to the growing functional dependence of grams and their 
conceptual cohesion with lexical stems. " 
(Bybee et al 1994: 106) 
In this section I shall suggest that this characterisation of grammaticization as both 
formally and semantically gradual has unfortunate consequences for the possibility of 
systemic, synchronic accounts of grams and for the conceptual/procedural distinction. 
In response to this problem I shall present evidence that grammaticization, whilst 
clearly gradual as far as formal change is concerned, is not a semantically gradual 
process. 
5.1 .1 
The consequences of semantically gradual grammaticization 
In chapter 4,1 proposed an analysis of the modal auxiliaries based on Groefsema 
(1995a) which was synchronic and structuralist in that it accounted for the semantics 
of individual modal auxiliaries in terms of their membership of a system of 
oppositions (although in §4.3.2 I noted that certain properties of should and must were 
not explained by this analysis). If, as has been claimed, grammaticization is a gradual 
process, both formally and semantically, the possibility of such an analysis is put in 
doubt for the following reasons: If each modal auxiliary is undergoing a process of 
gradual grammaticization, it will be inherently semantically unstable; any system of 
oppositions between the modal auxiliaries (such as that proposed in Groefsema 
1995a) must therefore also be unstable, and hence resistant to systematic, synchronic 
analysis. 
It is certainly true that, if not the semantics, at least the distribution of the modal 
auxiliaries has been subject to change, as the following uses of must from 1885 
illustrate: 
(5.1) For four or five days his condition was most crucial; indeed, I believe firmly 
that had it not been for Foulata's indefatigable nursing he must have died ... For two days we thought that he must die, and crept about with heavy hearts. 
(H. Rider Haggard 1885 King Solomon's Mines London, etc., Cassell p. 217) 
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In present-day English he would have died and he would/was going to die 
respectively are more appropriate, but the interpretation of the 1885 usage poses no 
problems. 
Bybee (1988: 247) rejects the structuralist view that grams are assigned a value by the 
oppositions they enter into, on the basis that grams develop gradually out of lexical 
material and therefore have inherent semantic content. She argues that since there are 
consistent cross-linguistic and diachronic relationships between lexical and 
grammatical meaning, the diachronic source of a gram must be more important in 
determining its meaning than the existence of other grams in the language. This is 
reflected in the observation that similar lexical sources for grams are found across 
languages, but systems of grams differ cross-linguistically. Bybee (1988: 253) notes 
that a developing gram must constrict the distribution of other grams since "every 
time it is used another gram is not. " However, she claims that when this happens a 
developing gram does not imbue another gram with meaning, and illustrates her 
argument with reference to the effect of the development of will on shall (shall being 
the earlier of the two forms). The specifics of this argument will be addressed in §6.2 
when will and shall are discussed in detail, but a few general responses to Bybee 
(1988) can be offered now. 
Whilst the lexical source of a gram undoubtedly has an important influence on the 
semantics of the resulting gram, the system of oppositions into which the gram enters 
also has a significant effect on the semantics and the distribution of the gram. Take 
the case of cognates in different languages which develop divergent meanings, such 
as Modem English will and Modern German wollen. Will is rarely the best translation 
for a form of wollen, rather, want, like or some other verb of desire or volition is more 
often appropriate. If English had not developed want (or an alternative form with a 
similar meaning) the development of will might well have paralleled that of wollen; 
but will and wollen are clearly semantically distinct, despite sharing a common lexical 
source. Bybee (1988) is therefore incorrect to claim that the diachronic source of a 
gram is more important in determining its meaning than systemic considerations; both 
are important. Furthermore, some distributional features of the modal auxiliaries, such 
as the interaction of epistemic must and may with negation (see §4.2.3), can only be 
explained by reference to a system. These considerations do not, however, answer the 
argument that a gradually developing semantics of a given gram can not be analysed 
in terms of a systemic, synchronic characterisation, such as that given for can, may, 
must and should in chapter 4. 
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In addition, the characterisation of grammaticization as a semantically gradual 
process is incompatible with the notion of a strict distinction between conceptual and 
procedural information types; if there is an intermediate position between lexical and 
grammatical encoding, and if these correspond to conceptual and procedural encoding 
respectively, as I have claimed, there must be an intermediate position between 
conceptual and procedural encoding. Rather than respond to this charge directly, I 
shall examine evidence which contradicts the underlying assumption that 
grammaticization is semantically gradual. 
Counter-evidence from verb-serialisation 
The underlying assumption that semantic development occurs in parallel with the 
formal aspects of grammaticization (Bybee et a! 1994: 106) is challenged in Giv6n 
(1991). Giv6n looked at verb-serialisation, whereby: 
"An event/state that one language codes as a simple clause with a 
single verb is coded in another language as a complex clause with two 
or more verbs. " 
(Givdn 1991: 81) 
Verb-serialisation can function not only as co-lexicalisation (for example, the 
_ translation of English fetch as aller chercher in French) but grammatically, for 
example by assigning nominal case-roles: 
(5.2) a. she take-stick break (patient) 
'she broke the stick' 
b. she walk go-market (locative) ' 
'she walked to the market' 
c. he work give-her (benefactive) 
'he worked for her' 
d. she take-knife cut meat (instrumental) 
'she cut the meat with the knife' (Givön 1991: 82) 
and by marking tense and aspect: 
(5.3) a. he stay work (durative) 
'he is working' 
b. he go work (future) 
'he will work' 
c. he work finish (perfective) 
'he has already worked' (Giv6n 1991: 83) 
Simply by looking at the grammar of a serial verb language, it is impossible to 
determine whether speakers of that language perceive the events they describe using 
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serial-verbs as single events or 'multi-events' (i. e. a combination of distinct events). 
On the assumption that there is an iconic relation between grammar and cognition it 
has been argued (e. g. Pawley 1987) that multi-verb sequences therefore code multi- 
propositional sequences and hence refer to multi-events. However, it has been noted 
(e. g. Bradshaw 1982, Crowley 1987) that the same iconicity principle can be used to 
argue that serial-verbs represent single events, by invoking grammatical criteria 
which treat a cluster of serial verbs as a single constituent coding a single proposition. 
In both arguments, "one winds up with an inevitable circularity: Grammar is used first 
to define cognition, and then is said to correlate with it. " (Giv6n 1991: 86) 
However, there is one major, well-attested iconicity principle which is dependent on 
neither grammar nor intuitive free translation (Giv6n 1991: 119). That is the principle 
that the temporal-physical distance between stretches of linguistically encoded 
material, determined by rhythm, intonation contours and pauses in speech, correlates 
directly with cognitive 'packaging'; for example, the idea that pause length between 
linguistic expressions such as serial-verbs correlates with the conceptual 'distance' 
between the information encoded by those expressions. Givon (1991: 86) reasoned 
that if serial-verb constructions reflect a multi-event cognitive segmentation of reality, 
then the pauses that characteristically occur at the boundaries of main clauses in non- 
serial-verb languages should also occur in serial-verb languages at serial-verb clause 
boundaries. Conversely, if serial-verbs represent single events, the probability of a 
pause occurring at a serial-verb clause boundary should be significantly lower than at 
a main clause boundary. Giv6n's findings are summarised below: 
(i) The probability of serial-verb constructions showing a pause is much lower, by a clear order of magnitude, [than[ the pause probability associated with 
typical main clauses; and 
(ii) The pause probability of serial-verb constructions falls within the probability 
range of mid-clause pauses associated with lexical words, or is even lower, i. e. falling within the range of the probability of mid-word pauses between 
grammatical morphemes. 
(Givbn 1991: 116) 
What these findings demonstrate is that lexical expressions can be used with the same 
functional load as grammaticized alternatives, as indicated by the iconic features of 
the utterances in which they occur. This leads Givön to conclude that, 
"cognitively, grammaticalization is not a gradual process, but rather an instantaneous one.... The minute a lexical item is used in a frame that 
intends it as a grammatical marker, it is thereby grammaticalized. " 
(Givön 1991: 123) 
When a lexical expression is used, as Giv6n puts it, in a frame that intends it as a 
grammatical marker, is the lexical meaning of the expression still recovered, and if 
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not, why not? The lexical semantics of the expression (that is, the conceptual 
information encoded) is clearly `accessed' in addition to the newly encoded 
grammatical semantics (that is, the procedural information); since Swinney (1979) it 
has been accepted that alternative meanings of ambiguous words are `accessed' or 
`activated' even when a context selects for only one. The inappropriate meaning(s) of 
an ambiguous word are soon deactivated however, leaving only the appropriate 
lexical entry (sense) to be `recognised' or `recovered'; that is, in terms of the three 
phase model of utterance interpretation, only the appropriate meaning is fed into 
phase two to be inferentially enriched. 'In the case of a formally lexical expression 
used functionally/semantically as a gram, the newly encoded procedural information 
is automatically recovered since it provides a necessary processing constraint on the 
interpretation of the associated clause. If the resulting interpretation achieves 
adequate contextual effects on its own, the interpretation process should cease 
according to the principle of relevance, since recovering and inferentially enriching 
the conceptual information also encoded would increase processing effort and reduce 
relevance. 
Givön (ibid. ) goes on to suggest that the supposedly gradual nature of 
grammaticization is in fact the result of the gradual nature of the formal structural 
adjustments which follow (sometimes long afterwards) original, instantaneous 
developments at the functional level. The frequent delay in formal grammaticization, 
and its gradual nature when it does occur, explains the existence of expressions which 
exhibit the semantic characteristics of grams but the formal characteristics of lexical 
items (for example verbs in languages other than English which fulfil a similar 
semantic function to that of the English modal auxiliaries whilst behaving lexically as 
main verbs). 
5-1-3 Counter-evidence from Kiswahili 
A clear example of the functionally instantaneous but formally gradual nature of 
grammaticization is provided by the development of the Kiswahili aspectual marker 
-mesha. Tense, aspect and modality markers in Kiswahili are encoded as preverbal 
prefixes: 
(5.4) Ni + me + s6ma I have read 
SP PERF read 
Kiswahili MTA prefixes are derived from auxiliary forms which in turn are derived 
from main verbs. This process is evidenced in contemporary Kiswahili in the recent 
development (mentioned in neither Ashton 1947 nor Polome 1967) of the MTA 
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prefix -mesha- with the sense of have already, derived from the verb kwisha ('finish') 
plus the perfect marker -me-, itself derived from the (archaic) verb mele which also 
meant `finish' (Nurse 1989: 287). The examples below illustrate in turn the use of me 
+ kwisha in a serial verb construction either with or without functional 
grammaticization (5.5), as a fully grammaticized prefix with the form -mekwisha- 
(5.6), and as a reduced prefix with the form -mesha- (5.7); each of these constructions 
is current in contemporary Kiswahili: 
(5.5) A+ me + kwisha ku + soma 
SP PERF kwisha INF read 
(5.6) A+ mekwisha + soma 
SP mekwisha read 
(5.7) A+ mesha + soma 
SP mesha read 
S/he has finished reading 
S/he has already read 
S/he has already read 
S/he has already read 
The construction in (5.6) with -mekwisha- treated as an MTA prefix is sometimes 
treated as a variant of the construction in (5.5) analysed as the auxiliary verb kwisha 
with the MTA prefix -me- but followed by a bare verb stem (i. e. minus the non-finite 
ku- prefix). The following transcription from Maw & Kelly (1975: 110-1) illustrates 
this practice: 
(5.8) Je, ndio wakati huu u+ me + kwisha timiza mihadi yenu, Je really time that SP PERF kwisha fulfil promise your (pl) 
au u+ me + kwisha vunja mihadi yenu? 
or SP PERF kwisha break promise your (p1) 
So, by that time, had you already fulfilled your promise, 
or had you already broken it? 
In other auxiliary plus main verb constructions, however, only the non-finite form of 
the main verb with the ku- prefix is possible, so -mekwisha- in (5.6) is best analysed 
as a MTA marker prefixed to a verb stem. 
The fact that -mekwisha- has developed into -mesha- provides an insight into the 
typical prosody associated with utterances of constructions like (5.5) with a 
grammatical functional load, and lends support to Givön's iconicity principle, that 
intonation contours of serial verb constructions reflect cognitive packaging (such as 
whether or not the auxiliary verbal group is being used as a grammatical marker). 
Stress in Kiswahili, manifested by relatively high pitch, typically falls on the 
penultimate syllable of most (polysyllabic) words (stress is indicated by an accent 
over the stressed vowel): 
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(5.9) Ni + me + kwisha I have finished 
SP PERF finish 
The fact that this stressed syllable has been lost in the reduced form of the 
grammatical marker -mesha- suggests that, when used grammatically, serial verb 
constructions such as (5.5) function prosodically as a single verbal group with stress 
on the penultimate syllable of the main verb only: 
(5.5) A+ me + kwisha ku + soma Slhe has already read 
SP PERF kwisha INF read 
In their transcription of (5.8), Maw & Kelly (1975) observed that the syllable /sha/ 
functioned as what they term a `salient syllable'. Maw & Kelly (1975) posit the `tone- 
group' as the unit of the intonational system, identified by reference to a `tonic' -a 
stressed syllable exhibiting one of a set of large-scale pitch movements. Salients 
initiate a pitch movement culminating in a tonic, and the beginning of a salient 
coincides with an accented syllable of the utterance (Maw & Kelly 1975: 7). This 
entails that the syllable /sha/ was stressed in the utterance of (5.8) rather than /kwi/ 
since /sha/ marked the beginning of a salient. From a discourse perspective, stressing 
/sha/ emphasised what I have rendered as already in the translation of (5.8). 
Once formal grammaticization has taken place and -mekwisha- is realised as a prefix 
on the verb, it behaves syntactically and morphologically as a typical MTA marker. 
Two co-occurrence phenomena illustrate this. First, all MTA markers, including 
-mekwisha-, can co-occur with the object prefix: 
(5.10) "U + mekwisha + mw + ona boy wa somo yako? " (RM p. 34) 
SP mekwisha OP see boy from class your 
Have you seen the boy from your class yet? 
Secondly, -mekwisha- has become one of a subset of Kiswahili MTA markers which 
can function as aspectual markers on the main verb of complex VPs. Complex VPs 
consist of a tensed form of the verb kuwa ('be') followed (not necessarily 
immediately) by the main verb with an MTA prefix marking aspect drawn from the 
set: -na- (5.11), -ki- (5.12), -me- (5.13), -mekwisha- (5.14) (the -mekwisha- prefix is 
more common in the main clause of complex VPs than -me-) and the negative forms 
ha-ja- (5.15) and ha-i (5.16), these latter two consisting of an initial prefix ha- plus a 
pre-stem prefix ja- and a verbal suffix -i respectively. 55 The subject of the auxiliary 
55 Hauner (1984: 112) also suggests that the prefix -a- is used as an aspect marker; however as all 
examples of this prefix occur in the first person singular (SPI, ni) e. g. nilikuwa nalaka, the most 
plausible explanation is that the supposed na- (ni+a-) is in fact a contraction of ni+na-. 
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is the same as that of the main verb (in examples below ha- consists of ha + a-). 
Although any MTA prefix may in principle occur in the auxiliary, in practice -1i- 
(past) and -ta- (future) predominate; in particular -ii- 
is found in contemporary 
narrative, as in the following examples (all from RM p. 6): 56 
(5.11) Tangu Ijumaa mpaka Jumapili Zakaria a+li+kuwa 
from Friday until Sunday Zakaria SP PAST be 
a+na+kwenda kunywa... 
SP PROD go drinking 
From Friday to Sunday Zakaria went drinking... 
(5.12) Wakati watoto wa+li+po+kuwa wa+ki+imba, 
time children SP PAST REL be SP PROG sing 
Zakaria a+li+kuwa a+ki+cheza - a+li+kuwa a+ki+rukaruka. 
Zakaria SP PAST be SP PROG dance SP PAST be SP PRO jump jump 
Whilst the children were singing, Zakaria was dancing - 
he was jumping up and down. 
(5.13) Zakaria a+li+kuwa a+me+shindwa hata kujenga nyumba ya maana. 
Zakaria SP PAST be SP PERF defeated even to build house of import 
Zakaria was incapable even of building a decent house 
(5.14) Kwa wakati huo wawili wa+li+kuwa wa+mekwisha+uzwa. 
By time that two SP PAST be SP mekwisha be sold 
By that time two (of them) had already been sold. 
(5.15) ... a+li+kuwa 
ha+ja+toa hata chapa ku+wa+lipia 
SP PAST be NEG-SP YET put out even stroke to OP pay for 
watoto ada ya shule. 
children fees of school 
... he had not 
done even a stroke (of work) to pay for his children's 
school fees. 
(5.16) Stella a+li+kuwa ha+wez+i ku+ficha siri... Stella SP PAST be NEG-SP be able NEG to keep secret 
Stella was unable to keep a secret... 
56 As examples (5.11) and (5.12) illustrate, -na- and -ki- convey similar information. According to 
Nurse & Hinnebusch (1993: 381) -na- marks progressive aspect whilst -ki- conveys a more general 
imperfective meaning: 
(7) 
(8) 
tu - li - kuwa tu - na - cheza 'we were playing (when you arrived)' 
we PAST be we PROG play 
tu - Ii - kuwa tu - ki - cheza 'we were playing (all day long, regularly)' 
we PAST be we IPFV play or 'we used to play' 
However, this analysis is clearly contradicted by our examples (5.11) and (5.12) in which the 
interpretations are reversed. 
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The aspectual function of -mekwisha- in conjunction with a tensed form of kuwa is 
also possible when kwisha is morphologically an auxiliary verb with the perfect 
marker -me-: 
(5.17) a+ li + kuwa a+ me + kwisha ku + agiza (MWK p1) 
SP PAST be SP PERF kwisha INF instruct 
'he had already given instructions' 
Finally, as evidence of the total integration of -me(kwi)sha- into the MTA paradigm, 
it can occur as an aspectual prefix in a complex VP, with a following OP: 
(5.18) wasichana wa+li+kuwa wa+mesha+m+shangilia sana Rosa. 
girls SP PAST be SP mesha OP congratulate much Rosa 
the girls had already often congratulated Rosa (EM p. 35) 
Summary 
The view of grammaticization as formally gradual but semantically instantaneous is 
compatible with the claim made in §2.1.2 that any expression has the potential to 
encode both conceptual information (about itself) and procedural information (about 
the inferential interpretation of a conceptual representation within its scope). In the 
model of the conceptual/procedural distinction proposed here, there is no information 
type intermediate between conceptual and procedural, so a gram part way along the 
(formal) grammaticization cline can not be said to be semantically intermediate 
between lexical and grammatical. To characterise an expression as semantically 
intermediate in this way would contradict the evidence of Giv6n (1991) that 
grammaticization is instantaneous. Neither is it necessary to characterise a gram, or an 
expression used grammatically, as encoding either conceptual (lexical) information 
or procedural (grammatical) information; to do so would result in polysemy every 
time that, as Giv6n (1991: 123) puts it, "a lexical item is used in a frame that intends it 
as a grammatical marker. " 
If an expression can, as I have proposed, encode both conceptual information and 
procedural information at phase two, grammaticization (the development of a 
procedural semantics) need not result in the loss of lexical (conceptual) semantic 
features. This still leaves two questions: first, how does an expression come to encode 
procedural information in addition to its conceptual semantic content, and secondly, 
does formal grammaticization, if and when it occurs, lead to a loss of conceptual 
semantic content. In the following sections I shall discuss first the causes of 
grammaticization, and secondly semantic retention. 
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12 The causes of grammaticization 
5.2.0 Introduction 
From the existence of expressions which behave semantically like grams but formally 
as members of lexical categories, such as French devoir, and conversely from the 
non-existence of formally grammaticized expressions with full lexical semantics, 
combined with Giv6n's (1991) observations that functional and formal features of 
grammaticization do not always develop in parallel, it is clear that semantic change 
drives formal change, rather than being driven by it. This has generally been assumed 
throughout the literature on grammaticization (cf. Bybee et al 1994: 281-301). 
In terms of the conceptual/procedural distinction, the semantic change driving 
grammaticization (taken as a composite functional and formal development) is the 
addition of procedural information to the semantics of an expression, alongside the 
conceptual information already encoded. That is, a given expression not only encodes 
information giving access to its own logical selection frame but also comes to encode 
information giving rise to a logical selection frame other than that in which it appears. 
In other words it comes to constrain the interpretation of the associated utterance in 
some way. We saw in §2.1.1 that there is in principle nothing to stop a given 
expression encoding both conceptual and procedural information; the question to be 
answered here, however, concerns what causes lexical expressions encoding 
conceptual information to come to encode procedural information as well. 
Bybee et al (1994: 282) identify five mechanisms of semantic change involved in the 
development of grams marking tense, aspect and modality, some characteristic of 
early stages of the grammaticization process, others of later stages. Given that the 
shift from conceptual to procedural encoding is the driving force behind the formal 
changes involved in grammaticization, I shall concentrate on describing those 
mechanisms operative in the early stages of grammaticization with a view to 
establishing which can initiate the shift to procedural encoding. The five mechanisms 
of semantic change to be discussed are 'metaphorical extension', the 
conventionalisation of implicature, 57 which I shall generally refer to simply as 
'inference' (following Bybee et al 1994), 'generalisation', 'harmony' and 'absorption' 
(of features of the linguistic contexts in which a gram prototypically occurs). I shall 
briefly describe each before looking in more detail at those involved in the early 
stages of grammaticization. 
57 The conventionalisation of implicature should not be confused with the Gricean notion of 
convcntioanl implicatures, which I reject (see §1.3.3 and 2.1.1). 
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Metaphorical extension and inference 
Metaphorical extension involves an abrupt shift of meaning from one, usually 
concrete, semantic category to another, usually more abstract one, for example, from 
OBJECT to SPACE to TIME to QUALITY. These can be viewed as primitive ontological 
categories similar to those proposed by Jackendoff (1983) (see §2.1.2 for discussion). 
Heine et al (1991: 161) illustrate the effect of metaphorical extension on the use of the 
Ewe lexeme megbe ('back'); in (5.19) megbg denotes a body part (OBJECT), in (5.20) a 
location (SPACE) either as an adverb (5.20a) or as a postposition (5.20b), in (5.21) a 
temporal relation (TIME) and finally in (5.22) it means 'mentally retarded' (QUALITY): 
semantic category 
(5.19) e-pe megbe fä OBJECT 
3SG-POSS back be cold 
His back is cold 
(5.20) a. e le x3 a megbe SPACE 
3SG is house DEF behind 
He is at the back of the house 
b. 6 nz megbe SPACE 
3SG stay behind 
He stays back 
(5.21) 6ki le e-megbe TIME 
3SG die be 3SG-behind 
He died after him 
(5.22) e tsi megbe QUALITY 
3SG remain behind 
He is backward/mentally retarded 
(5.22) is ambiguous between 'He is mentally retarded' and 'He remained behind' or 
'He is late'; this, and similar ambiguity between SPACE and TIME uses and OBJECT and 
SPACE uses, reflect some overlap between consecutive semantic categories. 
Despite the attention paid to metaphorical extension as a potential cause of 
grammaticization, Bybee et al (1994: 283) observed that very few examples of 
grammaticization of tense, aspect or modality in their study could be accommodated 
in the metaphorical model, and of those that could, the change occurred very early in 
the grammaticization process, exhibiting features of lexical rather than of 
grammatical change. A similar observation was made by Traugott (1988) who argued 
that although ordinary semantic change was metaphoric, grammaticization involves a 
special kind of metaphorical extension: metonymy, or the conventionalisation of 
implicature (see footnote 57). Carey (1990) who describes the role of the 
conventionalisation of implicature (henceforth 'inference') in the early development of 
the English perfect, characterises this mechanism as follows: 
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"When semantic change arises from the conventionalisation of invited 
inferences, some aspect of the context in which the expression was 
used with its old meaning becomes indexed and over time becomes 
part of the new meaning of the expression itself. " (Carey 1990: 373) 
12 ,2 
Generalisation harmony and absorption 
Three further mechanisms of semantic change are discussed in Bybee et al (1994), the 
first of which is generalisation, "the loss of specific features of meaning with the 
consequent expansion of appropriate contexts of use for a gram" (Bybee et al 
1994: 289). Generalisation can be described in terms of the loss of one feature of 
meaning; this is neatly illustrated in the development of can from being a marker of 
purely mental ability to general ability and finally to representing root possibility: 
can 
(i) mental ability mental enabling conditions exist in an agent for the 
completion of the predicate situation 
(ii) general ability enabling conditions exist in an agent for the completion 
of the predicate situation 
(iii) root possibility enabling conditions exist for the completion of the 
predicate situation 
(Bybee et a! 1994: 290) 
Generalisation may also be the mechanism behind the development of negation 
markers such as English nought > not and French ne... pas, both of which were 
formerly emphatic negation markers but which have now been generalised to non- 
emphatic contexts (Bybee et al 1994: 293). 
The final two mechanisms of semantic change to be discussed are harmony and the 
absorption of contextual meaning. Where harmony occurs, the meaning of a gram 
does not contribute any new information to a sentence since it merely echoes the 
temporal reference, modality, etc. expressed in the main clause (for example through 
temporal or modal adverbials). Harmony applies only to the later stages of 
grammaticization (Bybee et al 1994: 294) and results in semantic redundancy. A gram 
can come to be used so frequently, including when it harmonises with the context and 
is semantically redundant, that its absence becomes significant. When this occurs, the 
absence of such a gram may result in the formation of what Bybee et al (1994: 294) 
call a 'zero gram', which absorbs contextual meaning pertaining to the domain 
constrained by the overt gram. For example, the absence of the past tense -ed marker 
signals unmarked tense (not present tense as Bybee er al (1994: 294) claim) whereby 
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the addressee recovers the intended temporal interpretation from the context and the 
absence of an overt -ed marker (see §3.3.2 for discussion). 
These latter two mechanisms - harmony and the absorption of contextual meaning - 
are only involved in the later stages of grammaticization and so will not be discussed 
further. Instead, I shall focus on metaphorical extension, inference, and 
generalisation, and attempt to determine which of these is/are involved in the shift 
from purely conceptual encoding to procedural encoding and grammaticization. 
5,22 The mechanism of semantic change in grammaticization 
Heine et a! (1991) claim that metaphorical extension is one of the main, if not the 
main, mechanisms of semantic change involved in grammaticization. However there 
are two strong arguments against this view. The first is that the clearest cases of 
metaphorical extension, such as the extension of body-part terms to express spatial 
concepts (for example the extension of the semantic field of the Ewe lexeme megbd 
discussed above), are arguably not instances of grammaticization (cf. Bybee et a! 
1994: 284). At best, metaphorical extension often precedes subsequent 
grammaticization and may be a prerequisite for it. Secondly, the clearest cases of 
grammaticization are arguably due to inference rather than to metaphorical extension. 
These two mechanisms can be difficult to distinguish, given that both can be viewed 
as ways of solving the problem of how to represent members of one semantic 
category in terms of another (Traugott 1988: 413, Heine et a! 1991: 150). Traugott 
(1988) defines metaphor as the representation of information pertaining to one 
semantic domain in terms of another semantic domain not present in the context, and 
metonymy (inference) as the representation of information pertaining to one semantic 
domain in terms of another semantic domain which is present in the context, albeit 
non-overtly. 
The difficulty in distinguishing between metaphorical extension and inference can be 
illustrated through the development of an epistemic interpretation of must from the 
historically prior obligation interpretation. Bybee et al (1994: 284) argue that this 
change is due to metaphorical extension since "the obligation and probability senses 
of must occur in mutually exclusive environments. " The obligation reading occurs in 
future contexts such as (5.23) and the probability reading in past or present contexts 
such as (5.24): 
(5.23) The letter must arrive sometime next week. 
(5.24) The letter must have been in the mail. 
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Since, Bybee at al reason, an epistemic interpretation is not available in (5.23) and a 
deontic interpretation is not possible in (5.24), the extension of meaning from the 
deontic to the epistemic semantic field is a shift from one category to another not 
present in the context, and must therefore be a case of metaphorical extension. 
However, it is possible to find contexts in which examples such as (5.23) can receive 
an epistemic interpretation: 
(5.23') With a first class stamp it shouldn't take more than three days to arrive. 
The letter must arrive sometime next week. 
The epistemic interpretation of must in (5.23') derives ultimately from the fact that 
the postal services are obliged to convey a letter with a first class stamp to its 
destination within a certain time limit. The epistemic interpretation is therefore based 
on a semantic category (obligation) which is present in the context, hence the 
mechanism at work is inference rather than metaphor. Similarly, the epistemic 
interpretation of (5.24) can be viewed as deriving from obligation, given suitable 
contextual support (e. g. the secretary was obliged to follow the instruction to mail the 
letter): 
(5.24') I told the secretary to mail the details last week, 
so the letter must have been in the mail. 
These examples are not intended as knock down arguments against Bybee et al 
(1994: 284), but simply aim to demonstrate the difficulty of distinguishing metaphor 
and inference. 
Turning now to inference as a mechanism of semantic change, Traugott (1988: 413) 
characterises it as crucially involving "explicit coding of relevance and 
informativeness that earlier was only covertly implied. " In other words, 
grammaticization involves the conventionalisation of implicatures, which can be 
viewed as the licensing of inferences involved in uncovering 'covert' (i. e. implied) 
meaning, even in the absence of direct contextual support. Thus, for example, from an 
utterance of (5.23') an addressee could infer - from the fact that the postal services 
have certain obligations - that the letter in question probably will arrive the following 
week. With increased grammaticization, the inference to an epistemic interpretation 
can be made even in the absence of a deontic statement from which epistemic 
probability could be implied. 
Procedural encoding constrains the inferential processes involved in utterance 
interpretation in just this way, suggesting that inference is at least one mechanism of 
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semantic change which results in a shift from purely conceptual encoding to 
procedural encoding also. Inference, or the conventionalisation of implicature, can be 
illustrated in greater detail with respect to the development of will and shall (§6.2 
discusses will and shall synchronically in greater detail). 
Bybee et al (1994: 287-8) describe the development of will and shall as grams in 
terms of the following three stages: 
Use with first person subjects (obligation with shall, desire with will) 
(INFERENCE) ---> intention with first person subjects 
(INFERENCE) ---> prediction 
This development can be described in more detail as follows, taking into account the 
effect of generalisation and a number of issues to be discussed in chapter 6: 
Use with first person subjects (obligation with shall, desire with will) 
(INFERENCE) ---> intention with first person subjects 
(INFERENCE) ---> prediction about future events with first person subjects 
(GENERALISATION) ---> prediction about future events (any subject) 
(GENERALISATION) ---> prediction in general (will only) 
Here generalisation is involved in the later stages of the grammaticization process, 
after the shift to procedural encoding has taken place. Generalisation also seems to be 
involved in the early semantic development of the be going to construction. The 
change from progressing physically towards a goal ('I am going to the shops') to 
progressing in a non-physical sense towards a goal, giving rise to the overtones of 
intention ('I am going to go shopping') and inevitability (`I am going to be sick') can 
be viewed as due to generalisation (the loss of the physical component of meaning). 
In §6.4 1 shall demonstrate that the overtones of intention and inevitability often 
associated with the use of be going to are conceptual rather than procedural. I have 
found no case of generalisation changing a-lexical to a grammatical expression (i. e. 
initiating procedural encoding), suggesting that generalisation as a mechanism of 
semantic change is not itself the mechanism by which grammaticization is activated 
through the shift to procedural encoding, although it can derive a new, more general 
lexical meaning from a lexical expression, and a more general grammatical meaning 
from a gram. That leaves just inference, or the conventionalisation of implicature, as 
the one sure mechanism of semantic change driving the shift to procedural encoding 
which initiates grammaticization. 
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U Semantic retention 
53A Introduction 
I have so far argued that grammaticization is semantically instantaneous but formally 
gradual, and that the mechanism of semantic change which triggers grammaticization 
is the conventionalisation of implicature, giving rise to procedural encoding at phase 
two of utterance interpretation. That grammaticization is semantically instantaneous 
is possible because expressions may encode both conceptual and procedural 
information. Any procedural information encoded by an expression is automatically 
recovered (in addition to being merely accessed/activated) since it provides a 
necessary processing constraint on the interpretation of an associated conceptual 
representation. If the resulting interpretation is relevant on its own, the interpretation 
process will cease so as to minimise processing effort. However, when a formerly 
lexical expression is used as a grammatical marker, it does not suddenly cease to 
encode conceptual information; this conceptual information may no longer be of 
prime importance to the interpretation of an utterance containing such an expression, 
but it is nonetheless still accessible (that is, activated during modular decoding). 
As a gram develops over time, the conceptual information it encodes may become 
increasingly inaccessible, until such time as it disappears altogether and the gram 
encodes only procedural information, as does the English past tense suffix, -ed. 
However, from the moment an expression first encodes procedural information until 
the point where, as a gram, it no longer encodes any conceptual content, both 
conceptual and procedural information are encoded and may be recovered. 
Throughout the period of its development in which a gram encodes both conceptual 
and procedural information, it is said to exhibit semantic retention, whereby "certain 
more specific semantic nuances of the source construction can be retained in certain 
contexts long after grammaticization has begun. " (Bybee et al 1994: 16) 
Synchronic semantics since Saussure has avoided recourse to etymology in describing 
the semantic content of any expression, and the semantics of grammatical markers is 
no exception. As Culler (1976: 38) notes, knowing that the French negative marker 
pas and the noun pas ('step', `pace') derive from the same source is irrelevant as far 
as a synchronic account of the French negative marker is concerned. Nonetheless, 
certain semantic features of grams, such as the volitional interpretation of will which 
may be recovered in interrogative clauses, and also in certain if-clauses containing a 
variant of will, can only be accounted for in the light of the historical development of 
the gram in question; that is, as examples of semantic retention. In equating semantic 
retention with residual conceptual encoding we can maintain a monosemous 
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synchronic characterisation of grams such as will, but at two distinct levels of 
information structure: conceptual and procedural. After briefly discussing the 
problems caused by semantic retention for traditional polysemous and monosemous 
semantics, I shall further discuss the case of semantic retention in will. 
5.3J Problems for traditional analyses 
The term 'semantic retention' is something of a misnomer - grams which do not 
exhibit 'semantic retention' nonetheless have semantic content, albeit purely 
procedural; others, however, retain a certain amount of conceptual semantic content 
which is accessible in certain contexts. Hence 'conceptual retention' might be a more 
accurate term. Nonetheless, in the spirit of Occam's Razor (terminology is not to be 
increased beyond necessity) I shall adopt the term 'semantic retention' as used in 
Bybee et al (1994: 15-18). The term 'persistence' has also been used (Hopper 1991: 28- 
30) but this reflects a polysemous view in which grammatical markers exhibiting 
'persistence' have two meanings: one lexical and one relational. The term 'semantic 
retention', however, carries no such connotations. Bybee et al (1994: 281) profess 
agnosticism over whether grams such as will are synchronically monosemous or 
polysemous, and Bybee (1988: 255) explicitly rejects Coates' (1983) analysis of be 
going to as polysemous. This is compatible with the monosemous, unitary semantic 
approach adopted here. Semantic retention is problematic for polysemous accounts of 
grams, in that the specific semantic nuances of the source construction which 
distinguish, say, a supposed volitional will from a purely grammaticized will are often 
difficult to isolate. 
(5.25) I'll do the shopping. 
(5.25) could be loosely paraphrased as "I am willing to do the shopping" or could be 
interpreted as a simple prediction; often, however, (5.25) will be interpreted as a 
prediction with overtones of volition. On a polysemous account, we would have to 
say that will here is ambiguous between two meanings, or means two things at once. 
If will is characterised polysemously, any utterance containing it will need to be 
disambiguated; if will is characterised (as in §6.1 and §6.2) as monosemous and 
semantically underdetermined, it will need to be inferentially enriched. Either way, 
inferential processes must be brought to bear on the interpretation process. On the 
basis of Modified Occam's Razor, however, monosemous accounts are to be preferred 
wherever possible. However, semantic retention is also problematic for traditional 
monosemous accounts, which characterise grams as pure relational elements (Bybee 
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et al 1994: 17). Restrictions on the distribution of grams and differences in their 
interpretation can often be accommodated within a monosemous account by reference 
to an underlying unitary semantics for each gram, combined with an account of the 
systematic relations existing between grams sharing a common semantic field (such 
as was proposed for may, can, must and should in §4.2). However, semantic retention, 
such as the volitional overtone of will, is of a different order from the epistemic, 
deontic and dynamic interpretations of other modal auxiliaries. The latter can be 
derived from a combination of some single underdetermined procedural semantics for 
a given modal, plus an account of the systematic interaction of the modal auxiliaries 
with each other and with the principle of relevance. The volitional overtones of will, 
on the other hand, can not be derived in this way; chapter 6 demonstrates that the 
procedural semantic ontology of will alone is too indeterminate to give rise a 
specifically volitional interpretation, and that the systematic variation of will with 
other grams (notably shall and be going to), while it gives rise to certain implicatures, 
does not give rise to overtones of volition. 
5.3.2 Semantic retention: the case of will 
This chapter concludes with an explanation of semantic retention within the model of 
grammaticization proposed here. I shall continue to use will for exemplification, for 
the following reasons. First, because will provides a clear illustration of semantic 
retention, and secondly, to anticipate the more detailed discussion of will, shall and be 
going to in chapter 6. There are, however, two non-grammaticized forms of will 
which can not be accommodated within a monosemous account of grammaticized 
will. 58 I shall first distinguish these non-grammaticized expressions from the 
homophonous grammatical marker, so as to exclude them from my discussion of 
semantic retention with grammaticized will. 
The first non-grammaticized expression is will with habitual dynamic modal 
interpretation. There are three main reasons for excluding this 'habitual will' from our 
discussion of the grammaticized form: First, the interpretation of habitual will, that 
the subject of the clause is in the habit of doing something (for example in the 
collocations "if you will keep on/insist on doing x... "), is not recoverable as an 
overtone of grammaticized will. Secondly, habitual will must be emphasised with the 
result that, unlike grammaticized will, it does not have a reduced allomorph [1] affixed 
to the subject of the clause in which it occurs (compare (5.26b) and (5.26c) below). 
The negated form won't is possible as this can be independently emphasised (see 
58 Inflected, and often somewhat archaic, variants of will (e. g. "I must do as she wills", "He willed the 
horse to win") can be ignored. 
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(5.27) below). Third, habitual will is always possible in the protasis of conditional 
clauses59 when the grammaticized form is generally not (compare (5.26b) and (5.26c) 
below): 
(5.26) a. If you go out in the rain, you'll get wet. 
b. * If you'll go out in the rain, you'll get wet. 
c. If you will go out in the rain, you'll get wet. 
(5.27) If you won't wrap up warm, of course you'll catch a chill. 
The other non-grammaticized expression arises from a fossilised usage of "the earlier 
'desire' meaning of the now-grammaticized will" Bybee et al (1994: 16): 
(5.28) a. Do what you will, I won't betray my comrades. 
(Bybee et al 1994: 17) 
The volitional interpretation of will in (5.28a) is similar to that conveyed by cases of 
semantic retention with grammaticized will, but formally the two are in 
complementary distribution. In the purely volitional usage, will does not take a 
complement, either overt or inherent, and the reduced allomorph is ungrammatical, as 
evidenced by (5.28b): 
(5.28) b. * Do what you'll, I won't betray my comrades. 
The fact that, in the habitual and purely volitional examples, will has no phonetically 
reduced allomorph suggests a lexical rather than a grammaticized Characterisation and 
so these forms of will may be excluded from any synchronic characterisation of the 
homophonous grammatical marker, which must take account of semantic retention. 
Semantic retention with will is most evident in two environments: in interrogative 
clauses with second person subjects, and in the protasis of certain conditional clauses. 
The reasons for the prevalence of semantic retention in these two environments differ; 
in interrogative clauses semantic retention results from the nature of questions in the 
second person, the contrast with other future expression, and possibly also the fact 
that the phonetically reduced allomorph `ll is not possible. In the protasis of 
conditional clauses, semantic retention arises when will is in harmony with the 
context set up by the conditional marker if. I shall begin by discussing will in 
interrogative clauses. 
59 See below for further discussion. 
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Will in interrogative clauses 
Bybee et al (1994: 16) suggest that some of the differences in interpretation between 
will, shall and be going to are the result of semantic retention. Comparing will and 
shall, they claim that shall is appropriate in first person questions because its 
"obligation sense" suggests a request for confirmation from the addressee of the 
speaker's responsibility, 60 whereas will is not appropriate because "the older `desire' 
sense of will seems to come through, suggesting that the speaker is quite 
inappropriately asking whether s/he wants to call a cab": 
(5.29) a. Shall I call you a cab? 
b. Will I call you a cab? 
The volitional overtones of will are also highly accessible in interrogative clauses in 
the second person, which are frequently interpreted as requests, i. e. questions about 
the addressee's willingness to perform a particular function, from which a request to 
perform that function can be inferred. There are a number of factors which may 
contribute to this. 
First, requests in English are often expressed through the use of indirect illocution, 
frequently employing interrogatives. In a context where interpreting a second person 
interrogative with will simply as a request for information about a future situation or 
event fails to yield adequate contextual effects, an indirect illocution may be 
recovered, based on an interpretation of the interrogative as a request for information 
about the addressee's willingness to perform a particular act. The use of will rather 
than other expressions to make requests reflects the fact that volitional overtones are 
more accessible from the use of will, which has developed from a volitional source 
expression, than from the `present progressive' or be going to, for example, which 
have not. Whilst interrogatives with will, the 'present progressive' and be going to 
can all be used to request information, only will can be used to make a request: 
(5.30) a. Will you give tomorrow's lecture, or don't you know yet? 
b. Are you giving tomorrow's lecture, or don't you know yet? 
c. Are you going to give tomorrow's lecture, or don't you know yet? 
(5.31) a. Will you give tomorrow's lecture please? 
b. ? Are you giving tomorrow's lecture please? 
c. ? Are you going to give tomorrow's lecture please? 
60 in §6.21 shall argue that shall does not in fact exhibit semantic retention, and that some of the 
differences in acceptability and interpretation between will and shall are due to differences in the 
procedural information these expressions encode. 
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Secondly, in interrogative clauses, only the phonetically full form of will is possible, 
although this need not be stressed at all: 
(5.32) a. Will you do the shopping? 
b. * '11 you do the shopping? 
Recall that neither of the non-grammaticized forms of will encoded procedural 
information and neither had a reduced allomorph `ii. According to the model of 
conceptual and procedural encoding developed here, these two facts - the semantic 
and the formal - are connected. Conceptual information is information encoded by an 
expression which gives access to its own logical selection frame; that is, conceptual 
encoding gives rise to a concept capable of combining with other concepts to form a 
logical form. One concept within a logical form can be highlighted by emphasising 
the expression encoding it; conversely, an expression encoding a less important 
concept may receive less emphasis. Formal grammaticization often leads to a loss of 
conceptual semantic content since, as information encoded by an expression giving 
access to its own logical selection frame becomes less important the expression 
becomes formally less conspicuous, which in turn reduces the salience of the 
conceptual information and so on until all conceptual information has been 'bleached' 
from the expression. However, when a gram is highly salient, for example when it 
occurs in its full phonetic form and at a prominent point in a clause (for example at 
the beginning), and in a context which invites an appropriate interpretation, the 
conceptual information it encodes also becomes more highly salient; this, then, is one 
factor contributing to semantic retention. 
In comparison to will, take the Kiswahili future marker -ta-. All MTA markers in 
Kiswahili occur as prefixes to the verb stem. As we saw in §5.1.3, stress in Kiswahili 
typically falls on the penultimate syllable of a word or phrase, and most MTA 
markers (including -ta-) never fall on the penultimate syllable of a verb phrase; if the 
verb stem is monosyllabic the infinitival prefix ku- is inserted between the MTA 
prefix -ta- and the verb stem and takes stress (indicated by an accent): 
(5.33) ni + to + kwenda 
IS FUT go 
1 will go 
(5.34) ni+to+kü+ja 
IS FUT INF come 
I will come 
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Questions in Kiswahili do not involve an interrogative word order, instead declarative 
word order is retained and the interrogative function is indicated through je and/or 
intonation (see §2.2.3), so again, the MTA prefix cannot take stress: 
(5.35) "Je, Najum, utakwenda sokbni? " 
Je, Najum, you will go to the market? 
Correlating with this, -ta- does not exhibit semantic retention, even though it shares a 
similar lexical source to will in the verb taka ('want', or less frequently 'be about to') 
which is a productive, regular verb in contemporary Kiswahili. Also contributing to 
the interpretation of example (5.35) as a question rather than as a request is the fact 
that indirect illocution is far less common in Kiswahili than in English; if the speaker 
wanted Najum to go to the market, he would generally tell him so directly. 
Will in conditional clauses 
Semantic retention also occurs with will in the protasis of certain conditional clauses. 
In a sentence of the form 'if p then q', will is generally not possible in p; instead, an 
unmarked tense form of the verb is generally used: 
(5.36) a. * If it'll rain, you'll get wet. 
b. If it rains, you'll get wet. 
This is an example of temporal subordination. Wekker (1980) and Declerck (1984) 
both propose that temporal subordination of subordinate to main clauses results in the 
deletion of an underlying future tense (will) in the protasis. Although they are 
incorrect to view will as a future tense (see §6.1) this argument can be applied as it 
stands to languages such as French which do use a future tense in the main clause of a 
conditional sentence but not in the subordinate clause. If futurity in English is inferred 
rather than encoded (as argued in §6.1) then the argument for temporal subordination 
still holds on the assumption that future time reference is inferred with respect to the 
whole conjunct, rather than with respect to each clause separately. Declerck 
(1984: 283-4) argues that temporal subordination only occurs in sentences of the form 
'if p then q' where p is a sufficient condition of q, p and q are temporally related with 
respect to each other, and both p and q express the same kind of condition ('open', 
hypothetical or counterfactual). 61 
61 cf. Depraetere (1994) and Declerck & Depractere (1995) for discussion. (In addition, Haegeman & Wekker (1984) demonstrate that conditional clauses with temporal subordination differ syntactically from those without temporal subordination. ) 
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When these conditions hold and the apodosis has past time reference, temporal 
subordination does not result in the loss of the past tense -ed suffix in the protasis in 
favour of the unmarked form: 
(5.37) a. If you answer/*will answer that question, you will win a prize. 
b. If you answered that question, you would win a prize. 
c. If you had answered that question, you would have won a prize. 
[based on Declerck 1984 (8a) to (8c)] 
Unlike will, -ed can exhibit harmony with the context (see §5.2.2). When the 
procedural information encoded by will is in harmony with the context, the 
occurrence of will is still marked in comparison to the unmarked tense form and 
addressees will therefore look for additional contextual effects to justify the additional 
processing effort necessitated by the use of the relatively more marked will. Unlike 
the -ed suffix which has been bleached of all conceptual content, will still encodes 
conceptual information relating to volition; this conceptual information becomes 
accessible through the principle of relevance (the additional processing effort incurred 
by the use of will + lexical verb over the unmarked form of the lexical verb initiates in 
a search for additional contextual effects, which results in the conceptual information 
encoded by will being recovered). 
If the conceptual information encoded by will is semantically incompatible with the 
subject of the protasis, the resulting sentence is deemed ungrammatical, as in (5.36) 
repeated below: 
(5.36) a. * If it'll rain, you'll get wet. 
b. If it rains, you'll get wet. 
Where the subject of the protasis is semantically compatible, the conceptual 
information encoded by will becomes accessible. This is illustrated in the following 
examples, from Comrie (1985: 120): 
(5.38) a. If you do the shopping for me, I'll give you some money. 
b. If you'll do the shopping for me, I'll give you some money. 
(5.38b), in which the shopping occurs after money has been exchanged, could be 
loosely paraphrased by (5.39) with the same relative temporal ordering: 
(5.39) If you are willing to do the shopping for me, I'll give you some money. 
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In (5.38b) p ('you'll do the shopping for me') and q ('I'll give you some money') fulfil 
all the criteria for temporal subordination, as in (5.38a): p is a sufficient condition of 
q, p and q are temporally related with respect to each other, and both p and q express 
the same kind of condition ('open'). In other words, the procedural information 
encoded by the will in the protasis of (5.38b) is in harmony with the context, but will 
occurs nonetheless. As (5.38a) demonstrates, will could be replaced here with the 
unmarked tense form of do, but (5.38a) and (5.38b) are not synonymous; only (5.38b) 
can be paraphrased by (5.39). This is because of semantic retention, in which the 
conceptual information encoded by will is recovered by the addressee on the basis of 
the principle of relevance. 
Because of the possibility of paraphrasing will in sentences such as (5.38b) with be 
willing to as in (5.39), Coates (1983: 172) characterised will as primarily expressing 
volition. 62 Against this view, Klinge (1993: 344) claims that, when will seems to 
assign volition to the referent of its subject NP, as in (5.40), this is in fact a property 
of the utterance rather than a case of semantic synonymy between will and genuinely 
volitional forms such as be willing to (5.41) or want to (5.42), as the unacceptability 
of (5.43) demonstrates: 
(5.40) 1 will help you. 
(5.41) 1 am willing to help you, but unfortunately I cannot. 
(5.42) 1 want to help you, but unfortunately I cannot. 
(5.43) !I will help you, but unfortunately I cannot. 
[Klinge 1993 (69) to (72)] 
Now, Klinge (1993) claims that any volitional interpretation of an utterance of a 
sentence containing will is inferentially inferred from the utterance interpretation 
context rather than semantically encoded by will. This does not explain why volition 
in particular is so frequently inferred from the use of will, if nothing in the semantics 
of will refers to volition. However, if we claim, as I have done, that will encodes 
conceptual information relating to volition, and that this is only recovered when 
licensed by the principle of relevance, the fact that volition is often, but not always, 
recovered can be explained. Whilst the conceptual information encoded by will is not 
always recovered (although it is `accessed' in the psycholinguistic sense), the 
procedural information it encodes (informally defined as 'prediction', but see §6.1) is. 
The unacceptability of (5.43) arises because the procedural information encoded by 
62 Barense (1980: 51) also treats will as either a future tense, or as "short for some form of 'to be 
willing', " which is not future but rather signals present intention (the 'intentional' reading). 
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will (that the SR [I HELP YOU] is predicted) contradicts the second clause ('I cannot 
help you' in which II HELP YOUJ is not predicted). 
5A Summary 
In chapters 3 and 4I demonstrated that grammatical markers of tense, aspect and 
modality are exponents of procedural encoding at phase two of utterance 
interpretation. They constrain the inferential interpretation of sub-propositional 
conceptual representations of situations and events (SRs) with respect to features of 
the utterance interpretation context, and were termed 'operators'. Given that operators 
are grammatical markers ('grams'), a comprehensive account of their functions and 
distribution must take into account the fact that grams develop from lexical sources 
and may still be developing. That is, the procedural account of operators developed in 
chapter 3 must be compatible with what is known about grammaticization. 
In this section I have demonstrated that a procedural account of grammatical markers 
is compatible with research into grammaticization only if we allow linguistic 
expressions the capacity to encode both conceptual and procedural information. This 
modification, the possibility of which was demonstrated theoretically in §2.1.2 has a 
number of consequences for the relation between grammaticization and the 
conceptual/procedural distinction. 
Because it is a formally gradual process, grammaticization had been viewed as 
semantically gradual also. On this view the onset of grammaticization and the 
subsequent development of an expression from lexical to grammatical are all gradual, 
with semantic changes occurring parallel to formal changes such as phonetic 
reduction and affixation. This view is at odds with the clear-cut binary division of 
linguistically encoded information types into conceptual and procedural. Given the 
model developed in this thesis, we should expect a grammaticizing expression to 
encode both conceptual and procedural information, and that the onset of procedural 
encoding would be instantaneous. This is what Givbn's (1991) study of phonetic 
iconicity (through pause length) with respect to serial-verbs in fact found. The 
characterisation of grammaticization as semantically instantaneous but formally 
gradual also goes some way to explaining the existence of formally lexical verbs with 
clearly grammatical semantic content, such as modal verbs in French, German and 
Spanish. 
In §5.2 1 demonstrated that the conventionalisation of implicature appears to be the 
only sure mechanism of semantic change underlying the onset of procedural encoding 
185 
(i. e. initiating grammaticization). Given that the purpose of procedural encoding is to 
constrain the inferences drawn from utterances, it is unsurprising that the 
conventionalisation of inference should give rise to procedural encoding. 
Finally, the claim that a single expression may be an exponent of both conceptual and 
procedural information predicts the phenomenon of semantic retention. Semantic 
retention is at odds both with polysemous analyses of grams which posit ambiguity 
where there is none, and with monosemous accounts, based on a single underlying 
meaning for each gram, which fail to generate interpretations derived from semantic 
retention. Having disposed of variants of will in complementary syntactic and 
phonological variation with the homophonous grammatical marker, I demonstrated 
that semantic retention results from conceptual information encoded by will being 
made accessible to the addressee. This only occurs when will itself is sufficiently 
salient and co-occurs with appropriate agentive subjects. This may result when will is 
emphasised, as in interrogative clauses, or if the use of will in the protasis of a 
conditional clause is in harmony with the context, in which case the principle of 
relevance predicts that additional contextual effects will be sought. 
In chapter 61 shall analyse will, shall and be going to as exponents of procedural 
encoding at phase two of utterance interpretation (i. e. as operators), but taking into 
account the effects of semantic retention on the interpretations and distribution of 
these expressions. These expressions have been chosen because they represent 
different stages of grammaticization, exhibit semantic retention, and can be readily 
compared since they are all used in the expression of future time reference in English. 
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6 FUTURE EXPRESSIONS IN ENGLISH: will, shall and be going to 
¢,. Q Introduction 
Future time reference in English involves (not exclusively) the modal auxiliaries will 
and, to a lesser extent, shall, and the be going to construction. All three expressions 
are to be characterised as operators: exponents of procedural encoding at phase two of 
utterance interpretation with scope over SRs (although the scope of be going to is 
more restricted than that of the modal auxiliaries). Although procedural encoding is 
central to the semantics of will, shall and be going to, conceptual encoding must also 
be taken into account. Just as the ability of expressions to encode both conceptual and 
procedural information was shown to be central to the analysis of will in relation to 
grammaticization, so a synchronic characterisation of be going to (at least in 
contemporary British English) must make reference to both types of linguistically 
encoded information. 
The conceptual information encoded by will was discussed in §5.3.2, so in this 
chapter I shall focus on the procedural information it encodes. Will can be viewed as 
the pivot of the current chapter; shall and the be going to construction will be 
analysed in comparison with it. Shall is an older gram than will (Bybee 1988: 253), 
which appears to be being displaced by will and which, unlike will, does not exhibit 
semantic retention; be going to, in contrast, is a more recent grammatical construction 
than will, which appears to be increasing in frequency in comparison with will (at 
least in some dialects of English), and exhibits a higher degree of semantic retention 
than will. 
In §6.1 1 discuss the procedural semantics of will in both its future time and non- 
future time uses. In §6.2 shall is characterised in relation to will, and I shall conclude 
by discussing will and the be going to construction. 
t1 mu 
6.1.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I used will as an example of an operator exhibiting semantic 
retention, in the form of overtones associated with its volitional source construction. 
Little was said concerning the procedural information encoded by will, so in this 
section I shall provide an account of the procedural semantics of will. In §6.1.1 I shall 
demonstrate that, unlike can, may, must and should, will does not relate SRs to 
assumptions in the utterance interpretation context, and can therefore be viewed as a 
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semantically atypical modal auxiliary. In §6.1.2 1 shall discuss the relation between 
will and future time reference, and demonstrate that will does not relate SRs in its 
scope to the temporal cognitive domain, although this relation can be inferred from 
the use of will and the utterance interpretation context. ' 
6.1.1 Will and modality 
In line with my previous arguments (§4.1.2 and §5.3) in favour of monosemous 
characterisations of the modals, I shall maintain a monosemous perspective in 
describing the procedural information encoded by will. Although will behaves 
syntactically as a modal auxiliary, semantically it differs significantly from the 
members of this syntactic class discussed in chapter 4. The idea that will is an atypical 
modal auxiliary is not new: 
"it seems that will makes a somewhat different contribution to the 
proposition expressed than the four modals discussed above. This 
intuition is shared by Sweetser (1989) who calls will and shall 
BORDERLINE modals, and is reflected in Ehrman's (1966) basic 
meaning for will, which she gives as: 'the occurrence of the predication 
is guaranteed', which can be interpreted as 'don't worry about the 
evidence, concentrate on the proposition that will modifies'. " 
(Groefsema 1995a: 63) 
This can be illustrated by comparing utterances with will and must. Traditionally, two 
types of 'modal certainty' have been recognised, one based on repeated experience or 
common sense and realised by will, which contrasts with 'logical necessity', based on 
deduction and realised by must (Downing & Locke 1992: 385-6). In fact, will need not 
be restricted to modal certainty based on experience or common sense; compare (6.1) 
and (6.2): 
(6.1) It will be very hot in Djibouti at the moment. 
(6.2) It must be very hot in Djibouti at the moment. 
Spoken in August by a person who has never been to Djibouti but who has access to 
some relevant assumptions (for example that Djibouti is the world's hottest capital 
city and that it is in the northern hemisphere) both (6.1) and (6.2) could be felicitous, 
although (6.2) with must can draw attention to the assumptions or the deductive 
process in a way which (6.1) with will does not. This is expected given that must 
encodes an instruction to treat any SR within its scope as entailed by all the 
assumptions that have a bearing on that SR. However, if I were to talk about the 
temperature in Djibouti whilst reminiscing about the year I spent working there, only 
(6.1) with will would be felicitous, since the proposition expressed would be based 
not on a deduction from relevant assumptions but on induction from prior experience. 
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This suggests that will does not constrain the interpretation of a SR within its scope 
with respect to those assumptions in the utterance interpretation context which 
constitute evidence for the occurrence of the SR. In this respect will differs from can, 
may, must and should. However, what both (6.1) and (6.2) have in common is that the 
SR [IT BE HOT IN DJIBOUTI AT THE MOMENT] is unverified, or irrealis. The relation 
between a SR within the scope of can, may, must and should and the irrealis cognitive 
domain was shown to be inferred, albeit frequently, rather than procedurally encoded 
by these modals; with will, on the other hand, I shall argue that this relation is 
encoded. 
By analogy to figures 7 and 11, will, on these assumptions, could be represented as 
relating a SR to the irrealis domain as in figure 17 below. (The irrealis domain is 
represented as a two-dimensional plane in view of my characterisation of it (§3.2.2) 
as incorporating varying degrees of likelihood of occurrence of events which may be 
either potential or hypothetical. ) 
Figure 17: the function of will 
In relating a SR within its scope to the irrealis domain, will simply indicates that the 
event represented by the SR is unverified or potential. This is procedural information 
of the most general kind; in defending this characterisation of will I shall demonstrate 
that it does not encode any more specific information than this. 
6J-2 Will and temporal reference 
We have already seen how will is unspecified with respect to the relation of SRs to 
assumptions in the utterance interpretation context, by comparing it with must. I shall 
also demonstrate that will is unspecified with respect to the temporal reference of SRs 
within its scope. Will does not encode future time reference; rather, the nature of the 
link between a SR within the scope of will and the temporal cognitive domain is either 
inferred or encoded by some temporal adverbial. Against this atemporal 
characterisation of will (although within a relevance theoretic procedural perspective) 
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Irrealis domain 
Haegeman (1989: 306) argues that will "signals that the hearer should extend the 
immediately accessible (present) context for the processing of the proposition and 
should process the utterance against future propositions. " This account of will as 
encoding procedural information in the form of an instruction to process the 
associated proposition (or in my terminology, the SR within its scope) against a future 
context, is untenable. First, the immediately accessible context is not always the 
present, as the following example, from Haegeman (1989) illustrates: - 
(6.3) You'll wake up the baby. [Haegeman 1989 (34)] - 
As Haegeman (1989: 307) notes, when the addressee is moving about noisily, the 
immediately accessible context for the interpretation of (6.3) is a future one. It is the 
utterance interpretation context rather than any linguistically encoded information in 
(6.3) which specifies the temporal reference of the SR [YOU WAKE UP THE BABY]. 
Secondly, in some uses of will the associated SR is intended to be processed against 
either a present time context (6.4), or is timeless (6.5) or habitual (6.6): 
(6.4) Knock, knock "That'll be the postman. " 
(6.5) Bleach will kill germs. 
(6.6) Tigers will do anything for a tuna fish sandwich. 
Other utterances with will may be processed against a future time context, but this is 
not purely a function of the semantics of will. For example, nothing in (6.7) encodes 
future or present time reference: 
(6.7) She'll be twenty six. 
The intended temporal reference is determined by the utterance interpretation context; 
future in (6.8), present in (6.9): 
(6.8) How old will Alison be next month? 
(6.9) If Alison was born in April 1970, how old is she? 
Although temporal reference constitutes no part of the semantics of will, it is 
nonetheless part of the proposition expressed by utterances containing will; that is, it 
is a pragmatic aspect of what is said, like the temporal and causal relations between 
clauses conjoined by and (see § 1.3.3): 
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(6.9) A If Alison was born in April 1970, how old is she? 
(6.7) B She'll be twenty six. 
(6.10) A What, next April? 
B No. I think she's twenty six now. 
Maintaining a monosemous account, will is clearly not a future tense marker, 
although future time reference is often inferred from utterances of sentences 
containing will. The contribution made by tense in English is simply to distinguish 
between past and unspecified temporal reference. For example, the temporal reference 
of 'John will be working at home' (which is temporally unspecified) depends on the 
context in which it is used, in just the same way that unspecified tense marking alone 
underdetermines temporal reference: 
(6.11) a. There are no lectures today so John is working at home. 
b. There are no lectures next week so John is working at home. 
(6.12) a. There are no lectures today so John will be working at home. 
b. There are no lectures next week so John will be working at home. 
Because modals must be followed by an infinitive, past tense is indicated by the 
infinitive form of the auxiliary have following a modal auxiliary. This analysis is in 
line with McCawley's claim that "all occurrences of the auxiliary have are underlying 
past tenses" (McCawley 1971: 99). So (6.13) and (6.14) locate the SR [JOHN BE 
WORKING AT HOME] at some time prior to the temporal reference point: 
(6.13) John was working at home. 
(6.14) John will have been working at home. 
Given that will encodes procedural information relating a SR within its scope to the 
irrealis cognitive domain rather than to the temporal cognitive domain (i. e. it specifies 
that the situation or event referred to is non-actual and unverified), why is it so often 
used to express future time events? Indeed this appears to be its prototypical use, as 
the classification of will as a 'future tense' in functional studies (e. g. Dahl 1985, 
Bybee et al 1994) and the use of stressed will to suggest future time reference in 
(6.15) suggest: 
(6.9) A If Alison was born in April 1970, how old is she? 
(6.7) B She'll be twenty six. 
(6.15) A What, she will be twenty six? 
b No. I think she's twenty six now. 
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In §3.2.2 1 stated that both the temporal domain and the irrealis domain are involved 
in the representation of future time reference, since a situation or event in the future is 
also logically irrealis, as figure 9, repeated below, illustrates: 
Figure 9: 
past / realis present / realis 
past / irrealis present / irrealis future / irrrali, 
It is to be expected, therefore, that a marker of irreality will be used to refer to 
futurate situations and events in a language with no future tense. 
¢, 2 Will and shall 
62.0 Introduction 
We have seen that the semantics of will makes no reference to the relation of SRs to 
assumptions in the utterance interpretation context (in contrast to can, ma)y, must and 
should) and does not specify temporal reference (so will is not a future tense marker). 
In this section, I shall demonstrate that will is ontologically unspecified with respect 
to the agent-event versus world-event distinction introduced in §3.3.3. In contrast, 
shall constrains the interpretation of SRs within its scope to agent-events. This 
procedural information subsumes a future time interpretation; in §6.2.2 1 shall 
demonstrate that some of the differences in interpretation with shall with first person 
subjects (reflected in the traditional grammatical rule that future time should be 
expressed by shall with first person subjects and by will with others) reflects a partial 
generalisation of shall from being a marker of agent-events (subsuming future time 
reference) to a future time marker. 
62_1 Agent-events and world-events 
In §3.3.3 I demonstrated that the use of the English imperfective (or progressive) 
aspect with future time reference is restricted to the expression of agent-events, that 
is, events brought about by "the motivated production of an activity with the intention 
of bringing a consequent state about" (Klinge, p. c. ): 
(3.73) Mary's having a party next week. 
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By the same token, English imperfective aspect with future reference cannot be used 
to refer to world-events, that is, events which come about simply by virtue of the way 
the world is, independent of any motivated human activity: 
(3.46) ? Mary's having a birthday next week. 
In contrast, unmarked (simple) aspect with future time reference cannot be used to 
express agent-events in which the agent and the subject of the clause are coreferential: 
(3.65) Mary has a birthday next week. 
(3.66) ? Mary has a party next week. 
Klinge (1993) links the agent-event versus world-event distinction to the expression 
of different types of modality (epistemic - concerning knowledge of and belief about 
events and situations; deontic - concerning permission and obligation; and dynamic - 
concerning volition and ability): 
"Deontic land also dynamic) modality is an unverified correspondence 
between a SITUATION REPRESENTATION of ýi WORLD SITUATION Ia 
situation or event in the worlds brought about by an AGEE. N'1'-E": VI.. N'I , 
epistemic modality is an unverified correspondence hetween a 
SITUATION REPRESENTATION and either an obtaining or I... a previous 
WORLD SITUATION or a future WORLD-EVE'. N'I " 
(Klinge 1993: 346) 
The distinction between dein tic and dynamic modality depends can who motivates the 
agent-event; if the agent-event is motivated by the semantic subject of the clause it 
dynamic interpretation is recovered, but if the agent-event is motivated by someone 
other than the semantic subject it deontic interpretation is recovered. 
The fact that will is used in the expression of all three categories of' modality can he 
accounted for by proposing that utterances of' sentences containing ºs ill are 
unspecified between agent-event interpretations and world-event interpretations. 
Inferential enrichment is required to determine what kind of' modality (epistemic, 
deontic or dynamic), if any, an utterance of a sentence containing will is intended to+ 
convey, since will is semantically unspecified with respect to the agent-event versus 
world-event distinction. 
In contrast to will, s/iu// can never receive an epistemie interpretation. This leads 
Klinge (1993) to suggest that, whilst will can he used to refer to either in agent-event 
or a world-event (an 'unspecified-event'), s/aull indicates that a SR within its scope 
represents an agent-event rather than a world-event. So, in (6.16) Cinderella's going to 
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the Ball is dependent on the action either of the speaker (in which case (6.16) is 
interpreted as a promise) or of the addressee (in which case (6.16) is interpreted as a 
command) but can not be interpreted simply as a description of the way the world 
turns out to be: 
(6.16) You shall go to the Ball, Cinderella! 
Similarly in (6.17) the use of shall indicates that the situation described should be 
interpreted as an agent-event (with the additional implication that the agent in 
question is God rather than the meek): 
(6.17) The meek shall inherit the Earth. 
With will in place of shall, both (6.16) and (6.17) could (but need not) be simply 
predictions, that is, intended to be interpreted as world-events; this interpretation is 
not recoverable when shall is used. Thus (6.18) below would be infelicitous if shall 
replaced will: 
(6.18) Will it work? You bet it will! (Mark Goodier, Radio 1,21/3/1991) 
This difference between will and shall manifests itself most obviously in 
interrogatives. Interrogatives with shall in the first person are often interpreted as 
offers or proposals with dynamic or deontic modality, whereas interrogatives in the 
first person with will are often requests for information with epistemic modality: 
(6.19) Shall I visit John? (paraphrased as: 'Do you want me to visit John? ' or 
'Do you think it would be a good idea if I visited John? ') 
(6.20) Shall we visit John? (paraphrased as: 'Would you like us to visit John? ' etc. ) 
(6.21) Will I/we visit John? (paraphrased as: 'Do you know if I/we will visit John? ') 
Similarly, interrogatives in the third person with shall are generally offers or 
suggestions, since the events referred to can only come about as the result of 
motivated human activity (agent-events), whereas interrogatives in the third person 
with will are generally requests for information. For example, Leech (1987: 84) 
suggests (6.22) could be "spoken by a mother offering the services of her daughter to 
a neighbour", whereas (6.23) could not; (given an appropriate context, a volitional 
overtone can arise with will: "Is Gwen willing to do your shopping for you? "): 
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(6.22) Shall Gwen do your shopping for you? (Leech 1987: 84) 
(6.23) Will Gwen do your shopping for you? (Klinge 1993: 349) 
Concerning interrogatives with shall in the second person, little can be said beyond 
the fact that they rarely (if ever) occur; Wekker's (1976) corpus of some 600,000 
words (spoken and written) contained no examples of "Shall you...? " (Wekker 
1976: 58). Interrogatives with will in the second person are often requests or 
commands (referring to agent-events), but can be simply requests for information 
(possibly referring to world-events). 
In summary, shall encodes information that the occurrence of a SR within its scope is 
due to an agent-event. A SR within the scope of shall represents a future situation or 
event, as shall is only ever used in future contexts in contemporary English; this, 
together with the observation that the agent-event versus world-event distinction only 
affects the distribution of English progressive and unspecified aspect with future 
temporal reference, suggests that the agent-event versus world-event distinction only 
operates where there is future time reference. The characterisation of shall as simply 
indicating that a SR within its scope represents an agent-event thereby incorporates 
reference to the future (abstract) cognitive domain. 
6.2.2 Shall 
Shall encodes information that a SR within its scope will be realised as an agent-event. 
Is this information procedural, or can it be characterised in terms of semantic 
retention, i. e., is the agent-event semantics of shall residual conceptual information 
formally encoded by its lexical source expression? In Old English, scal expressed 
obligation or necessity, even when expressing prediction, which as shall it 
increasingly did in Middle English (Oxford English Dictionary 1971: 609.8). Bybee 
(1988: 253) argues that as will developed as a marker of prediction in Modern English, 
it displaced shall from this function, leaving shall as a marker of obligation in all 
persons but as a marker of prediction only with first person subjects. This, she claims, 
shows that the development of will constricted the domain of application of shall but 
did not imbue it with any additional meaning, as only the source meaning of shall and 
meanings derivable from it contribute to the current semantic content of shall. 
However, as examples (6.16) and (6.17) illustrate, shall does not only express 
obligation, but can also be used to express a promise: 
(6.16) You shall go to the ball, Cinderella! 
(6.17) The meek shall inherit the Earth. 
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This suggests that the information encoded by shall has changed from that encoded 
by its source; whether and to what extent this is due to the influence of contrast with 
will is unclear. 
Still to be established is the status of the information encoded by shall: is it 
conceptual or procedural? The information encoded by shall that a SR within its scope 
represents an agent-event is recoverable whenever shall is used with second or third 
person subjects. With first person subjects an agent-event interpretation need not be 
recovered in declarative clauses, hence the acceptability of (6.24), but must be (at 
least in most dialects of contemporary British English) in interrogative clauses, hence 
the unacceptability of (6.25): 
(6.24) I shall be twenty eight next year. 
(6.25) ! Shall I be twenty eight next year? 
There are two hypotheses to account for this anomaly. The first is that shall exhibits 
semantic retention, encoding conceptual information relating to agent-event status 
and procedural information relating a SR in its scope to the future abstract cognitive 
domain. However, this hypothesis fails to explain why semantic retention occurs in 
all declarative clauses apart from some with first person subjects. 
The second hypothesis is that shall encodes procedural information to interpret a SR 
within its scope as representing an agent-event; subsumed by this information is an 
instruction to relate the SR to the future cognitive domain. The lack of an agent-event 
interpretation in some utterances with first person subjects in declarative clauses can 
be explained as evidence of generalisation, "the loss of specific features of meaning 
with the consequent expansion of appropriate contexts of use for a gram" (Bybee et al 
1994: 289), which as we saw in §5.1.2 is a mechanism which derives more general 
lexical meaning from specific lexical expressions, and more general grammatical 
meaning from grams, but does not itself derive grammatical meaning from lexical 
expressions. Generalisation can be described in terms of the loss of one feature of 
meaning, and this can easily be applied to shall: 
shall 
(i) Agent-event: A SR within the scope of shall represents a future situation 
or event brought about by motivated human activity. 
(ii) Future: A SR within the scope of shall represents a future situation 
or event. 
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The reason this generalisation has been initiated with first person subjects in 
declarative clauses may be due to the fact that predictions in the first person often 
refer to agent-events (people have access to their own intentions that they do not have 
to others') with the result that first person declarative clauses with shall become 
generalised as first person predictions. Questions with shall in the first person refer to 
the intentions of others, as (6.19) and (6.20) illustrate (since there is no point in 
questioning one's own intentions, except rhetorically) and therefore have not been 
generalised as first person predictions. 
This suggests that shall encodes procedural information that a SR within its scope 
represents an agent-event, and that this has undergone the first stage of generalisation 
towards expressing future time reference independent of any agent-event 
interpretation. However, there are reasons to expect that this process of generalisation 
will not be completed. In Middle English, according to the OED (1971: 609.8) "the 
future was expressed by either shall or will, the former being much more common. " 
Shall has since been largely displaced by will as a marker of prediction in all persons, 
particularly in North American varieties of English; Poplack & Tagliamonte (1995) 
found only two tokens of shall out of a total of 2,651 futurate clauses in their study of 
the forms used for future temporal reference in three Canadian speech communities. 63 
Decreased frequency of an expression is accompanied by a restriction rather than an 
expansion of appropriate contexts of use, suggesting that the generalisation of shall 
which appears to have been initiated has been curtailed by the development of will, 
and possibly also by that of the more recent be going to construction. 
QI Will and he going to: sconal differences 
6.3.0 Introduction 
In this and the following section I shall compare the two currently most common 
future expressions in English, will and be going to. These exhibit a number of 
differences both in distribution and in interpretation. I shall begin by arguing (against 
Klinge 1993) that be going to is not disqualified from classification as an operator on 
the grounds that its scope differs from that of will and shall then demonstrate that 
differences between will and be going to in respect to their interaction with past-time 
temporal adverbials can be accounted for in terms of their relative scope, rather than 
(as Klinge 1993 claims) semantically. I shall conclude by demonstrating that 
63 The communities studied were North Preston African-Americans, Guysborough African-Americans 
and Guysborough Whites; the two instances of shall came from the Guysborough African-American 
community (total of futurate forms 1,264). 
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differences between will and he going to in respect to their co-occurrence with 
already, which Haegeman (1989) attributes to pragmatic factors, can also be 
accounted for in terms of relative scope. Both discussions shed light on the semantics 
of be going to, which will be taken up in §6.4. 
Both Klinge (1993) which provides an analysis of the English modal auxiliaries, 
briefly mentioning he going to, and Haegeman (1989) which provides a pragmatic 
account of will and he going to, assume a relevance theoretic framework. However, 
Klinge (1993) and Haegeman (1989) differ concerning the status of be going to with 
respect to the conceptual/procedural distinction. Haegeman analyses both be going to 
and will as exponents of procedural encoding; she writes: 
"Be going to ... 
imposes a constraint on the processing of the proposition 
with which it is associated. It signals that this proposition is relevant in a 
context including at least some present tense propositions, or, in other 
words, it guarantees a contextual effect if the utterance is processed 
against a present context. Will, on the other hand, signals that the hearer 
should extend the immediately accessible (present) context for the 
processing of the proposition and should process the utterance against 
future propositions. " 
(Haegeman 1989: 305) 
Klinge (1993) also holds that will is procedural but argues that it, along with all the 
modals, encodes "potentiality" (1993: 323) rather than futurity as the constraint 
imposed on processing (§4.2.1 discusses Klinge's analyses of may and must). In other 
words, the proposition with which will is associated is to be processed as potential 
rather than actual. Since future contexts are logically also potential, Klinge argues (as 
I did in §6.1.2 against Haegeman 1989) that although will is often processed against a 
future context, this is not what it encodes; in other words, futurity is not part of the 
semantics of will, even though will can be used in the expression of future time 
propositions. As for he going to, Klinge (1993: 346) assumes, for reasons to be 
discussed below, that this encodes conceptual information. The differences between 
the characterisations of will and he going to in Haegeman (1989) and Klinge (1993) 
are summarised in figure 18: 
Figure 18: 
Procedural Conceptual 
Klinge (1993) will 'potentiality' he going to 
Ilaegeman (1989) will future context' ' 
he going to resent context' 
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I shall first discuss and reject Klinge's claim that be going, ' toi does not encode 
procedural information, and then demonstrate that one of llaegeman's arguments 
purporting to demonstrate that he going to encodes procedural information instructing 
addressees to process utterances against present time contexts can in fact he 
accounted for as a scopal difference relating to the relative scope of will and he going 
to. 
6.3.1 Be going to as an operator 
The be going to construction exhibits many of the features of grammatical markers 
discussed in §5.1.1. It is semantically bleached, not being restricted, for example, to 
co-occurrence with suhjects capahle of movement towards a goal: 
(6.26) It's going to rain. 
It has a phonetically reduced allomorph, gonna, and exhibits a high degree of 
syntactic rigidity, in that it only takes bare non-finite verbal ccºmplennrnts, in contrast 
to the non-grimm, ºticizcd present progressive furnn cif go with locative to in (0.27a): 
(6.27) a. I'in going to town to see a film. 
b. * 1'111 gonna town to see a film. 
c. I'ii gonna see a film in town. 
Being grammaticized, he going to can he characterised as an operator, that is, as an 
exponent of procedural encoding at phase two with scope over SRs. I lºowever, Klinge 
(1993) characterises the be going to construction as an exponent of conceptual rather 
than procedural information. Klinge's comments on be going to are hrief and are 
repeated below in full: 
"Be going to does not seem to occur where the WORLD SI'I'l1ATION is in 
past time relative to the time cif utterance: 
(6.29) * They are going to have arrived two hours ago. 
Apparently, the explanation is that be going to, like he willing to is part of 
the SITUATION REPRESENTATION, as suggested by the following example 
from Leech (1987: 57): 
(6.29) Call Me It lunch time on Monday - I'll be going to 
speak to the boss about it that afternoon. 
with the structure: 
(6.30) W ILL H BE GOING TO SPEAK TO THE BOSS I" 
(Klinge 1993: 346) 
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Klinge presents two arguments for treating be going to as part of a SR. First, he claims 
that be going to does not occur when the temporal reference of the SR is prior to the 
utterance (6.28), in contrast to will (which he has already established as an operator): 
(6.31) They will have arrived two hours ago. [Klinge 1993 (74)] 
Secondly, Klinge demonstrates in (6.30) that be going to falls within the scope of will 
and must, therefore, be part of a SR. As I noted in §3.2.1, Klinge characterises 
operators and SRs in such a way that an expression can not be both an operator and 
part of a SR, and defines operators as exponents of procedural encoding and SRs as 
exponents of conceptual encoding. Given this characterisation of operators and SRS, 
and the claim that be going to is always part of a SR, it follows that be going to is an 
exponent of conceptual encoding in Klinge's model. 
I shall argue against this claim as follows. I shall begin by reviewing the arguments 
presented in §3.2.1 for defining a SR relative to the operator with immediate scope 
over it, thereby allowing an operator with narrow scope to form part of a SR within 
the scope of a second operator with wider scope than the first. This will allow be 
going to to form part of a SR relative to will, whilst still encoding procedural 
information. I shall conclude by accounting for the unacceptability of (6.28) within 
my framework. 
Klinge (1993) distinguishes between linguistic expressions which encode conceptual 
information and those which encode procedural information as follows: all conceptual 
information is encoded within the 'propositional content' (PC) of an utterance; 
procedural information is encoded in operators with scope over the PC, which is then 
inferentially enriched to give rise to a SR. 
In §3.2.1 1 refined Klinge's definition of a SR to reflect the fact that operators differ 
with respect to their relative scope; in my reformulation a SR need not be derived 
solely from the inferentially enriched PC (contra Klinge 1993: 321). Instead, a SR is 
defined relative to the operator which has immediate scope over it, with the result that 
there are three distinct SRs in (6.32) below, defined relative to the three operators; 
only the innermost SR [MARY WORK] consists purely of conceptual information: 
(6.32) a. Mary will have been working. 
b. WILL [PAST [PROGRESSIVE [SR MARY WORK]]] 
C. WILL [PAST [SR MARY BE WORKING]] 
d. WILL [SR MARY HAVE BEEN WORKING] 
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We can therefore talk of the unique PC encoded by an utterance but not of the unique 
SR (unless only one operator is encoded in the utterance). The PC consists solely of 
linguistically encoded conceptual information, whereas a SR within the scope of a 
given operator, 0, consists of the conceptual information encoded by the PC 
inferentially enriched in line with the procedural information encoded by any other 
operators with narrower scope than 0. 
Given this framework, when be going to falls within the scope of will, it is part of the 
SR over which will has scope (as Klinge 1993 claims), but this does not prevent be 
going to itself from functioning as an operator (and therefore as an exponent of 
procedural encoding) with scope over a further SR: 
(6.30) WILL [I BE GOING TO SPEAK TO THE BOSS] 
(6.30') WILL I BE GOING TO [I SPEAK TO THE BOSS]] 
Klinge's other argument for treating be going to as part of a SR was that whilst will 
can occur when the temporal reference of the SR within its scope is prior to the time 
of utterance, be going to can not: 
(6.28) * They are going to have arrived two hours ago. 
(6.31) They will have arrived two hours ago. 
This observation does not in itself demonstrate that be going to is not an operator, or 
that it cannot encode procedural information; it simply demonstrates that the 
distribution of will and be going to are not co-extensive. In the remainder of this sub- 
section I shall attempt to account for the acceptability of (6.31) and the 
unacceptability of (6.28) within the framework outlined above. 
Temporal adverbials such as two hours ago behave similarly to the manner adverbials 
(seriously, frankly, confidentially) discussed in §2.3.2, in that they sometimes exhibit 
scopal ambiguity. In (6.33) below, the temporal adverbial two hours ago can modify 
either the saying or the being here: 
(6.33) She said she would be here two hours ago. 
When analysing the logical forms of examples such as (6.28) and (6.31) I shall adopt 
a `minimal attachment' approach and incorporate the temporal adverbial within the 
nearest SR, i. e. the last or innermost SR. If this yields a contradictory result, I shall 
incorporate the temporal adverbial within the next SR and so on until no contradiction 
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arises. If an acceptable sentence yields a contradictory result with the temporal 
adverbial modifying all SRs, or if an unacceptable sentence does not result in a 
contradictory logical form, my analysis will have been proved untenable. 
In §3.3 1 characterised tense markers as operators, constraining the manipulation of 
SRs with respect to the temporal cognitive domain; I shall argue here that it is the 
procedural semantics of will and be going to, and the scope of each relative to the 
tense operator which accounts for the acceptability of (6.31) and the unacceptability 
of (6.28). In (6.31), the past64 tense operator encoded in have arrived is within the 
scope of will, rather than having scope over it; the temporal adverbial has been 
minimally attached to the innermost SR (SRI): 
(6.31) a. They will have arrived two hours ago. 
b. WILL [2 PAST [1 THEY ARRIVE TWO HOURS AGO]] 
The PAST operator in (6.31) locates the event [THEY ARRIVE TWO HOURS AGO] in the 
past (it is therefore functionally redundant, but its omission would be incompatible 
with the temporal adverbial phrase), and WILL encodes information to interpret the SR 
within its scope as potential (not explicitly future) rather than verified. 
Turning to (6.28) we see that, unlike will, be going to is within the scope of a tense 
operator encoded in the finite verb form are and has scope over a further SR or SRs: 
(6.28) a. * They are going to have arrived two hours ago. 
b. NON-PAST L3 BE GOING TO [2 PAST [1 THEY ARRIVE TWO HOURS AGO]]] 
Let us assume that be going to functions as some kind of future marker, i. e. it encodes 
information to process the SR within its scope as occurring subsequent to the time set 
up by the tense of the finite form of be (in §6.4 1 shall defend this characterisation of 
the procedural information encoded by be going to). Given this assumption, the SR of 
which be going to is part (SR3) must be temporally prior to SR2; that is, SR3 < SR2. 
64 Klinge (1993: 345) refers to the tense in (6.31a) as the perfect and renders my (6.31b) as his (75): 
(75) WILL [PREVIOUS [THEY ARRIVE TWO HOURS AGO]] 
I have used PAST rather than PREVIOUS because in sentences such as (6.31a) the pasUperfect 
distinction is lost due to the grammatical constraint to follow a modal auxiliary with a non-tensed form. 
Also, if the modal auxiliary were omitted from (6.31 a) the resulting form would be in the past tense (9) 
rather than the perfect (10): 
(9) They arrived two hours ago. 
(10) * They have arrived two hours ago. 
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Now, in (6.28) the outermost (NON-PAST) operator restricts the temporal reference of 
SR3 to a time coreferential with or subsequent to the time of utterance (to): SR3 z to. 
Now, SR2 is located at a time two hours prior to to: to > SR2, which entails that SR3 is 
subsequent to SR2: SR3 > SR2. This gives SR3 < SR2 and SR3 Z to > SR2. Since SR3 
cannot be both prior to and subsequent to SR2, (6.28) is contradictory. This holds 
whether the temporal adverbial [TWO HOURS AGO] is incorporated within SRI, SR2 or 
SR3. 
In contrast, if the tense operator with scope over be going to is PAST, the resulting 
sentence is acceptable: 
(6.34) a. They were going to have arrived two hours ago. 
b. PAST [3 BE GOING TO [2 PAST [I THEY ARRIVE TWO HOURS AGO]]] 
The following temporal relations amongst the SRs are encoded in (6.34): 
Because of the procedural content of be going to, SR3 must be temporally prior to SR2, 
hence SR3 < SR2. 
SR3 is within the scope of a deictic PAST tense operator, hence SR3 < to. 
Because of the temporal adverbial in SRI and the PAST operator with scope over it, 
SRI (and therefore SR2 also) is prior to to, hence SR2 < to. 
These relations are compatible as follows: SR3 < SR2 < to, hence (6.32) ought to be 
acceptable, which it is. 
The most natural interpretation of (6.34) would be that the subject of the clause did 
not in fact arrive two hours ago, whereas (6.31), with will, suggests that they did 
arrive two hours ago (although this is not known for certain). Relevance theory 
accounts for this through the principle of relevance: "Every act of ostensive 
communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance"(S&W 
1986: 158), where optimal relevance is defined as adequate contextual effects for 
minimum processing effort. The most economical way of stating that they did not 
arrive two hours ago is to say just that; however, the most economical way of stating 
that they were expected to arrive, had planned to arrive, etc. two hours ago, but didn't, 
might be to utter (6.34a). 65 
65 There is an alternative reading of (6.34a) for some people, in which the potential for, or expectation 
of, the SR [THEY HAVE ARRIVED], rather than the SR itself, is located two hours prior to the utterance. 
In this reading, the temporal adverbial [TWO HOURS AGO] modifies SR3. This is represented in (11) 
below with an accompanying paraphrase: 
(l 1) PAST [g BE GOING TO TWO HOURS AGO [2 PAST [I THEY ARRIVE]]] 
Two hours ago, they were going to have arrived. 
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In summary, I first demonstrated that although will has wider scope than be going to 
this does not bar be going to from functioning as an operator in its own right; be 
going to is an operator with narrower scope than will and can contribute to a SR 
within the scope of will. I then demonstrated that the contrast between the 
unacceptability of (6.28) with be going to and the acceptability of (6.31) with will, 
which Klinge (1993) attributed to semantic differences between be going to and will 
with respect to the conceptual/procedural distinction, could be accounted for in terms 
of relative scope. In discussing these examples, I assumed that be going to encodes 
procedural information to process the SR immediately within its scope as subsequent 
to the SR to which be going to itself contributes. In contrast, will encodes procedural 
information concerning atemporal potentiality, hence the acceptability of (6.5) with 
will but not of (6.35) with be going to: 
(6.5) Bleach will kill gems. 
(6.35) ? Bleach is going to kill germs. 
6.3.2 Co-occurrence restrictions with already 
To conclude this section, I shall demonstrate that scopal, as opposed to pragmatic, 
differences between will and be going to contribute to the different co-occurrence 
patterns of will and be going to with the temporal adverbial already. These co- 
occurrence patterns also shed more light on the semantics of be going to. 
Haegeman (1989) claims that will encodes procedural information to process an 
associated utterance against a future context, whilst be going to encodes procedural 
information to process an associated utterance against a context including at least 
some present tense assumptions. In §6.1.2 I demonstrated the untenability of 
Haegeman's characterisation of will, and in this section I shall demonstrate that one of 
the arguments purporting to support the above characterisation of be going to does not 
in fact do so. 
According to Haegeman (1989) the differences between will and be going to are 
pragmatic; they impose constraints on the construction of utterance interpretation 
contexts. Haegeman (1989: 296) proposes that the contrast between will and be going 
to might be clarified by looking at their co-occurrence with already, which, she 
claims, also "imposes 'pragmatic' constraints on processing. " Specifically, Haegeman 
(1989: 296) claims: 
1) that already relates events or states to other events in the immediate (i. e. present) 
context rather than to a point in time (at least where present time is concerned). 
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2) that already therefore occurs with be going to rather than with will, since be going 
to guarantees adequate contextual effects from a proposition if it is related to a present 
context. 
Now, in §1.3.3 I illustrated how the term `pragmatic' can be used to mean either 
inferred (as opposed to encoded), or non-truth-conditional, and how these definitions 
need not be coextensive. Since the differences discussed in Haegeman (1989) are 
differences between two linguistically encoded expressions, `pragmatic' can only be 
being used to mean non-truth-conditional. However, already is not `pragmatic' in the 
sense of non-truth-conditional; already indicates that a situation holds not only at the 
temporal reference point (for example, five p. m. ) but also prior to then: 
(6.36) a. I was here at five p. m. and not before five p. m. 
b. *I was already here at five p. m. and not before five p. m. 66 
This information is truth-conditional, that is, it contributes to the proposition 
expressed. (Example (6.36) also illustrates that already can relate situations to points 
in past time (five p. m. ) and does not have to relate them to other events when the 
temporal reference is past. ) 
Against Haegeman's second claim, that already occurs with be going to rather than 
with will, consider the following examples: 
(6.37) He's already going to visit John. 
(6.38) * He'll already visit John. 
(6.39) He'll already be visiting John. 
(6.38) only differs from (6.39) in that the SR I HE VISIT JOHN] is within the scope of a 
PROGRESSIVE operator in (6.39). (6.38) is unacceptable because already can only co- 
occur with a SR with progressive or perfect aspect since already imposes constraints 
on the temporal reference of states, or situations, rather than events - ongoing with 
progressive aspect or resultant with perfect aspect (cf. Michaelis 1996). In the logical 
forms below, ALREADY has been represented in the same way as the temporal 
adverbial TWO HOURS AGO which is also truth-conditional. However, bearing in mind 
that already is restricted to co-occurrence with states rather than events, it has been 
incorporated into the innermost SR having PROGRESSIVE aspect (except in the 
unacceptable (6.38) where there is only one SR): 
66 1 am grateful to Vladimir Zcgarac for these examples. 
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(6.37) a. He's already going to visit John. 
b. NON-PAST [HE BE GOING TO VISIT JOHN ALREADY] 
c. NON-PAST [2 BE GOING TO ALREADY [I HE VISIT JOHN]] 
(6.38) a. * He'll already visit John. 
b. WILL [I HE VISIT JOHN ALREADY] 
(6.39) a. He'll already be visiting John. 
b. WILL [HE BE VISITING JOHN ALREADY] 
C. WILL 12 PROGRESSIVE ALREADY II HE VISIT JOHN]] 
In (6.37), ALREADY can not be constraining the temporal reference of the event 
represented by SRI, since this is not a state; it must therefore be interacting directly 
with SR2, containing BE GOING TO, which must therefore be a representation of a state 
rather than an event. ALREADY indicates that the situation described by SR2 holds at 
and prior to to, and the procedural semantics of BE GOING TO locates SR2 prior to SRI. 
(6.37) is acceptable because these temporal relations (represented as follows) are 
compatible: SR2 S to < SRI. 
In (6.39), WILL has scope over the SR containing ALREADY, indicating that this 
represents a potential situation (either in the present or in the future). Because of the 
semantics of ALREADY, SR2 holds at and prior to the temporal reference set up, for 
example, by an accompanying temporal adverbial phrase such as "when you try to 
phone him". 
To summarise, the different co-occurrence patterns of will and be going to with 
already do not demonstrate, as Haegeman (1989) claims they do, that will and be 
going to are only pragmatically (i. e. non-truth-conditionally) distinct. The logical 
forms above show that ALREADY combines with SRs representing situations or states. 
WILL does not contribute to a SR as modal auxiliaries in English are the outermost 
operators, and so ALREADY falls within the scope of WILL. BE GOING TO, on the other 
hand, does contribute to SRs containing ALREADY; this demonstrates that be going to, 
as well as encoding procedural information relating to future time reference (as the 
analysis of (6.28) and (6.31) illustrated), can also represent an ongoing state. This is 
not surprising given that the be going to construction is derived from the progressive 
form of the verb go plus the allative marker to. In §6.4 I shall examine the semantics 
of be going to in terms of the conceptual/procedural distinction. 
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6A Will and be going to: semantic differences 
6.4.0 Introduction 
In this section I shall begin by providing a justification for the characterisation of be 
going to, assumed in §6.3, as encoding procedural information relating SRs to the 
future (abstract) cognitive domain. I shall then discuss differences in distribution and 
interpretation between will and be going to which cannot be accounted for purely in 
terms of differences between their relative scope, and suggest that these differences 
arise when be going to exhibits semantic retention. I shall conclude by specifying the 
conceptual semantic content encoded by be going to. 
6.4.1 Procedural information encoded by be going to: a justification 
The previous section demonstrated that be . going to can be analysed as an operator, 
that is, as an exponent of procedural encoding at phase two of utterance interpretation 
with scope over SRs. I assumed that the procedural information encoded by be going 
to concerned futurity, or (strictly) ulterior time reference, that is, future time relative 
to some temporal reference point (R) which need not be the time of utterance (to). In 
other words, a SR within the scope of be going to (SRI) must be related temporally to 
a time subsequent to that of the SR containing be going to (SR2); that is: 
OPERATOR [SR2 BE GOING TO [SRI ... 
]] where SR2 < SRI. 
The temporal reference (R) of SR2 may be indicated by a temporal adverbial, such as 
`two hours ago', or may be inferred, the inference being constrained by a temporal or 
modal operator with scope over SR2, such as the past tense form of be. 
This characterisation of be going to as a future time marker arises from the following 
considerations. First, it has been noted (Fries 1927, Ultan 1978, Bybee et al 1991: 18, 
Bybee et al 1994: 244) that, cross-linguistically, future grams typically develop from 
movement verbs, from lexical constructions expressing obligation, desire, and ability, 
and, less commonly, from temporal adverbs. Whilst shall has evolved from a lexical 
source encoding obligation, the be going to construction has evolved from a 
movement verb, go. Secondly, Bybee et al (1994: 11) observe that future grams 
typically develop from constructions with imperfective rather than perfective or past 
marking (encoded in the be going to construction by be +ing) and from constructions 
incorporating an allative component (here encoded by the preposition 1o). 67 Since 
67 The relation between allatives and future time reference can be illustrated by comparing allative to 
with the gerundive -ing: 
(12) a. You must remember to lock the door. 
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movement verbs are also a common source of pasts and progressives, Bybee et al 
(1991: 30) suggest that movement alone is not sufficient to give rise to future grams; 
imperfectivity and allativity are also required. It is therefore the combination of 
movement verbs plus imperfective marking and an allative component, rather than 
movement verbs alone, that gives rise to future grams; hence, the semantic content of 
the entire pre-grammaticized be going to construction contributes to the procedural 
semantics of the resulting operator. 
Given that the be going to construction exhibits the formal features of 
grammaticization and is derived from the imperfective form of a movement verb with 
an allative complement, we would expect it to encode procedural information relating 
to future time reference. In support of this characterisation is the fact that in §6.3.1 the 
analysis of be going to as an operator encoding future time reference allowed us to 
account for the unacceptability of (6.28) in contrast to the acceptable (6.31): 
(6.28) * They are going to have arrived two hours ago. 
(6.31) They will have arrived two hours ago. 
Similarly, we would expect that if be going to encodes procedural information 
constraining the interpretation of SRs with respect to future temporal reference, it 
might be interchangeable with will with future time interpretation; and this is the case: 
(6.40) a. Hurry up! We're going to be late! 
b. Hurry up! We'll be late! 
(6.41) a. The world's oil supply is going to run out one day. 
b. The world's oil supply will run out one day. 
Whilst be going to and will can be used interchangeably in the above examples, some 
peripheral contrasts in interpretation may be observed; that is, various `overtones' 
associated with the use of will or be going to can be recovered, if licensed by the 
utterance interpretation context. For example, McIntosh (1966: 307-309) suggests that 
examples such as (6.40a) stress 'present orientation', for example that the addressee is 
dawdling at the moment, whereas (6.40b) stresses the contingent nature of the future 
event, i. e. something can still be done to avoid being late; examples like (6.41a) 
b. You must remember locking the door. 
In (12a) the event YOU LOCK THE DOOR is envisaged subsequent to the time of utterance, whilst in 
(12b) this event is envisaged prior to the time of utterance. I am grateful to David Adger for bringing 
this distinction to my attention. 
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would, according to McIntosh (1966) emphasise the inevitability of the world's oil 
supply running out, whereas (6.41b) would emphasise the fact that this event is still a 
long way off. However, speakers are not always interested in conveying these 
additional overtones, and in such cases it would not be worth the addressee 
recovering them since optimal relevance would be achieved simply by recovering a 
proposition along the lines of "at some future time, x". 
The possible differences in interpretation between the minimal pairs with be going to 
and will in examples (6.40) and (6.41), are very subtle, and some speakers of English 
fail to make these distinctions at all. Below, I shall look at further minimal pairs in 
which differences in interpretation and distribution between be going to and will with 
future time reference are clearer. I shall continue to describe these differences as 
arising from `overtones' associated with will or be going to, since `overtone' is a 
theoretically neutral term. In the following discussion, I shall determine whether these 
overtones, which I shall argue are the result of semantic retention in the case of be 
going to, are truth-conditional or not, and whether they are explicatures or 
implicatures. 
6.4.2 A descriptive characterisation of be going to 
In this section, I shall illustrate some of the overtones associated with utterances of 
sentences containing be going to in contrast to will. The use of be going to in various 
contexts can suggest prior intention, inevitability or imminence; the following 
minimal pairs illustrate these three overtones associated with be going to. 
Prior intention68 
If an affirmative response to a request contains will, intention subsequent to the 
request is suggested; if the response contains be going to intention prior to the request 
is suggested, as the following minimal pair demonstrates: 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.42) a. I'm going to visit him. 
b. I'll visit him. 
Intention to visit John originating prior to the request is indicated in (6.42a), that is, 
the speaker of (6.42a) was already intending to visit John at the time of the request; 
(6.42b), on the other hand, indicates intention to visit John originating subsequent to 
68 Also termed "intention with forethought" (Coates 1983: 200), "present decision or intention" 
(Palmer 1979: 122) and "future culmination of present intention" (Leech 1987: 59). 
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the request, that is, the speaker of (6.42b) had not been intending to visit John but 
decides to on being asked. 
The difference between intention prior to a request (associated with be going to) and 
intention subsequent to a request (associated with will) also affects the interpretation 
of interrogatives. Interrogatives in the second person with will are often requests 
(6.43) or orders (6.44) (see §5.3.2), but such interrogatives with be going to are more 
often questions about the addressee's prior intentions (6.45): 
(6.43) Will you do the washing up for me, please? 
(6.44) Will you please stop making that awful noise! 
(6.45) Are you going to do the washing up, or am I? 
The final sets of minimal pairs illustrate the effect of the overtone of prior intention 
on the acceptability of be going to in certain contexts. In the following situations, 
only (6.46) and (6.48) are acceptable as it is impossible to intend to answer a 
telephone before it rings, or to intend definitely to ask for help before help is needed: 
Telephone: 'Rrring, Rrring' (immediately): 
(6.46) I'll get it! 
(6.47) ? I'm going to get it! 
(6.48) I promise I'll ask you if I need help. 
(6.49) ?I promise I'm going to ask you if I need help. 
Inevitability69 
Inevitability is suggested in (6.50a) with be going to in contrast to contingency in 
(6.50b) with will: 
(6.50) a. Don't go near that parcel! It's going to explode! 
b. Don't go near that parcel! It will explode! 
(6.50a) suggests that the parcel is going to explode whether anyone goes near it or 
not, whereas (6.50b) suggests that the parcel will explode only if someone goes near 
it. 
69 Inevitability is often connected in the literature with the notion of "future culmination of present 
cause" (Leech 1987: 59). Palmer (1979: 123) explicitly links the two when he says: "Often there is a 
sense of inevitability - the train of events is already in motion. " This is not a necessary connection 
however; be going to can be used to stress the inevitability of future events without explicit reference 
to their present-orientation, as in (6.41a) above: 'The world's oil supply is going to run out one day'. 
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Because of the contingent nature of many will constructions, will rather than be going 
to is generally found in the apodosis of conditional sentences. 70 Be going to can be 
used in the protasis of conditional clauses where, as Palmer (1979: 124) notes, it 
contrasts with the unmarked form: 
(6.51) If she stays more than one night, she can have my room. 
(6.52) If she's going to stay more than one night, she can have my room. 
In (6.51) her having the room is dependent on and subsequent to her staying more 
than one night, which is contingent; in (6.52) her staying more than one night is 
inevitable, or at least confidently envisaged. Be going to can also be used in the 
protasis of a conditional clause to indicate the continuation of events, as well as the 
planned nature of events as in (6.52); (6.53) indicates that running around is already 
in progress and likely to continue: 
(6.53) If you're going to run around like that, do it outside! 
Imminence7I 
Generally, if events are not imminent, and especially if they are envisaged subsequent 
to another future event, e. g. "After they build new houses... ", will is used: 
(6.54) After they build new houses here, they'll have to widen the roads 
and put up gas stations, and pretty soon the whole area will just 
beabigstrip. 
(Watterson 1988 Something Under the Bed is Drooling p. 99) 
But will, being modal, cannot be used for 'future in the future' as no modal verb can 
follow another verb, so 'future in the future' takes the form: "... will be going to... ". 
In the examples below, imminence is suggested in (6.55a) but not necessarily in 
(6.55b). Whereas (6.55b) is what Binnick (1972: 7) terms 'elliptical' (that is, it is 
incomplete as it stands) unless qualified in some way ("... if I eat any more ice-cream", 
"... after an hour on a coach"), (6.55a) is not 'elliptical' because being sick is envisaged 
as inevitable and imminent: 
70 This observation is corroborated by data from all three corpora in Poplack & Tagliamonte (1995) 
which show will occurring in over 60% of main clauses of conditional sentences. 
71 Also referred to as "immediate future with no current activity" (Palmer 1979: 122) and "a time 
immediately subsequent to the moment of speaking" (Coates 1983: 204). 
(6.55) a. I'm going to be sick! 
b. I'!! be sick! 
The idea of imminence is often associated, as in (6.55a), with the overtone of 
inevitability (indeed Leech (1987: 60) subsumes imminence and inevitability under 
'current activity leading to a future event'), and also with the overtone of prior 
intention; for example, Palmer's (1979: 122) example of "immediate future with no 
current activity": 
(6.56) What are you going to play us? 
conveys the overtone of prior intention, paraphrased as, 'What have you planned to 
play us? '. Nonetheless, I shall include imminence as a separate category because, as 
McIntosh (1966: 306) states: 
"Distinctions between present- and future-orientation are often of no 
great importance;... But more generally critical is the choice of G- 
constructions [forms of be going to], other things being equal, for the 
expression of something imminent: She's going to faint. " 
There is, however, considerable variation amongst speakers over the accessibility of 
the overtone of imminence associated with he going to. Poplack & Tagliamonte 
(1995) found that he going to was favoured for immediate future reference (defined as 
events, processes and states understood - on the basis of contextual information such 
as adverbial specification - to have occurred between ten seconds and one hour after 
the utterance) in one of their three corpora ("Guysborough Whites"). In this corpus, 
be going to occurred 44% of the time in imminent contexts but only 18% of the time 
elsewhere, whereas the other two corpora demonstrated no preference for be going to 
in imminent contexts (in line with Myhill 1994). Whilst these findings do not 
demonstrate that be going to encodes imminence for Guysborough Whites, they do 
indicate a positive functional correlation between imminence and the use of be going 
to in this speech community. This provides a counterexample to the findings of Bybee 
et al (1994) - for whom grammatical categories are functionally determined72 - when 
they write: 
"The most common sources of immediate futures in our database are 
verbs meaning `come to'; `go to' sources do not yield immediate 
futures in our data. " 
(Bybee et a! 1994: 280) 
72 For example, will is classified as a future gram because of its high correlation with future contexts, 
although, as I demonstrated in §6.1.2, will is not a future tense marker. 
212 
Summary 
3 
i 
Three overtones associated with the use of be going to have been illustrated: prior 
intention (6.42a), inevitability (6.50a), and imminence (6.55a). 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.42) a. I'm going to visit him. 
(6.50) a. Don't go near that parcel! It's going to explode! 
(6.55) a. I'm going to be sick! 
The theoretical status of these overtones has yet to be established; in the following 
section I shall determine whether these overtones are truth-conditional or not, and 
whether they are explicatures or implicatures. 
6.4.3 The pragmatics of he going to 
In this section I shall determine the theoretical status of the different overtones 
typically associated with utterances of sentences containing be going to (prior as 
opposed to subsequent intention, inevitability as opposed to contingency, and 
imminence). In terms of their logical semantic/pragmatic status, are the overtones part 
of 'what is literally said', i. e. do they contribute to the truth-conditions of the 
associated utterance, or are they non-truth-conditional? And from the linguistic 
semantic/pragmatic point of view, in which 'semantic' is defined as encoded and 
'pragmatic' as inferred (this is the usage adopted here), are the overtones part of the 
explicit content of utterances, or are they implicatures? I shall address these questions 
in turn. 
First, are the overtones associated with certain utterances containing be going to truth. 
conditional, that is, do they contribute to the proposition expressed? Consider the 
following examples: 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.57) ? I'm going to visit him but I wasn't intending to. 
(6.58) Don't go near that parcel! It's going to explode! 
? But if you keep well clear it won't explode. 
(6.55) a. I'm going to be sick! 
(6.59) If he's going to be sick, we'd better stop the car right now. 
In (6.57) and (6.58), cancellation of the overtones of prior intention in (6.57) and 
inevitability in (6.58), leads to a sense of contradiction, suggesting that prior intention 
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and inevitability are part of the propositions expressed by utterances of (6.57) and 
(6.58). In (6.59), the overtone of imminence can enter into a relationship of 
entailment, suggesting that this also is part of the proposition expressed rather than a 
non-truth-conditional implicature. The conclusion 'we'd better stop the car right now' 
only follows from 'he's going to be sick' if his being sick is an imminent event rather 
than an event expected at some unspecified time in the future. 
The fact that these overtones contribute to the propositions expressed in the above 
examples, does not entail that they are encoded. As already noted, relevance theory 
recognises pragmatic aspects of what is said (truth-conditional content). The second 
question to be answered, therefore, is whether the overtones associated with certain 
utterances containing be going to are encoded by be going to or inferred. 
If they are directly encoded, then be going to must be polysemous, given that not all 
of the overtones are recovered in every utterance, as the examples above illustrate. 
However, there are significant problems associated with a polysemous account. To 
begin with, it is not clear what the basic meanings of be going to would be. For 
example, Coates (1983: 198-204) distinguishes between root and epistemic 
"meanings", whilst Leech (1971: 54) distinguishes "between two meanings [of be 
going to], the FUTURE CULMINATION OF PRESENT INTENTION and the FUTURE 
CULMINATION OF PRESENT CAUSE. " Even if two meanings could be distinguished, 
there is still the problem of accounting for utterances in which none of the overtones 
are evident (suggesting a further meaning of be going to, that of pure future). 
There is also the problem of how to account for utterances like (6.60) which can be 
interpreted in more than one way, as evidenced by the possible responses (6.61) to 
(6.63): The interlocutors A and B are expecting visitors for a meal; B is standing in 
the kitchen filling a kettle; A enters: 
(6.60) A: Are you going to make a pot of tea? 
(6.61) B: No, I'm going to boil some water for the potatoes. 
(6.62) B: No, I'll wait / I'm going to wait until the guests have arrived. 
(6.63) B: Yes, when the guests arrive. 
In (6.61) B has interpreted A's question as referring primarily to the current activity 
(filling the kettle), and the response is intended to be interpreted likewise, as a 
reference to the current activity; B's intention to make a pot of tea is neither denied 
nor affirmed, despite the answer, 'No... '. In (6.62) B has interpreted A's question as 
referring to the imminence or otherwise of making a pot of tea so the response 'No... ' 
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denies that a pot of tea is on the point of being made, although the remainder of (6.62) 
affirms that B intends making one; nothing is said concerning the current activity. In 
(6.63) B has interpreted A's question as referring to B's intentions; the current activity 
is incidental and nothing is said concerning it. If (6.60) were genuinely ambiguous the 
speaker (A) would have intended to communicate one specific proposition which the 
addressee (B) could be expected to recover, and only one of the responses above 
would be felicitous. As it is, any of the responses (6.61) to (6.63) is felicitous given 
an appropriate interpretation of (6.60); this suggests that (6.60) encodes a single 
logical form which the addressee can enrich in such a way as to license an optimally 
relevant response. 
If (6.60) encodes a single logical form, be going to must be monosemous and 
therefore the specific interpretations of (6.60) - reflected in the responses (6.61) to 
(6.63) - arise from (6.60) being inferentially enriched in different ways. The overtones 
of prior intention, inevitability and imminence cannot, therefore, be directly encoded 
by be going to. But neither can the overtones of prior intention and inevitability be 
purely inferred, given that they arise with utterances containing be going to but not 
will: 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.42) a. I'm going to visit him. 
b. I'll visit him. 
(6.50) a. Don't go near that parcel! It's going to explode! 
b. Don't go near that parcel! It will explode! 
Imminence, however, can arise as an overtone of an utterance containing will. 
Imminence is conveyed in (6.46); will is felicitous but be going to in (6.47) is not, 
because the use of be going to could suggest an intention to answer the phone prior to 
it ringing, which is impossible: 
Telephone: Rrring, Rrring' (immediately): 
(6.46) I'll get it. 
(6.47) ? I'm going to get it. 
Also, the overtone of imminence can be easily cancelled even where prior intention or 
inevitability cannot; in Palmer's (1979: 122) example of "immediate future with no 
current activity", (6.56), the assumption that the addressee has already decided what 
to play can be recovered whether (6.56) is uttered a month prior to a concert or when 
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the addressee is seated at the piano and about to begin to play. The overtone of 
imminence is only recoverable given the latter context, and even then can be 
cancelled, as (6.64) illustrates: 
(6.56) What are you going to play us? 
(6.64) Some Chopin, but first I'd like to say a few words... 
Similarly, inevitability is suggested whether (6.65) below is uttered by someone 
reading a long-term weather forecast or by someone who can already see clouds 
gathering; imminence is only suggested in the latter scenario: 
(6.65) It's going to rain. 
These considerations indicate that any suggestion of imminence can be inferred from 
the utterance interpretation context alone, whereas the overtones of prior intention and 
inevitability, whilst not directly encoded by be going to, are also not purely inferred. 
This entails that prior intention and inevitability, being derived from a combination of 
information encoded in be going to and inference, are explicatures of utterances in 
which they arise, where "an explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and 
contextually inferred conceptual features" (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 182). Imminence, 
however, is simply inferred from the utterance interpretation context and is therefore 
an implicature of the utterances in which it is recovered. 
Postscript: the pragmatics of will 
The ideas of intention subsequent to a request and contingency often associated with 
will (in contrast to prior intention and inevitability associated with be going to) are 
always cancellable, suggesting that these are implicatures rather than explicatures: 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.66) I'll visit him, in fact I was already intending to. 
(6.67) a. It's going to explode whether anyone goes near it or not. 
b. It will explode whether anyone goes near it or not. 
If these overtones are not explicit, that is, not derived from a logical form containing 
will, why do they typically arise from utterances of sentences containing will rather 
than any other form? The answer lies in the principle of relevance. Will with future 
reference contrasts with be going to (among other future expressions), and an 
addressee, aware that a speaker has a choice of various forms for the expression of 
futurity in English, assumes that the choice of will is motivated by some 
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communicative purpose. Specifically, a speaker who does not want an addressee to 
recover any of the overtones which can be inferred from an utterance of a sentence 
containing be going to (or some other form) may use will. Thus, by inference alone, 
an addressee may recover intention subsequent to, rather than prior to, a request, or 
contingency in contrast to inevitability, depending on the utterance interpretation 
context. In this way, adequate contextual effects are achieved, and the additional 
inferential processing entailed is offset by the frequency of mention of will over all 
other future expressions. 73 What maintains the integrity of will, or indeed of any 
linguistic sign, is its common core of (often semantically underdetermined) meaning 
plus "the opposition between that sign and other signs with related but contrasting 
meanings" (Contini-Morava 1989: 39) including, in the case of will, other modal 
auxiliaries and be going to. 
6.4.4 The conceptual semantic content of he going to 
When be going to is used, the overtones discussed above are not always recovered (as 
opposed to activated) by an addressee, whereas future time reference is. At the end of 
§5.3.2 I demonstrated, with respect to will, that the procedural information encoded 
by a gram is always recovered by the addressee (since being procedural it can only 
reduce processing effort). Any conceptual information also encoded (through 
semantic retention) is only recovered if this results in adequate contextual effects, 
thereby justifying the additional processing effort involved in recovering and 
enriching the additional conceptual information. This suggests that whilst future time 
reference is procedurally encoded by be going to (as I argued in §6.4.1), the overtones 
of prior intention and inevitability might result from semantic retention. If the 
overtones do in fact arise as a result of semantic retention, the conceptual semantic 
content of be going to must be specified; this is the task of the current section. 
An account of the conceptual information encoded by be going to must fulfil the 
following three criteria. First, the conceptual semantics of be going to must be 
compatible with the semantics of the lexical source construction, since the conceptual 
information encoded by be going to results from semantic retention, whereby "certain 
more specific semantic nuances of the source construction can be retained in certain 
contexts long after grammaticization has begun. " (Bybee et al 1994: 16) Second, it 
must be characterised as a state, rather than as an event, as the co-occurrence of be 
going to with already (which imposes constraints on the temporal reference of 
ongoing or resultant states rather than events) demonstrated (see §6.3.2). Finally, the 
73 The Survey of English Usage (University College London 1960) cited in Haegeman (1983: 15) 
recorded 2,668 occurrences of will compared with 539 of be going to. 
217 
conceptual semantic content of be going to must be capable of being inferentially 
enriched to give rise to the overtones of prior intention and inevitability. 
Let us take the first criterion, compatibility with the semantics of the lexical source 
construction. In §5.2.3 1 suggested that generalisation was involved in the early 
semantic development of be going to, prior to actual grammaticization (through 
inference, that is, the conventionalisation of implicature). Generalisation involves the 
loss of one feature of the meaning of an expression, in this case the notion of physical 
movement: 
be going to 
(i) physical progression the subject is in the process of progressing 
towards a physical goal. 
(ii) general progression the subject is in the process of progressing 
towards a goal. 
The goal towards which the subject is progressing is a physical location in (i) and the 
realisation of a further situation or event in (ii). If the subject is in the process of 
progressing towards the realisation of a further situation or event, the subsequent 
realisation of that situation or event is implied. The grammaticization of be going to 
as an operator encoding future time reference can then be easily achieved through the 
conventionalisation of this implicature. 
The second criterion, that the conceptual semantics of be going to must be 
characterised as a state, has been fulfilled. The state of being in the process of 
progressing towards the realisation of a subsequent situation or event is a state having 
the potential for the subsequent realisation of that event; this simplification gives rise 
to the following paraphrase of the conceptual semantics of be going to: 
A SR, SR2, containing both a form of be going to and an embedded SR, 
SRI, (i. e. OPERATOR 12 BE GOING TO [I ... ]]) is a representation of a state having the potential for the subsequent realisation of SRI. 
With this definition of the semantics of be going to, it is possible to account for the 
overtones of prior intention and inevitability, thereby fulfilling the third criterion. 
Prior intention is conveyed by the use of be going to in (6.42a): 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.42) a. I'm going to visit him. 
b. I'll visit him. 
These can be represented as the following logical forms: 
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(6.68) a. NON-PAST [2 BE GOING TO [i I VISIT HIM]] 
b. WILL [I I VISIT HIM] 
In (6.68a) SR2 represents a state with the potential for the subsequent realisation of 
SRI. In (6.68b) SRI only became a potential event once (6.42b) had been uttered; but 
in (6.68a) the potential for subsequent realisation of the event [I VISIT HIM] is stated as 
currently existing, in this case inferred to be a prior intention. The contrast between be 
going to and will on this interpretation is illustrated in (6.69) below: 
(6.69) 1 wasn't going to (visit him) but I will (visit him) if you like. 
PAST [3 NOT [2 BE GOING TO [1 I VISIT HIM]] but WILL [1 I VISIT HIM] ... 
(6.69) can be paraphrased as follows: in the past there was no potential for the 
situation [I VISIT HIM] to be subsequently reälised, but now (that I have been asked) [I 
VISIT HIM] is a potential situation. 
Similarly, the overtone of inevitability conveyed by (6.50a) arises out of the fact that 
be going to indicates that the potential for the subsequent realisation of the event [IT 
EXPLODE] is current and actual: 
(6.50) a. Don't go near it! It's going to explode! 
NON-PAST [2 BE GOING TO [1 IT EXPLODE]] 
SR2 is a state having the potential for the subsequent realisation of SRI; from this, and 
the utterance interpretation context, the overtone of inevitability can be inferred. 
U Summary 
In this chapter, will, shall and be going to were all characterised as exponents of 
procedural encoding at phase two, with scope over SRs. Although these three forms 
are all used to express future time reference, the procedural information encoded by 
each is distinct. This reflects their differing lexical sources, which also determine any 
conceptual semantic content also encoded. The semantic and scopal differences 
between will, shall and be going to are reflected in the differences in distribution and 
interpretation amongst them which I have discussed. Below, I shall review my 
analyses of will, shall and be going to in turn. 
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Will encodes information relating SRs in its scope to the irrealis cognitive domain; 
that is, it indicates that any SR in its scope is to be entertained as unverified, or 
potential. The temporal reference of a SR within the scope of will must either be 
specified adverbially or inferred from the utterance interpretation context, since 
temporal reference constitutes no part of the semantics of will: 
(6.8) How old will Alison be next month? 
(6.9) If Alison was born in April 1970, how old is she? 
(6.7) She'll be twenty six. 
With certain utterances of will, especially in interrogative and conditional clauses, 
volitional overtones may arise: 
(6.70) Will you do the shopping? 
(6.71) If you'll do the shopping for me, I'll give you some money. 
In chapter 51 argued that these are the result of semantic retention, reflecting the 
volitional semantics of the lexical source expression from which will the grammatical 
marker has developed. 
Shall has developed from a lexical source expressing obligation. This has given rise 
to procedural information specifying that a SR within the scope of shall is to be 
interpreted as an agent-event (that is, an event brought about by motivated human 
activity) rather than a world-event (that is, an event brought about independently of 
motivated human activity). As a result, dynamic and deontic modality can be inferred 
from the use of shall, since these involve factors intrinsically linked with motivated 
human activity: permission and obligation in the case of deontic modality, volition 
and ability in the case of dynamic modality. Epistemic modality can not be inferred 
from the use of shall, since this is "an unverified correspondence between a 
SITUATION REPRESENTATION and either an obtaining or [ ... ] a previous WORLD 
SITUATION or a future WORLD-EVENT. " (Klinge 1993: 346) In contrast, will can 
express all three modalities, since it is unspecified with respect to the agent-event 
versus world-event distinction. 
The agent-event/world event distinction is only operative in English with futurate 
situations and events (thus it only affects the interpretation of clauses with 
imperfective or unmarked aspect where these have future time reference - see §3.3.3). 
As a result, the agent-event procedural semantics of shall subsumes future time 
reference. A process of semantic generalisation has begun in shall, with the result that 
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shall can express simple futurity with first person subjects. However, this 
generalisation has not extended to non-first person subjects; this arrested development 
coincides with a decrease in the frequency of shall and a corresponding increase in 
the frequency of will and, in particular, be going to. 
With respect to the be going to construction, I demonstrated that, although it belongs 
to a different syntactic class from the modal auxiliaries, be going to can also be 
characterised as an operator, although with narrower scope than the modal auxiliaries. 
In a construction of the form OPERATOR [2 BE GOING TO [1 ... ]], be going to encodes 
procedural information to locate SRI at a time subsequent to that of SR2 (SRI > SR2). 
This procedural characterisation reflects the following facts: First, that be going to 
exhibits many of the features of grammatical markers: semantic bleaching, phonetic 
reduction (in the gonna allomorph) and syntactic rigidity (see §6.3.1). Secondly, that 
the lexical source construction of be going to - consisting of a movement verb with 
imperfective aspect and an allative component - is a typical source construction for 
future grams (Bybee et al 1994: 11). Third, that positing a temporal relation of the 
form SRI > SR2 accounted for the unacceptability of (6.28) in contrast to the 
acceptable (6.31): 
(6.28) * They are going to have arrived two hours ago. 
(6.31) They will have arrived two hours ago. 
Be going to also exhibits semantic retention; the conceptual semantics of be going to 
was paraphrased in §6.4.4 as: 
A SR, SR2, containing both a form of be going to and an embedded SR, 
SRI, (i. e. OPERATOR [2 BE GOING TO [1 ... ]]) 
is a representation of a state 
having the potential for the subsequent realisation of SRI. 
This conceptual semantic content a) is compatible with the lexical source construction 
of be going to, b) is characterised as a state - reflecting the co-occurrence of be going 
to with already (§6.3.2), and c) gives rise to the overtones of prior intention and 
inevitability. These overtones are explicatures (since they arise with utterances 
containing be going to but not with utterances containing will) and are not 
cancellable: 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.57) ? I'm going to visit him but I wasn't intending to. 
(6.58) Don't go near that parcel! It's going to explode!. 
? But if you keep well clear it won't explode. 
221 
The overtones of intention subsequent to a request and contingency, associated with 
will, and the overtone of imminence, often associated with be going to, on the other 
hand, are implicatures, being always cancellable: 
Can somebody visit John tomorrow? 
(6.66) I'll visit him, in fact I was already intending to. 
(6.67) b. It will explode whether anyone goes near it or not. 
(6.56) What are you going to play us? 
(6.65) Some Chopin, but first I'd like to say a few words... 
To summarise, I demonstrated that will, shall and be going to encode procedural 
information allowing these expressions to contribute to (without fully determining) 
propositions expressed by utterances in which they occur, by constraining the 
inferential interpretation of SRs within their scope. However, purely procedural 
characterisations of will and be going to fail to provide comprehensive accounts of 
their distribution and interpretation, and I demonstrated that these expressions also 
encode conceptual information (no longer encoded by the older shall). 
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7 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The aims of the thesis, as stated in the introduction, were to explore the distinction 
between conceptual and procedural encoding, and in particular to determine and 
characterise exponents of procedural encoding constraining the manipulation of sub- 
propositional conceptual representations. The first two chapters described the 
theoretical basis of the distinction in terms of a three-phase, relevance theoretic model 
of utterance interpretation, and reviewed some of the literature concerning it. Then, in 
chapters 3 and 4,1 demonstrated how the distinction could be extended to provide a 
procedural account of pronouns, and tense, aspect and modality markers. Finally, in 
chapters 5 and 6, I discussed the relationship between the conceptual/procedural 
distinction in semantics and grammaticization in tense, aspect and modality markers, 
and demonstrated how a comprehensive account of future expressions in English 
must make reference to both conceptual and procedural encoding. I shall discuss my 
conclusions in greater detail below. 
71 The theoretical basis 
The cognitive basis for a distinction between conceptual and procedural information 
lies in the principle of relevance. The need to achieve adequate contextual effects 
requires that utterances contain or make reference to information capable of being 
developed into fully propositional conceptual representations, which can be combined 
with assumptions in the utterance interpretation context to yield contextual effects; 
this is conceptual information. Balancing this need to achieve adequate effects is the 
requirement to do so as efficiently as possible; procedural information reduces 
processing effort by constraining the utterance interpretation process, thereby 
increasing cognitive efficiency and contributing to relevance. Since humans are 
rational information processors who both produce and receive linguistically encoded 
information, it is to be expected that linguistic systems will encode not only 
conceptual information, but procedural information also. 
According to relevance theory, inferential communication takes precedence over 
decoding which, being fast, automatic and informationally encapsulated, incurs less 
processing effort than inference, which involves central cognitive processes. 
Accordingly, procedural encoding constrains inferential processing. In chapter 1I 
introduced a three-phase model of utterance interpretation, consisting of a modular 
decoding phase and two inferential phases. During phase three of utterance 
interpretation, fully propositional conceptual representations are manipulated with 
respect to an utterance interpretation context (i. e. new information is contextualised in 
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old information) resulting in contextual effects. Blakemore (1987,1988a) proposed 
that this process of contextualisation is constrained by discourse connectives such as 
so and after all which reduce the hypothesis space to be searched and thereby reduce 
processing effort. In chapter 21 developed this theme, and discussed discourse 
connectives and syntactic constructions which constrain the computation of 
implicatures, and the Kiswahili interrogative marker, JE, which constrains the 
computation of higher-level explicatures. Although these are clear cases of procedural 
encoding, I mentioned the claim made in Groefsema (1992) that a single expression 
might in theory encode both conceptual and procedural information. Also discussed, 
was the possibility of procedural encoding functioning at phase two of utterance 
interpretation, constraining the inferential processes involved in the construction of 
fully propositional conceptual representations; this extension of the distinction was 
explored in following chapters. 
7.2 Procedural encoding at phase two 
In chapter 3I developed Wilson & Sperber's (1993) proposal that pronouns encode 
procedural information constraining the identification of propositions. I maintained 
the view of inference as the manipulation of conceptual representations by proposing 
that pronouns constrain the manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual 
representations of entities, projected by the logical entries of predicates. I further 
proposed that pronouns constrain reference assignment on the basis of Ariel's 
Accessibility Hierarchy and on the basis of other information such as number, gender, 
case, or noun class. I demonstrated that, while English personal pronouns and 
Kiswahili Object Markers differed significantly in terms of their syntactic, semantic 
and discourse functions, they could all be characterised as exponents of procedural 
encoding at phase two. 
I then discussed the role of procedural encoding in the determination of temporal 
reference, aspectual status, and modality, all of which can be inferentially determined 
and contribute to the construction of propositional conceptual representations. I 
demonstrated that markers of tense and aspect cannot be characterised in directly 
truth-conditional terms since, while they contribute to propositions, they do not fully 
determine them - as inference is still integral to the determination of temporal and 
aspectual information (in the absence of explicit temporal and aspectual adverbials), 
even when markers of tense and aspect are present. I proposed a characterisation of 
tense and aspect markers as `operators', that is, exponents of procedural encoding 
which constrain the inferential manipulation of sub-propositional conceptual 
representations of situations and events ('situation representations' or SRs for shoe). 
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Chapter 4 consisted of a more detailed analysis of the English modal auxiliaries can, 
may, must and should in procedural terms (based largely on Groefsema 1995a). 
Although this purely procedural analysis accounted for their distributions and 
interpretations more successfully than the alternatives, it failed to account for certain 
features of the semantics of should and must in particular, and did not deal with 
variations in usage. Variation is a feature of linguistic change, so in the following 
chapter I turned my attention to grammaticization. 
.2A diachronic perspective 
The final two chapters introduced a diachronic and variationist perspective into 
relevance theory, through relating conceptual and procedural encoding to 
grammaticization and the analysis of English future expressions, taking account of 
variation and historical factors. 
In chapter 51 explored the relation between conceptual/procedural distinction at 
phase two and grammaticization, with respect to the development of tense, aspect and 
modality markers. I discussed three facets of grammaticization from a relevance 
theoretic perspective: the question of whether grammaticization is semantically, 
gradual or instantaneous, the causes of grammaticization, and the phenomenon of 
semantic retention (where semantic overtones of the lexical source construction of a 
grammatical marker are recoverable in certain contexts). I first showed how the 
model of the conceptual/procedural distinction developed in the thesis, which views it 
as a dichotomy excluding any intermediate information type(s), was compatible with 
Givön's (1991) findings that the onset of grammaticization is semantically 
instantaneous and does not involve any intermediate stage between lexical and 
(functionally) grammatical expression. I then discussed the mechanisms of semantic 
change involved in the onset of grammaticization, and concluded that the 
conventionalisation of implicature (an inferential process) was arguably the only sure 
semantic mechanism involved in the development of lexical expressions into 
grammatical markers. This was to be expected, given that grammatical markers had 
been characterised as exponents of procedural information, the purpose of which is to 
constrain the inferential processes of utterance interpretation. Finally, I discussed 
semantic retention, and showed how a monosemous account of a grammatical marker 
exhibiting semantic retention was possible if the gram were characterised as an 
exponent of both conceptual and procedural encoding (as proposed earlier). The 
conditions under which will exhibits semantic retention were accounted for by 
reference to the principle of relevance. 
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I concluded by providing an account of the semantics of will, shall and be going to, 
based on the conceptual/procedural distinction and taking account of the historical 
development of these expressions and their current variation in usage. I demonstrated 
that while they are all operators, will and be going to also exhibit semantic retention 
and can therefore only be accurately characterised if conceptual encoding in these 
forms is taken into account. 
Z4 Prospects 
In the postface to the second edition of Relevance Sperber & Wilson write: 
"It may turn out that the conceptual/procedural distinction will shed 
more light on linguistic semantics than the traditional distinction 
between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning. " 
(S&W 1995: 259) 
I hope that in this thesis I have shed some light on the conceptual/procedural 
distinction, and that a sense of its potential importance has been conveyed. At phase 
three of utterance interpretation, procedural encoding can be found not only in 
discourse connectives, but in syntax (where much work remains to be done relating 
procedural encoding and the various manifestations of information packaging) and in 
the interpretive use of language for the expression of higher-level explicatures. By 
extending the distinction to incorporate inferential processing at phase two, it may 
shed light on a whole range of phenomena. The notion of procedural encoding has 
implications not only for pronouns but also for the study of reference assignment and 
anaphora resolution in general. In the study of tense, aspect and modality also, 
procedural analyses promise exciting alternatives to directly truth-conditional 
accounts. 
Much work remains to be done, but I hope that in the three-phase model of utterance 
interpretation and in the characterisation of procedural information in terms of 
constraints on the manipulation of sub-propositional and propositional conceptual 
representations, I have provided useful tools for this task. 
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